Tunisia:
The military turned against the autocratic, corrupt president under pressure from the public. The first interim government was also forced out under pressure from demonstraters. Now it seems "the regime" is much bigger than Ben Ali. An old figure who had served as First Minister under the mentor of Ben Ali was called for service. The agency of political police is dissolved The main task is to set up a constitutional convention.
Egypt:
Mubarak is out; so are the VP and the last government he appointed. The new prime minister was a non-corrupt old minister who participated in Tahrir Square demonstrations. The State Security Investigation Agency has been replaced by the National Security Agency. Both chambers of parliament have been dismissed. The old constitution is being amended.
Libya:
The peaceful demonstrations that began on February 17 in Benghazi turned into an armed rebellion as Qaddafi pulled out his militias from towns in the East. The rebels formed the Libyan National Provisional Council, headed by the former Minister of Justice. Qaddafi and his senior military officer called their opponents "rats," the term Italian colonial leaders used to describe Libyan resistance leaders. The Qaddafi regime is using military assets, including top of the line planes, tanks and military vehicles, against the poorly armed rebels. Al-Zawiyah, the nearest town to the capital, came under heavy fire. In Tripoli and other places heavy guns were used against any opposition gatherings. The international community turned against the regime; so did a good chunck of Libya's diplomats who cannot be controlled by Qaddafi. Now Western power along with the Arab League and some Arab governments will participate in enforcing a No-Fly Zone in Libya and will attack Qaddafi assets.
Yeman:
Demonstrations are gainining momentum, while the Saleh regime is losing ground. Many of his allies, including tribal leaders, ministers, party leaders, and even state security and military leaders have defected to the opposition. The regime is now using lethal force against demonstrators in Change Square outside Sanaa University. But the violent treatment of protesters is reported everywhere. North and South Yemen may emerge truly unified after this because now both sides share one experience: removing the corrupt Saleh regime.
Bahrain:
In anticipation of a move by the restless opposition the king offered each Bahraini family $2,600, a move that backfired. The ruling family was caught by surprise with the breadth of the opposition. The opposition calls for reforming the regime and seek a constitutional monarchy. There has been a test of wills. The ruling family, which is Sunni, accuses the opposition, which, like the population, is largely Shia, of being sectarian. But the ruling family has mobilized its supporters, who are largely Sunni, to also take to the streets in support of the king. The hypocricy was not well received and demonstrators continued to come. The ruling family has called for help from its allies in the Gulf. Pinensula Shield Forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE were deployed to protect the regime. The dialogue has not even begun.
Iraq:
Anti-government demonstrators are taking to the streets in large numbers in all governorates, except two Kurdish regions. People criticize the government for failing to provide services and jobs. People charge the government with corruption and ask "where is the oil money?" In certain instances security forces used live bullets to hold off protesters. Iraq has a freely elected government, but al-Maliki managed to break away from his Da'wa Party to form a new political block that won a substantial number of seats in the parliament. Many people charge him with diverting state funds to buy off political support.
Jordan:
Demonstrations that used to call for limited sociopolitical changes in government policy before January 14, 2011, the day of Ben Ali's departure, are now calling for reforming the regime. King Abdullah II met with opposition leaders for the first time since he came to power. He also dismissed the government and appointed a new one to conduct dialogue with the opposition. Opposition leaders refuse to participate, demanding to talk to the king or his personal appointee.
Morocco:
Following demonstrations in Rabat, King Muhammad VI announced sweeping changes in the political system to take place in three months.
Algeria:
State of Emergency has been lifted by the parliament. The ruling coalition is breaking apart, with the HIMS, the Algerian Muslim Brotherhood branch, calling the regime corrupt and demanding sweeping changes in the political system.
Oman:
Demonstrations broke out in Suhar region. Sultan Qabus responded by offering unemployment money, salary increases, 50,000 new jobs, and the establishment of a committee to study increasing the political powers of the Shura Council.
Saudi Arabia:
After severe rains that flooded the streets of Jeddah, demonstrators took to the street calling for better government services. Eastern Region's demonstrations have been suppressed by the police (the region is heavily populated by Shia Muslims). The Council of Senior Scholars issued a fatwa prohibiting demonstrations. King Abdullah has just given a speech on Friday March 18, 2011, offering the equivalent of a two-month salary payment to government employees and a two-month stipend for public university students. He also ordered $532 for every unemployed person and the establishment of a council to combat corruption. He praised the pro-government religious scholars and the security forces.
United Arab Emirates:
On March 9, 2011, a petition was signed by 133 Emirati nationals including academics, journalists and rights activists calling for direct elections. The UAE, which consists of seven emirates including Abu Dhabi and Dubai, had indirect elections in 2006 for the first time.The petition said that "changes in the region" inspired them to call for widening the margin of freedoms.
Palestinian Territories:
Immediately following the departure of Mubarak, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah pushed for a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement policy. Although the resolution used language that the Obama Administration had supported previously, the American representative was instructed to veto the resolution. On March 14, Palestinian youths held demonstrations in Ramallah and on March 15 various factions in Gaza held demonstrations calling for ending the split between Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said he would be willing to go to Gaza to end the split, form a national unity interim government to prepare for elections.
Syria:
Facebook activism is growing but so is government monitoring of it. In one incident of a call to Day of Rage, the regime blanketed street corners in Damascus with the pictures of Bashar and Hafiz al-Assad. Some people are writing calls for change on walls. Regime operatives immediately white-wash them. Small demonstrations have taken place in Damascus; one in front of the Interior Ministry called for the release of three protesters arrested the previous day at Hamidiyah Market demonstration. Walid al-Muallim, Foreign Minister, said reform is coming from within the regime this year. But no other initiative was announced; nor did the regime try to reach out to opposition groups. Today, Friday March 18, 2011, witnessed the largest demonstrations ever. Thousands of people streamed out of mosques in different parts of the country, including Damascus, Hims, Banyas, and Dir'a. Al-Jazeera showed footage taken by protesters; participants called for political reform. At the historic Umayyad mosque security forces in plain clothes flooded the mosque in anticipation of the demonstrations (they learned about it from facebook). After the prayers, they closed the mosque to prevent demonstrators from taking to the streets. Two demonstrators were reportedly arrested.
Lebanon:
A new youth coalion of a few thousand members has taken to the street to demand an end to sectarian politics.
Friday, March 18, 2011
Thursday, March 17, 2011
"We are Citizens not Subjects"
Syrians seem to be having a difficult time coming up with their own version of the Arab Spring of 2011. The regime has well-staffed security agencies and a sectarian social support base that will support the regime to the end. The country had a history of political violence and extreme suppression. But it has been nearly 30 years since a band of radical Muslim Brother rose up in arms against the regime, which responded by bombing old Hamah in 1982, killing thousands and sending many more to flee their country. Most Syrians today and younger than 30; that episode does not define their worldviews. Plus, the regime was repressive before and after that event.
Young Syrians and meeting on Facebook. Many announced February 5, 2011 as their Day of Rage . Witnesses say security forces blanketed the streets of Damascus with pictures of Bashar and Hafiz al-Assad. The scare tactic worked and massive demonstrations were aborted. In remote areas like Dir'a near the border with Jordan, people wrote on walls in the cover the of the dark the familiar chant of the Arab People Power Revolution of 2011, "the people want to depose the regime!" So there is evidence of restlessness.
