Today the Algerian government arrested Ali Belhaj,leader of the banned Front of Islamic Salvation, for a sermon he gave. But Internet anti-dictatorship activists in Algeria had already dubbed tomorrow their January 25th. The removal of Mubarak less than 24 hours before the dawn of the planned Algerian protest may have given a great boost to the Algerian revolutionaries. We'll see if Algeria proves to be ripe for the next phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution. We have learned from Egypt and Tunisia that Facebook communication works only if there are people on the ground with adequate organization ready to take action and build momentum. The April 6 movement in Egypt began in 2008. They called for an April 2009 strike, but then the response was limited. With the success of the Tunisian revolution in forcing Ben Ali out, many Egyptians began thinking they could the same to their dictator if they shed away fear and believe in themselves. Young opposition leaders siezed the moment. They heeded the Arab saying "hit the iron rod when it's hot."
Algeria may prove to be a tougher case. Although there have been protests since January 14, the country has a multi-party system that includes the MB and other Islamists. But the state is military-controlled like Egypt. Algerians have an elected president but they know that when push comes to shove, he does not call the shots. Even in normal times he does not make the most important decisions in the country. With Egyptians now openly calling for a political system controlled by civilians, Algerians might be thinking that they too deserve what Egyptians hope for. Algerian society is not as homogeneous as its Egyptian or Tunisian counterpart. But this may not hinder a mass uprising. The major division in the country produced the Berber-Arab tension, but this is mitigated by the fact that nearly all Algerians are Sunni. Berbers are now leading the charge for change. With Sunni Arabs joining, the country might have a chance in producing the first multicultural civilian state in North Africa.
The current pro-democracy revolt in the Arab world is spearheaded by a generation that grew up under repression but with full awareness of the language of freedom and rights. Egypt and Tunisia tell that declining economic conditions mix with high education levels to produce a good recipe for revolt. Educated people know how to link their living to the upper structures of power in their state.
But Arab countries vary. A Syrian friend of mine tells me that Friday, February 4, 2011, failed to be the Syrian Day of Rage because the regime carried out a psychological terror blitzkrieg. People woke up in Damascus to find the pictures of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad hung at every corner, letting anyone thinking of responding to the cyber activists know that the security forces are there in their neighborhood. The fear tactic worked. But for the long run the regime may have aided in its own demise. Most Syrians never heard of the Internet call to demonstration. But now Asad is telling them that all of them are suspect and they must fear reprisals if they respond to anti-regime instigators. This may force passive Syrians to begin thinking seriously about the possibility that fear is holding them from marching into the path of freedom. Facing one's fear is the first step; the Asad regime has forced it on people. The Syrian regime may have won a battle, but the revolt for freedom is a long term process.
But there is another important obstacle in Syria. The largest opposition group, the MB, had been banned since 1982 and membership in the group is punishable by death after a band of their militants embarked on a campaign of sectarian violence against Alawite security targets. The insurrection was put down violently: the old city of Hama was leveled by air strikes, killing more than 20,000 people and leaving 100,000 refugees. But the regime has grown increasingly dependent on the Alawite minority as a social support base for the regime. A pro-democracy opposition have better a chance of success if it deals with the fears of Alawites under a political system of people power should be the first order of business.
In Bahrain a Sunni family rules a country that has a majority Shia population. The rulers have allowed a measure of representation but has relinquished no power whatsover. In other countries there are grassroots demands for power sharing but ruling families engage in various forms of posturing about political reform without offering any tangible concessions. These are: Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Libya (which began as a military regime before turning into a family rule). The level of political participation varies widely in these countries; Kuwait has a strong parliament and the opposition has a majority, but every resource and instrument of power (oil revenues, military and security forces and burearucracy) is in the hands of Sabah family.
There are other forms of power structures in the Arab world: Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania are military regimes that have allowed extensive measures of freedom but where power rests with those who the group that has the most guns. In the United Arab Emirates and Qatar there are no visible movements from top or bottom for power sharing. But this might change soon, given the spread of the Arab Anti-dictatorship Revolution.
Lebanon and Palestine are exceptional cases. The former is a confessional democracy that witnessed the rise of Hizbullah's military wing under two decades of Israeli occupation. The latter has distorted power structures because of the Israeli occupation. The state has to be free before a clear picture of power emerges. At the society level Palestine and Lebanon offer the most extensive and developed expression of political diversity.
Despite the variety of forms of government, the question at hand has to do with the nature of state political power. So far Lebanon may not even last as a state and Palestine is being dismembered under the cover of a peace process. In the rest of the Arab countries all powers ultimately tend to rest with the person on the top of the politcal pyramid. Tunisia and Egypt have toppled their dictators. The order of business for them now is to move to recognizing the people as collectivity as the sovereign. In Egypt, the transitional military regime that took power after Mubarak departed has acknowledged that it is not a replacement of the "legitimacy that people accept." What this means will soon appear in the actions of the military leaders. The revolution here is entering a new phase.
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