In one random incident circulating among people throughout the region, a pedestrian challenged verbal abuse from a traffic police officer who call the man an "ass." The man suprised him by coming back to him demanding an apology for mistreating a citizen. In a matter of minutes, the confrontation turned into a demonstration of a few thousand civilians coming to the aid of the man facing off a score of security officers. A large force from the Interior Ministry dispersed the crowd but the Interior Minister apologized publicly for the incident--perhaps a first in modern Syrian history. The story cannot be confirmed but it underscores the growing feeling of empowerment and appreciation to the rights of citizenship among Arabs.
In the last few days, al-Jazeera reported (with some amature footage) that tens of young, upper middle class youths from different sects and genders took to the street in the famous Hamidiyah Market. Two men and one woman were arrested. The following day their relatives and friends went to the Interior Ministry to demand a meeting with the minister and to inquire about the whereabouts of the arrested demonstrators. Their gathering turned into a demonstration in front of the ministry building. They were told that a meeting with the minister requires an application process that takes time. But what they gained is to train the regime and its functionaries that people are taking to the streets peacefully and are willing to meet and talk.
Walid Al-Muallim, the Foreign Minister of Syria, said that change is coming this year. Suhair al-Atasi, a Syrian human rights advocate, said all these incidents are spontaneous, stemming from the growing sentiment among people that they want to be treated as citizens, not subjects. This is another indication of the cultural transformation in the Arab world. Change is coming to Syria. Let's hope it will be as peaceful as it has been thus far in Tunisia and Egypt.
Tomorrow, March 18, 2011, has been dubbed by Syrian new media activists as the Friday of Dignity. It is fair to predict that more people will come out asking politely and firmly for rights they know belong to them but which they have been denied for so long.
Young Syrians and meeting on Facebook. Many announced February 5, 2011 as their Day of Rage . Witnesses say security forces blanketed the streets of Damascus with pictures of Bashar and Hafiz al-Assad. The scare tactic worked and massive demonstrations were aborted. In remote areas like Dir'a near the border with Jordan, people wrote on walls in the cover the of the dark the familiar chant of the Arab People Power Revolution of 2011, "the people want to depose the regime!" So there is evidence of restlessness.
In one random incident circulating among people throughout the region, a pedestrian challenged verbal abuse from a traffic police officer who call the man an "ass." The man suprised him by coming back to him demanding an apology for mistreating a citizen. In a matter of minutes, the confrontation turned into a demonstration of a few thousand civilians coming to the aid of the man facing off a score of security officers. A large force from the Interior Ministry dispersed the crowd but the Interior Minister apologized publicly for the incident--perhaps a first in modern Syrian history. The story cannot be confirmed but it underscores the growing feeling of empowerment and appreciation to the rights of citizenship among Arabs.
In the last few days, al-Jazeera reported (with some amature footage) that tens of young, upper middle class youths from different sects and genders took to the street in the famous Hamidiyah Market. Two men and one woman were arrested. The following day their relatives and friends went to the Interior Ministry to demand a meeting with the minister and to inquire about the whereabouts of the arrested demonstrators. Their gathering turned into a demonstration in front of the ministry building. They were told that a meeting with the minister requires an application process that takes time. But what they gained is to train the regime and its functionaries that people are taking to the streets peacefully and are willing to meet and talk.
Walid Al-Muallim, the Foreign Minister of Syria, said that change is coming this year. Suhair al-Atasi, a Syrian human rights advocate, said all these incidents are spontaneous, stemming from the growing sentiment among people that they want to be treated as citizens, not subjects. This is another indication of the cultural transformation in the Arab world. Change is coming to Syria. Let's hope it will be as peaceful as it has been thus far in Tunisia and Egypt.
Tomorrow, March 18, 2011, has been dubbed by Syrian new media activists as the Friday of Dignity. It is fair to predict that more people will come out asking politely and firmly for rights they know belong to them but which they have been denied for so long.
Thursday, March 10, 2011
U.S. Congress Hearing Turns into Islamophbia Fest
I watched today’s Peter King hearing on “the extent of radicalization in the American Muslim community” held by the House Committee on Homeland Security which he chairs. The congressman deserves some credit: he did not call only his allies and there were two stories of radicalization told by two witnesses. Congressman King even allowed two democratic colleagues to testify on the damaging effects of the hearing. Keith Ellison wept as he recalled the story of a Muslim 9/11 myrter: First Responder Muhammad Hamdani who gave his life to save innocent people, only to be later suspected of terrorism because of his Muslim faith.
Two witnesses, a Somali American relative to two young men who went to Somalia to fight for the extremist groups Al-Shabab and an African American father to a young Muslim convert who also went overseas for radical Muslim causes, talked very briefly about their encounter with radicalization. Shockingly, there were only a couple of probing questions by members of the committee about the details of the stories or the Muslim leaders and organizations involved or became aware of the incidents. And I did not get the feeling that members of the committee were interested in exploring what the two incidents meant for measuring the extent of radicalism among American Muslims or what the information means for government counterterrorism policy—which is the declared objective of the hearing.
Several members used the incidents as a proof, a smoking gun, that justified throwing in the names of objectionable Muslim groups (e.g., CAIR, Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas) even though they were not involved in the incidents and whose mention was connected to learning from the serious radicalization stories that the committee just learned. Thus we had a vivid demonstration of how the politics of Islamophobia mix: It is about projecting fear-provoking Muslim things together for an audience that is supposed to only make a decision where their emotions and loyalties are—regardless of the facts.
Los Angeles County Sherrif Leroy Baca testified that he was pleased with his relationship with the Muslim community. When in a response to a question he affirmed that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)-LA cooperates with his department on counter-terrorism, a republican member of Congress turned against Baca in an attempt to bring him back in line with the anti-CAIR message that King opened with. CAIR-National had been publicizing a statement he allegedly made about the presence of too many mosques in America.
We also learned in this hearing about the extent of the strict secularism of Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, a Muslim physician with ideas about contemporary Muslim political thought. He was given much of the witness speaking time. We learned about the actors in Muslim world politics (even beyond America) that he dislikes. He definitely opposes the Muslim Brothers, including those who are willing to play by democratic rules. But Obama does not object to their participation in government and Bush had successfully courted them in Iraq in the effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In Tunisia their Ennahda party has been legalized. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is establishing a new political party calling for a civil state and accepting members regardless of faith.
But a discussion of this nature does not fit in the work of a committee that is paid by taxpayers to watch government performance in homeland security. This is not to say that such discussion should not to be had in the halls of Congress. I set up educational panels in congressional meeting rooms on American Muslims; the functions were open to members of Congress and their staff. But these events were not part of a government sponsored investigation.
The politics of Islamophobia and resistance to it were balanced in quantity and passion. Some members of the committee dropped in talking points about Sharia creep in the United States, a popular talking point on Fox News, while others complained that despite the religious affiliation of the KKK and its terrorism in America over a century, Congress never held a hearing on their ideology. But the real loser of today's hearing is the tax payer whose government did not gain any new ground in combatting terrorism.
Two witnesses, a Somali American relative to two young men who went to Somalia to fight for the extremist groups Al-Shabab and an African American father to a young Muslim convert who also went overseas for radical Muslim causes, talked very briefly about their encounter with radicalization. Shockingly, there were only a couple of probing questions by members of the committee about the details of the stories or the Muslim leaders and organizations involved or became aware of the incidents. And I did not get the feeling that members of the committee were interested in exploring what the two incidents meant for measuring the extent of radicalism among American Muslims or what the information means for government counterterrorism policy—which is the declared objective of the hearing.
Several members used the incidents as a proof, a smoking gun, that justified throwing in the names of objectionable Muslim groups (e.g., CAIR, Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas) even though they were not involved in the incidents and whose mention was connected to learning from the serious radicalization stories that the committee just learned. Thus we had a vivid demonstration of how the politics of Islamophobia mix: It is about projecting fear-provoking Muslim things together for an audience that is supposed to only make a decision where their emotions and loyalties are—regardless of the facts.
Los Angeles County Sherrif Leroy Baca testified that he was pleased with his relationship with the Muslim community. When in a response to a question he affirmed that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)-LA cooperates with his department on counter-terrorism, a republican member of Congress turned against Baca in an attempt to bring him back in line with the anti-CAIR message that King opened with. CAIR-National had been publicizing a statement he allegedly made about the presence of too many mosques in America.
We also learned in this hearing about the extent of the strict secularism of Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, a Muslim physician with ideas about contemporary Muslim political thought. He was given much of the witness speaking time. We learned about the actors in Muslim world politics (even beyond America) that he dislikes. He definitely opposes the Muslim Brothers, including those who are willing to play by democratic rules. But Obama does not object to their participation in government and Bush had successfully courted them in Iraq in the effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In Tunisia their Ennahda party has been legalized. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is establishing a new political party calling for a civil state and accepting members regardless of faith.
But a discussion of this nature does not fit in the work of a committee that is paid by taxpayers to watch government performance in homeland security. This is not to say that such discussion should not to be had in the halls of Congress. I set up educational panels in congressional meeting rooms on American Muslims; the functions were open to members of Congress and their staff. But these events were not part of a government sponsored investigation.
The politics of Islamophobia and resistance to it were balanced in quantity and passion. Some members of the committee dropped in talking points about Sharia creep in the United States, a popular talking point on Fox News, while others complained that despite the religious affiliation of the KKK and its terrorism in America over a century, Congress never held a hearing on their ideology. But the real loser of today's hearing is the tax payer whose government did not gain any new ground in combatting terrorism.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Qaddafis Pursuing their Narrative
Qaddafi is now giving a talk during his 34th annual celebration of people power rule. He said what his son Saif al-Islam had warned against has come true. His son had said that foreign companies would leave, Libya would divide, and a civil war would engulf Libya. Qaddafi said the outside world is misinformed about what is going on in his country and have fallen victim to international media outlets that hated Qaddafi and powers that have their eyes on Libyan oil.
He said that pursuing his concept of people rule the state's security brigades have been training people in different parts of Libya on the use of arms to help them defend themselves in case of a foreign invasion. What happened after the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt was that some former Guantanamo detainees and supporters in towns in the East ganged up and attacked security installations and stole weapons. The Qaddafi regime ordered his local security forces to pull out rather than spill Libyan blood. But in the initial confrontation tens of people were killed from both sides. The residents seen demonstrating in streets were relatives of those killed from both sides protesting this resort to violence.
Qaddafi denied that there is massive rejection of his rule and blamed the armed rebels for terrorizing the civilians in the towns that fell to rebel hands. Again, he stressed that his forces do not wish to fight and have not begun to push back. But now that the rebels are spreading chaos in the country, he will have to fight back. He said that his fight will be legitimate since he will be fighting against the possibility of establishing a terrorist al-Qaida rule in Libya.
Why would a regime in power just choose to surrender to small bands of rebels in each town? Al-Qaddafi's explanation is that these rebels are people too and that he empowered them because his revolution was meant to bring power to the people. But now terrorists have exploited this state of affair.
The opposition says that the revolt began with civilians taking to the streets to demonstrate peacefully. They were met with the violence of members of the security brigades (or those among them who were loyal to Qaddafi's rule). People then went against the security installations and overpowered the remnants of the Qaddafi regime in their towns.
It would be interesting to see if the opposition now restores the civilian image of the revolution by calling for a massive show of civilian will in all the towns liberated from the regime of the Qaddafi family. Otherwise, there will be room for cynicism about the nature of what is going on in Libya. Is it a rebellion by tribesmen who think they haven't had equal share of the oil wealth? Were the confrontations around the security installations staged by the secret agents of Qaddafi himself to create the ongoing dynamic as a way to head off a massive peaceful call for change? Or may be we are witnessing a unique case of regime change in Libya, where tribal forces and modern societal formations have not been able to mesh cohesively yet to demonstrate to the world how trivial their dictator is.
The Qaddafis want the world to think that the Libya is now in the middle of a civil war and they have the right to defend themselves and restore order. But the Qaddafis seem increasingly isolated and dellusional. The Colonel denies that he is in charge, but only his son is coming forward to vouch for the regime. The Qaddafis may still have supporters and assets. Their relatives alone can put up some fight, but those in the outer circles of support will increasingly reach a conclusion that the days of the regime are numbered and they better switch sides before it is too late. These elements will be more convinced if they see the outpouring civilian support for a peaceful change. Will the opposition be able to prove that Qaddafi is isolated by the people of Libya? In the next few days, this is going to be main task of the revolution. But again, this revolt does not seem to be as organized as its Tunisian or Egyptian counterpart.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
هل تنجز الثورة المصرية ديمقراطية حقيقية على أساس مفهوم"القوة للشعب"؟
الدولة المعاصرة هي بناء هيكلي لممارسة القوة السياسية (أو السلطة) في أي بلد من البلدان. إن ثورة 25 يناير المصرية حث تاريخي فريد في ممارسة السلطة الشعبية عن طريق الخروج الجماهيري الهائل للتعبير عن الإرادة الجمعية للامة. فهذا يحدث لأول مرة ليس فقط في تاريخ المسلمين السنة (الذين لم يثوروا أبدا كمجموعة سكانية متعددة الأطياف ضد حكامهم) ، ولكن أيضا في تاريخ البشرية. وسوف تعد انتكاسة للحضارة الإنسانية إذا فشل المصريون ف مأسسة هذا الإنجاز الذي قد ينتج أول ديمقراطية شعبية حقيقية في التاريخ.
إن ما تحقق لغاية الآن هو إزاحة مبارك ، النقطة العليا في هرم القوة لدولة 1952، ولكن نظامه لا يزال يحكم. عندما هتف المتظاهرون "الجيش والشعب يد واحدة" فكان هذا يعني الافتراض بأن تذوب جميع مكونات الدولة والمجتمع في بوتقة الثورة لإنشاء نظام جديد. وعلاوة على ذلك ، فإن دور المؤسسة العسكرية هو أن تكون الضامن النهائي لأمن الناس، و خصوصا عندما تحولت قوات الأمن المركزي والشرطة للعمل ضد الشعب وتخلت عن واجب الحفاظ على السلام الاجتماعي. ولكن هذه هي قراءة المصريين المدنيين لدور الجيش، وقد لا يكون الجنرالات مقتنعين بهذه القراءة للأحداث.
إذا كان الجنرالات صادقين في تصريحاتهم بالسماح بالتحول السياسي لسلطة مدنية فإنهم بحاجة لإظهار أنهم مرتاحون لفكرة "القوة للشعب" كأهم إنجازللثورة التي قلبت هرم القوة في الدولة لصالح الشعب. لكن الشعب المصري ليس دمويا ويريد أن يعطي الفرصة لكل من لم يمارسوا الاستبداد والفساد لكي يصلحوا أنفسهم ويعترفوا ويتأقلموا مع الواقع الجديد. فإما أن يصبح هذا المفهوم هو الإطار لإعادة تشكيل الدولة المصرية الجديدة وإلا فإنه قد يتم القضاء على المنجز الأساسي للثورة. لقد قام الجنرالات بتحقيق بعض من مطالب الثورة ولكنهم لم يقوموا حتى بالافراج عن السجناء السياسيين أو رفع حالة الطوارئ. بل لا يزال فلول نظام مبارك يتصرفون كما لو ان كل ما أراده الشعب قد تحقق بتنحي مبارك. إن الجنرالات لم يعربوا عن إقرارهم أو احترامهم للتغيير الجذري في الثقافة الساسية المصرية التي أصبحت تري أن موازين القوى الداخلية يجب أن تعود لوضعها الطبييعي، أي ليد المدنيين. ولن يكون دور الجيش مبررا قبل أن يقر الجنرالات أنه لن يكون بمقدورهم من الآن فصاعدا السيطرة على الحياة المدنية. إن مواجهة هذه المعضلة هي المرحلة الحالية التي تمر بها ثورة 25 يناير المصرية.
لقد سحقت الثورة المصرية الممارسات القديمة للعبة القوة السياسية ولكن تحقق هذا من حيث المبدأ فقط، و يرى الثوار أن عليهم الآن أن يحولوا هذا المكتسب إلى واقع على الأرض بسرعة وإلا فسوف تحبط الثورة. واحدة من مهام الثورة هو ردم الهوة بين ما يقوله الدستور عن كيفية وشرعية ممارسة القوة السياسية وما يحدث على الأرض. وبالتالي يجب على من يكتبون الدستور الجديد ترسيخ الاعتراف بما أنجزته ثورة 25 ينايروهو وجوب هيمنة قوة الشعب. فهذه هي القوة التي أطاحت بالنظام القديم ، وهي ذات القوة التي ينبغي أن يضفي الدستور الجديد الطابع الرسمي لها. لقد أظهر المصريون للعالم معناها من خلال تلاحمهم ووقوفهم لجانب بعضهم من أجل إرساء قواعد جديدة للفعل السياسي يكون عمادها تعزيز حرية الناس وضمان إنشاء مؤسسات ترسخ العدالة الاجتماعية بلا قهر ولكن بحماية من الدستور والقانون. وليس مهم الآن الحديث المفصل عن مأسسة سلطة الشعب ، ولكن عما إذا كان من المعترف به كمفهوم أساسي في عالم ما بعد 25 يناير 2011. وأهم القوى الفاعلة التي ينبغي أن تقر بذلك علنا هم جنرالات مصر لأن معناها الرئيس هو تقليص دور الجيش كشرط لازم لإنهاء الاستبداد وبناء نظام حر وعادل.
إذا فإن الشعب المصري الآن في طور تدريب قادة الجيش على معنى السياسة في الدولة الجديدة القائمة على مفهوم قوة الشعب. هذا واضح في رد فعل الثوريين لضرب المتظاهرين من قبل الشرطة العسكرية يوم الجمعه 25 فبراير 2011، فقد دعى الشباب للتعبئة الفورية لمواجهة العسكرفي ميدان التحرير. ولكن أظهر الجنرالات قدرا من الدهاء باصدار بيان علني يعتذر عن الحادث ويؤكد عدم صدور أوامر بضرب المتظاهرين.
الجيش هومؤسسة تمارس عملها بإصدار وتنفيذ أوامر من خلال سلسلة تنظيمية. فمن غير المعقول أن يتصرف ضباط الشرطة العسكرية المرابطون في ميدان التحريردون أمر من قياداتهم. ولذلك ينبغي للمرء أن يفترض -- حتى يتوفر دليل على العكس -- أن الأمر بتفريق المتظاهرين بالقوة جاء من أعلى، وإن لم يكن من طنطاوي نفسه فهو المسؤل عنه في نهاية الأمر. وهذا التهرب من الحقيقة يفسر على أنه دليل يظهر بأن قادة الجيش لايزالون يقودون بذات العقلية البلطجية الغير مسؤلة التي أودت بمبارك إلي نهايته. على الجنرالات أن يفهموا أن شعب ثورة 25 يناير لن يكون بمقدوره أن يسمح ببقاء قادةعسكريين (أو مدنيين) لا يفهمون معنى المصداقية في الخطاب العام. والمصداقية مطعونة في حالات اللجوء للتزليف أو لإنكار ما هو معلوم للناس بالضرورة. إن أي تكرار لمثل هذه الأحداث ستعني التصادم بين الشعب وقيادات العسكر. وهو ما يعني أن النظام المصري سيؤل إلى مآل شقيقه الليبي البئيس وسيتم تغيير جذري وكامل للنظام ليس فقط لمؤسساته وأدواته بل وحتى لأشخاصه جلهم إن لم يكن كلهم.
لقد اختبر طنطاوي وجنرالاته الثوار ووجدوا أنهم جادون وإن كانوا يمهلون. ولكنهم الشباب بدأوا يشكون في نوايا قيادات الجيش، ولعلهم بدأوا بالاعداد لاحتمال المواجهة. وبالإمكان للجيش الإقرار بالخطأ وإعلان العمل على التصحيح و الدفع بمبادرات لإظهار حسن النوايا بتحقيق مطالب إضافية نادى بها الثوار لتهدئهم. هذه هي الوسائل الوحيدة لاستعادة المصداقية لدى الشعب، وإلا فستفسر المواراة بأن قيادة الجيش لا تعي أو لا تحترم الطابع المؤسسي في الدولة المعاصرة، وهو ما يعني أن الجنرالات غير مؤهلين لقيادة الجيش فضلا عن مشاركة المدنيين في إرساء مفاهيم وأطر الدولة الجديدة.
وبغض النظر عمن سيقود، فما هو الدور المراد للجيش في الحياة المصرية الجديدة؟ هناك من يرى تسليم الملف الأمن القومي للجيش كوسيلة لاستمالة قيادات الجيش. وهذا التفكير متعجل وغير مدروس، لأنه يبطل مفهوم سلطة الشعب، فينبغي أن ينظر لأفراد وقيادات للجيش على أنهم مجموعة من الموظفين المعنيين بحماية الناس. والأمن القومي هو في صلب عمل الدولة في أية ديمقراطية فاعلة بالعالم ويتم تأمينه من خلال الحصول على الموارد العامة، مما لا بد له أن يؤثر على عمل أي حكومة. إن الأنظمة الدكتاتورية العسكرية هي التي يسمح للجنرالات فيها بمناقشة أمور عامة بمعزل عن المدنيين. هذا هو فعله نظام مبارك الذي أسقطه الشعب.
وفي المقابل، يتطلع بعض المصريون إلي العلاقة بين العسكر والمجتمع في تركيا كنموذج يمكن الاحتذاء به. لكن المدنيون الأتراك ليسوا سعداء بهذا الوضع، فالجيش هناك مازال يسيطر على جميع الجوانب الهامة في الدولة. وحتى القادة العسكريين المتقاعدين يغترون بقوتهم ومزاياهم بما يكفي للقيام أحيانا بالتفكير بمؤامرات لاسقاط الحكم المدني. وبالإضافة لذلك، فهناك فرق كبير بين عسكر مصر ونظرائهم الأتراك، لأن المصريين إن تنازلوا للمدنيين فهم يفعلون ذلك تحت ضغط الثوار وليس نتيجة لمراجعات أظهرت لهم أن الإصلاح واجب. أما قيادات الجيش التركي فقبلت بدورطليعي للسياسيين المدنيين منذ نشأة الدولة التركية الحديثة. والحقيقة التي لا يمكن أن تغفل هي أن الجنرالات المصريين مكرهون لامبادرون وهم متباطؤن بالاستجابة لمطالب الثورة، مما يعني أنهم يحاولون جاهدين تقليل خسائرهم.
ولكن هناك نموذج آخر لعلاقة المجتمع بالجيش يفضله العديد من المحتجين كما بدى في لافتات تنادي "بالدولة المدنية" و "الحكم المدني." بموجب هذا البديل الذي يعمل به في جميع الدول الديمقراطية المستقرة ، تخضع مؤسسة الجيش للسلطة المدنية بنص الدستور والقانون واللوائح الإدارية والحكومية والممارسة الفعلية. في هذه الدول يقوم ممثلو الشعب المنتخبون بإقرار الميزانية العسكرية واعلان الحرب والموافقة على تعيين القادة العسكريين. في ظل النظام المصري الحالي فإن قيادة العسكر ليست مستقلة عن الشعب والحكومة فحسب، بل إنها تسيطرعلى جميع جوانب الحياة المصرية. هذه الحالة من الدكتاتورية العسكرية هو ما قامت الثورة للإطاحة به.
الأفراد العسكريون هم أناس مثل كل مواطن مصري. لكن المؤسسة العسكرية هي حصرية و قد سعى قادتها لقهرالمصريين لمدة ستين عاما. وإذا لم تنهي الثورة المصرية هذا الوضع بعمومه فما هو إنجاز الثورة إذن؟ قدينتهي المصريون بالحصول على انتخابات حرة وبرلمان يتمتع بسلطة على الورق لكن في الواقع لا يمكنه أن يفعل الكثير لتأمين الحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية التي نادت بها الثورة واستشهد من أجلها الكثيرون. وحيهنا سوف يندفع الناس ضد قادة الثورة. أما مصر فستدخل مرحلة جديدة من الاستبداد، وربما بأسماء وعناصر منتفعة جديدة. إن قوة الشعب لا تعني اعتبارا فارغا للشعب على أنه الحكم النهائي للشرعية، بل إنها تعني تقسيم و توزيع منظومة القوة السياسية بين الشعب كأفراد وكمجموعة وبين مختلف المؤسسات بهدف منع تركيز السلطات في أيدي قلة من الناس. وفي الحالة المصرية فإن هذا يستلزم أيضا إعادة تشكيل المنظمات العسكرية والأمنية حتى لا تنشأ ظروف تمكنها من الاستحواذ على السلطة واضطهاد المواطنين مجددا. وعندها سيثري الشعب المصري الحضارة الإنسانية بمعاني وممارسات للسياسة لم تعرف من قبل.
إن ما تحقق لغاية الآن هو إزاحة مبارك ، النقطة العليا في هرم القوة لدولة 1952، ولكن نظامه لا يزال يحكم. عندما هتف المتظاهرون "الجيش والشعب يد واحدة" فكان هذا يعني الافتراض بأن تذوب جميع مكونات الدولة والمجتمع في بوتقة الثورة لإنشاء نظام جديد. وعلاوة على ذلك ، فإن دور المؤسسة العسكرية هو أن تكون الضامن النهائي لأمن الناس، و خصوصا عندما تحولت قوات الأمن المركزي والشرطة للعمل ضد الشعب وتخلت عن واجب الحفاظ على السلام الاجتماعي. ولكن هذه هي قراءة المصريين المدنيين لدور الجيش، وقد لا يكون الجنرالات مقتنعين بهذه القراءة للأحداث.
إذا كان الجنرالات صادقين في تصريحاتهم بالسماح بالتحول السياسي لسلطة مدنية فإنهم بحاجة لإظهار أنهم مرتاحون لفكرة "القوة للشعب" كأهم إنجازللثورة التي قلبت هرم القوة في الدولة لصالح الشعب. لكن الشعب المصري ليس دمويا ويريد أن يعطي الفرصة لكل من لم يمارسوا الاستبداد والفساد لكي يصلحوا أنفسهم ويعترفوا ويتأقلموا مع الواقع الجديد. فإما أن يصبح هذا المفهوم هو الإطار لإعادة تشكيل الدولة المصرية الجديدة وإلا فإنه قد يتم القضاء على المنجز الأساسي للثورة. لقد قام الجنرالات بتحقيق بعض من مطالب الثورة ولكنهم لم يقوموا حتى بالافراج عن السجناء السياسيين أو رفع حالة الطوارئ. بل لا يزال فلول نظام مبارك يتصرفون كما لو ان كل ما أراده الشعب قد تحقق بتنحي مبارك. إن الجنرالات لم يعربوا عن إقرارهم أو احترامهم للتغيير الجذري في الثقافة الساسية المصرية التي أصبحت تري أن موازين القوى الداخلية يجب أن تعود لوضعها الطبييعي، أي ليد المدنيين. ولن يكون دور الجيش مبررا قبل أن يقر الجنرالات أنه لن يكون بمقدورهم من الآن فصاعدا السيطرة على الحياة المدنية. إن مواجهة هذه المعضلة هي المرحلة الحالية التي تمر بها ثورة 25 يناير المصرية.
لقد سحقت الثورة المصرية الممارسات القديمة للعبة القوة السياسية ولكن تحقق هذا من حيث المبدأ فقط، و يرى الثوار أن عليهم الآن أن يحولوا هذا المكتسب إلى واقع على الأرض بسرعة وإلا فسوف تحبط الثورة. واحدة من مهام الثورة هو ردم الهوة بين ما يقوله الدستور عن كيفية وشرعية ممارسة القوة السياسية وما يحدث على الأرض. وبالتالي يجب على من يكتبون الدستور الجديد ترسيخ الاعتراف بما أنجزته ثورة 25 ينايروهو وجوب هيمنة قوة الشعب. فهذه هي القوة التي أطاحت بالنظام القديم ، وهي ذات القوة التي ينبغي أن يضفي الدستور الجديد الطابع الرسمي لها. لقد أظهر المصريون للعالم معناها من خلال تلاحمهم ووقوفهم لجانب بعضهم من أجل إرساء قواعد جديدة للفعل السياسي يكون عمادها تعزيز حرية الناس وضمان إنشاء مؤسسات ترسخ العدالة الاجتماعية بلا قهر ولكن بحماية من الدستور والقانون. وليس مهم الآن الحديث المفصل عن مأسسة سلطة الشعب ، ولكن عما إذا كان من المعترف به كمفهوم أساسي في عالم ما بعد 25 يناير 2011. وأهم القوى الفاعلة التي ينبغي أن تقر بذلك علنا هم جنرالات مصر لأن معناها الرئيس هو تقليص دور الجيش كشرط لازم لإنهاء الاستبداد وبناء نظام حر وعادل.
إذا فإن الشعب المصري الآن في طور تدريب قادة الجيش على معنى السياسة في الدولة الجديدة القائمة على مفهوم قوة الشعب. هذا واضح في رد فعل الثوريين لضرب المتظاهرين من قبل الشرطة العسكرية يوم الجمعه 25 فبراير 2011، فقد دعى الشباب للتعبئة الفورية لمواجهة العسكرفي ميدان التحرير. ولكن أظهر الجنرالات قدرا من الدهاء باصدار بيان علني يعتذر عن الحادث ويؤكد عدم صدور أوامر بضرب المتظاهرين.
الجيش هومؤسسة تمارس عملها بإصدار وتنفيذ أوامر من خلال سلسلة تنظيمية. فمن غير المعقول أن يتصرف ضباط الشرطة العسكرية المرابطون في ميدان التحريردون أمر من قياداتهم. ولذلك ينبغي للمرء أن يفترض -- حتى يتوفر دليل على العكس -- أن الأمر بتفريق المتظاهرين بالقوة جاء من أعلى، وإن لم يكن من طنطاوي نفسه فهو المسؤل عنه في نهاية الأمر. وهذا التهرب من الحقيقة يفسر على أنه دليل يظهر بأن قادة الجيش لايزالون يقودون بذات العقلية البلطجية الغير مسؤلة التي أودت بمبارك إلي نهايته. على الجنرالات أن يفهموا أن شعب ثورة 25 يناير لن يكون بمقدوره أن يسمح ببقاء قادةعسكريين (أو مدنيين) لا يفهمون معنى المصداقية في الخطاب العام. والمصداقية مطعونة في حالات اللجوء للتزليف أو لإنكار ما هو معلوم للناس بالضرورة. إن أي تكرار لمثل هذه الأحداث ستعني التصادم بين الشعب وقيادات العسكر. وهو ما يعني أن النظام المصري سيؤل إلى مآل شقيقه الليبي البئيس وسيتم تغيير جذري وكامل للنظام ليس فقط لمؤسساته وأدواته بل وحتى لأشخاصه جلهم إن لم يكن كلهم.
لقد اختبر طنطاوي وجنرالاته الثوار ووجدوا أنهم جادون وإن كانوا يمهلون. ولكنهم الشباب بدأوا يشكون في نوايا قيادات الجيش، ولعلهم بدأوا بالاعداد لاحتمال المواجهة. وبالإمكان للجيش الإقرار بالخطأ وإعلان العمل على التصحيح و الدفع بمبادرات لإظهار حسن النوايا بتحقيق مطالب إضافية نادى بها الثوار لتهدئهم. هذه هي الوسائل الوحيدة لاستعادة المصداقية لدى الشعب، وإلا فستفسر المواراة بأن قيادة الجيش لا تعي أو لا تحترم الطابع المؤسسي في الدولة المعاصرة، وهو ما يعني أن الجنرالات غير مؤهلين لقيادة الجيش فضلا عن مشاركة المدنيين في إرساء مفاهيم وأطر الدولة الجديدة.
وبغض النظر عمن سيقود، فما هو الدور المراد للجيش في الحياة المصرية الجديدة؟ هناك من يرى تسليم الملف الأمن القومي للجيش كوسيلة لاستمالة قيادات الجيش. وهذا التفكير متعجل وغير مدروس، لأنه يبطل مفهوم سلطة الشعب، فينبغي أن ينظر لأفراد وقيادات للجيش على أنهم مجموعة من الموظفين المعنيين بحماية الناس. والأمن القومي هو في صلب عمل الدولة في أية ديمقراطية فاعلة بالعالم ويتم تأمينه من خلال الحصول على الموارد العامة، مما لا بد له أن يؤثر على عمل أي حكومة. إن الأنظمة الدكتاتورية العسكرية هي التي يسمح للجنرالات فيها بمناقشة أمور عامة بمعزل عن المدنيين. هذا هو فعله نظام مبارك الذي أسقطه الشعب.
وفي المقابل، يتطلع بعض المصريون إلي العلاقة بين العسكر والمجتمع في تركيا كنموذج يمكن الاحتذاء به. لكن المدنيون الأتراك ليسوا سعداء بهذا الوضع، فالجيش هناك مازال يسيطر على جميع الجوانب الهامة في الدولة. وحتى القادة العسكريين المتقاعدين يغترون بقوتهم ومزاياهم بما يكفي للقيام أحيانا بالتفكير بمؤامرات لاسقاط الحكم المدني. وبالإضافة لذلك، فهناك فرق كبير بين عسكر مصر ونظرائهم الأتراك، لأن المصريين إن تنازلوا للمدنيين فهم يفعلون ذلك تحت ضغط الثوار وليس نتيجة لمراجعات أظهرت لهم أن الإصلاح واجب. أما قيادات الجيش التركي فقبلت بدورطليعي للسياسيين المدنيين منذ نشأة الدولة التركية الحديثة. والحقيقة التي لا يمكن أن تغفل هي أن الجنرالات المصريين مكرهون لامبادرون وهم متباطؤن بالاستجابة لمطالب الثورة، مما يعني أنهم يحاولون جاهدين تقليل خسائرهم.
ولكن هناك نموذج آخر لعلاقة المجتمع بالجيش يفضله العديد من المحتجين كما بدى في لافتات تنادي "بالدولة المدنية" و "الحكم المدني." بموجب هذا البديل الذي يعمل به في جميع الدول الديمقراطية المستقرة ، تخضع مؤسسة الجيش للسلطة المدنية بنص الدستور والقانون واللوائح الإدارية والحكومية والممارسة الفعلية. في هذه الدول يقوم ممثلو الشعب المنتخبون بإقرار الميزانية العسكرية واعلان الحرب والموافقة على تعيين القادة العسكريين. في ظل النظام المصري الحالي فإن قيادة العسكر ليست مستقلة عن الشعب والحكومة فحسب، بل إنها تسيطرعلى جميع جوانب الحياة المصرية. هذه الحالة من الدكتاتورية العسكرية هو ما قامت الثورة للإطاحة به.
الأفراد العسكريون هم أناس مثل كل مواطن مصري. لكن المؤسسة العسكرية هي حصرية و قد سعى قادتها لقهرالمصريين لمدة ستين عاما. وإذا لم تنهي الثورة المصرية هذا الوضع بعمومه فما هو إنجاز الثورة إذن؟ قدينتهي المصريون بالحصول على انتخابات حرة وبرلمان يتمتع بسلطة على الورق لكن في الواقع لا يمكنه أن يفعل الكثير لتأمين الحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية التي نادت بها الثورة واستشهد من أجلها الكثيرون. وحيهنا سوف يندفع الناس ضد قادة الثورة. أما مصر فستدخل مرحلة جديدة من الاستبداد، وربما بأسماء وعناصر منتفعة جديدة. إن قوة الشعب لا تعني اعتبارا فارغا للشعب على أنه الحكم النهائي للشرعية، بل إنها تعني تقسيم و توزيع منظومة القوة السياسية بين الشعب كأفراد وكمجموعة وبين مختلف المؤسسات بهدف منع تركيز السلطات في أيدي قلة من الناس. وفي الحالة المصرية فإن هذا يستلزم أيضا إعادة تشكيل المنظمات العسكرية والأمنية حتى لا تنشأ ظروف تمكنها من الاستحواذ على السلطة واضطهاد المواطنين مجددا. وعندها سيثري الشعب المصري الحضارة الإنسانية بمعاني وممارسات للسياسة لم تعرف من قبل.
The Egyptian People Power State: Is it Possible?
The contemporary state comprises structures of power in any given country. The massive Egyptian January 25th Revolution is a unique historical event not only in the history of Sunni Muslims, who never revolted as a whole (yet diverse) population group against their own rulers, but also in the history of mankind. Never before in human history has this overwhelming expression of collective will been exhibited in the way it appeared in Egypt (and Tunisia before). It will be a setback to human civilization if Egyptians fail to institutionalize the People Power that forced Mubarak to leave.
Mubarak, the tipping point of the power pyramid in the 1952 republic, has been scratched off, but his regime is still intact. When the protesters chanted “the army and the people are one hand” this meant that during a revolution all components of state and society must melt into one body to create the new order. Moreover, because the military’s job is to be the ultimate guarantor of people’s security, that institution had to step in when the Central Security Forces and Police turned against the people and abandoned their duty of maintaining domestic peace. But this is the reading of the role of the military by ordinary Egyptians; it may not be how the generals read the events since January 25, 2011.
Still, if People Power is the supreme political value in the new state, the military’s involvement in the transition should be temporary and very limited. Indeed, the Revolution will have only institutionalized oppression if it agreed to a military encroachment into civilian life. People Power means soldiers must act now on the expectation that they are going back to their barracks.
But there are threats facing the Revolution from the very people who stand to lose positions of privilege. Let’s face it: most of these people are current or former leaders in the military. This is what the 1952 regime did in Egypt. The generals who stepped in when ordinary Egyptians defeated the Mubarak security forces need to show that they are comfortable with submitting to the new reality of People Power. This reality will either be defeated or will successfully define the new Egyptian state. The generals have met some of the revolution’s demands but have not yet even released political prisoners or lifted the state of emergency. Some of the remnants of the Mubarak regime are acting as if all the people wanted was for Mubarak and his family to leave. The generals have not expressed commitment to the drastic change in the internal balance of power between civilians in the military—a change that was commanded by the revolution’s state of People Power. The generals will not lead a constructive transition before they realize that they will have no control over civilian life any more. This is the main challenge that now faces the Egyptian January 25th Revolution.
One of the tasks of the Revolution is to erase the gap between what the constitution says and what happens on the ground. Thus the writing of the new Constitution must proceed by acknowledging what the January 25th Revolution has already achieved: the dominance of the People. It is this power that deposed the ancient regime; it is this power that must be institutionalized. The new Constitution should be seen as only the formalization of this reality.
If People Power is to define the new state, then Egyptians are now in the middle of re-training the leaders of the military. This is evident in the revolutionaries’ reaction to the beating of protesters by the military police on Friday, February 25, 2011. Youth leaders reacted with an immediate call for mobilization to face-off the military in Tahrir Square. Leaders of the military exhibited shrewd skill by releasing a public statement apologizing for the incident and saying what happened was not sanctioned from above.
The military is an organization in which power is exercised though a chain of command. The military police officers who beat the protesters would not have acted without an order from above. Therefore, one should assume--until there is proof to the contrary--that the order came from the top, most likely from Tantawi himself. This is a turning point in the revolution’s history. If the military leaders do not come clean in their explanation of what happened, they will lose credibility and confrontation with the revolutionaries will become inevitable. People Power means that any leaders, military or civilian, must be capable and ready to withstand public scrutiny. A baltagiah (thuggish) mindset cannot rule free people.
But the core issues in the ongoing negotiation between society and military go beyond atmospherics. What role will the military have in Egyptian life? There are some arguments that civilians should surrender the national security file to the military in the new Egyptian state as way of placating them. This is a dangerous proposal, because it essentially nullifies People Power. The military should be seen as formations of functionaries with a certain job, as opposed to an institution relevant to the political system (for now it is the political system). In any functioning democratic state in the world, national security is one policy area. It is run through the procurement of funds and the mobilization of an organizational structure. Only in military regimes, the generals are allowed to exercise of power in ways that excludes civilians. This is the Mubarak regime that the people revolted against.
Some Egyptians look at state-society relations in Turkey as a model. But the Turkish civilians are not happy with what they have. Their military is still in control of all important aspects of state and civilian life. Even retired military leaders feel secure and resourceful enough to engage in conspiracies to topple civilian rule. Yet, never in Turkish life has the military exercised the dominant role that the Egyptian military has. But there is another model that many Egyptian protesters expressed support for in posters that read “civilian state” and “civilian rule.” Under this alternative, which is adopted in nearly all stable democratic states, the military submits to civilian control. Elected representatives decide military budget, declare war, and confirm military leaders. Under the current Egyptian system, the military is not only independent of the people and the state; it is fully in control of all aspects of Egyptian civilian life. This state of military dictatorship is what the revolution set out to change.
Military personnel are people like every other Egyptian citizen. But the institution of the military is exclusive and has allowed its leaders to oppress Egyptians for sixty years. If the January 25th Egyptian Revolution does not destroy this state of affair, Egyptians may likely end up with free elections and a parliament that on paper has power but in practice can do little to secure freedom and social justice—the two main values enunciated by the revolution and are key to reinforcing People Power.
People Power does not mean an empty respect for the people as the final arbiter of legitimacy. It means state power will have to be divided in an orderly fashion so that political power will never be allowed to fall into the hands of the few. In the Egyptian case, this entails the restructuring of military and security organizations so that they may never be able to abuse people again.
The enunciation of social justice does not mean a People Power system is a socialist state. In fact in a Muslim culture it requires the institutionalization of a free market system. Muslims should be free to earn and keep their earning unhampered by the corrupt practices of political parasites. Legal and constitutional protections should guarantee the sacredness of private property. Only such measures will prevent the sort of draconian asset sequestration campaigns that the 1952 state was famous for. But People Power means that corporate political power will be checked so as to prevent business people and their economic organizations from amassing political clout to enrich themselves—like they do in Arab feudalist regimes where the rich owns and rules. A People Power regime, then, is free and fair.
Mubarak, the tipping point of the power pyramid in the 1952 republic, has been scratched off, but his regime is still intact. When the protesters chanted “the army and the people are one hand” this meant that during a revolution all components of state and society must melt into one body to create the new order. Moreover, because the military’s job is to be the ultimate guarantor of people’s security, that institution had to step in when the Central Security Forces and Police turned against the people and abandoned their duty of maintaining domestic peace. But this is the reading of the role of the military by ordinary Egyptians; it may not be how the generals read the events since January 25, 2011.
Still, if People Power is the supreme political value in the new state, the military’s involvement in the transition should be temporary and very limited. Indeed, the Revolution will have only institutionalized oppression if it agreed to a military encroachment into civilian life. People Power means soldiers must act now on the expectation that they are going back to their barracks.
But there are threats facing the Revolution from the very people who stand to lose positions of privilege. Let’s face it: most of these people are current or former leaders in the military. This is what the 1952 regime did in Egypt. The generals who stepped in when ordinary Egyptians defeated the Mubarak security forces need to show that they are comfortable with submitting to the new reality of People Power. This reality will either be defeated or will successfully define the new Egyptian state. The generals have met some of the revolution’s demands but have not yet even released political prisoners or lifted the state of emergency. Some of the remnants of the Mubarak regime are acting as if all the people wanted was for Mubarak and his family to leave. The generals have not expressed commitment to the drastic change in the internal balance of power between civilians in the military—a change that was commanded by the revolution’s state of People Power. The generals will not lead a constructive transition before they realize that they will have no control over civilian life any more. This is the main challenge that now faces the Egyptian January 25th Revolution.
One of the tasks of the Revolution is to erase the gap between what the constitution says and what happens on the ground. Thus the writing of the new Constitution must proceed by acknowledging what the January 25th Revolution has already achieved: the dominance of the People. It is this power that deposed the ancient regime; it is this power that must be institutionalized. The new Constitution should be seen as only the formalization of this reality.
If People Power is to define the new state, then Egyptians are now in the middle of re-training the leaders of the military. This is evident in the revolutionaries’ reaction to the beating of protesters by the military police on Friday, February 25, 2011. Youth leaders reacted with an immediate call for mobilization to face-off the military in Tahrir Square. Leaders of the military exhibited shrewd skill by releasing a public statement apologizing for the incident and saying what happened was not sanctioned from above.
The military is an organization in which power is exercised though a chain of command. The military police officers who beat the protesters would not have acted without an order from above. Therefore, one should assume--until there is proof to the contrary--that the order came from the top, most likely from Tantawi himself. This is a turning point in the revolution’s history. If the military leaders do not come clean in their explanation of what happened, they will lose credibility and confrontation with the revolutionaries will become inevitable. People Power means that any leaders, military or civilian, must be capable and ready to withstand public scrutiny. A baltagiah (thuggish) mindset cannot rule free people.
But the core issues in the ongoing negotiation between society and military go beyond atmospherics. What role will the military have in Egyptian life? There are some arguments that civilians should surrender the national security file to the military in the new Egyptian state as way of placating them. This is a dangerous proposal, because it essentially nullifies People Power. The military should be seen as formations of functionaries with a certain job, as opposed to an institution relevant to the political system (for now it is the political system). In any functioning democratic state in the world, national security is one policy area. It is run through the procurement of funds and the mobilization of an organizational structure. Only in military regimes, the generals are allowed to exercise of power in ways that excludes civilians. This is the Mubarak regime that the people revolted against.
Some Egyptians look at state-society relations in Turkey as a model. But the Turkish civilians are not happy with what they have. Their military is still in control of all important aspects of state and civilian life. Even retired military leaders feel secure and resourceful enough to engage in conspiracies to topple civilian rule. Yet, never in Turkish life has the military exercised the dominant role that the Egyptian military has. But there is another model that many Egyptian protesters expressed support for in posters that read “civilian state” and “civilian rule.” Under this alternative, which is adopted in nearly all stable democratic states, the military submits to civilian control. Elected representatives decide military budget, declare war, and confirm military leaders. Under the current Egyptian system, the military is not only independent of the people and the state; it is fully in control of all aspects of Egyptian civilian life. This state of military dictatorship is what the revolution set out to change.
Military personnel are people like every other Egyptian citizen. But the institution of the military is exclusive and has allowed its leaders to oppress Egyptians for sixty years. If the January 25th Egyptian Revolution does not destroy this state of affair, Egyptians may likely end up with free elections and a parliament that on paper has power but in practice can do little to secure freedom and social justice—the two main values enunciated by the revolution and are key to reinforcing People Power.
People Power does not mean an empty respect for the people as the final arbiter of legitimacy. It means state power will have to be divided in an orderly fashion so that political power will never be allowed to fall into the hands of the few. In the Egyptian case, this entails the restructuring of military and security organizations so that they may never be able to abuse people again.
The enunciation of social justice does not mean a People Power system is a socialist state. In fact in a Muslim culture it requires the institutionalization of a free market system. Muslims should be free to earn and keep their earning unhampered by the corrupt practices of political parasites. Legal and constitutional protections should guarantee the sacredness of private property. Only such measures will prevent the sort of draconian asset sequestration campaigns that the 1952 state was famous for. But People Power means that corporate political power will be checked so as to prevent business people and their economic organizations from amassing political clout to enrich themselves—like they do in Arab feudalist regimes where the rich owns and rules. A People Power regime, then, is free and fair.
Friday, February 25, 2011
February 25, 2011 and the Transformation of Human Civilization
Millions of Arabs, Persians, Kurds, and Africans in dozens of cities in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, among other countries, are out on the streets now (Friday, February 25, 2011, 9:28 am EST) demanding either regime change or reform. Although the vast majority are Muslim, they include a substantial number of Christians; some are non-believers. The protesters are majority Shia in Bahrain and Iraq, majority Kurdish in northern Iraq, and majority Tawariq in Southern Libya. People who are out are not only common young people, but also political parties, tribal leaders, clansmen, professionals, women, and even children.
This is a historic Friday in the memory of the region's people, but it might be remembered as a turning point in human civilization. The organic massive expression (though chants and posters) of revultion to despotism, nepotism, factionalism, tribalism, corruption, poverty, discrimination, and cronyism directed against people's own rulers never happened before in that part of the world. To be sure, Arabs and Muslims protested before, but these movements were either against foreign rule or were localized or limited to certain regions or religious or political segments. Today all factions, clans, tribes and regions are forced to submit to popular will so as not to appear outside the mainstream. In nearly all countries demonstrators are raising their own national flags and the independence era flag of Libya, whose people are now experiencing the wrath of their falling dictator.
The powers to be are failing miserably. The strangest of all current leaders is not Qaddafi, for despite his crazed, irrational behavior he proved to be consistent. When Libyans topple him and finish cleaning up their house, they will agonize on why they have let this oppressor stay in power for so long.
But the most bizzare of all rulers are the Iraqi leaders in Baghdad and major cities in Kurdistan. Al-Maliki called the demonstrations anti-democratic and suspicious. Although he asked people in a televised address not to partake in them, people are coming out in Shia, Sunni and Kurdish areas. The security forces of the two ruling Kurdish patrons, Talibani and Barazani, are shooting at their own ethnic cohorts. The demands in Iraq do not include regime change; only an end to corruption, nepotism and the mishandling of the economy.
Iraq shows that transition to democracy is messy, but more importantly, it is about a cultural change that goes beyond the theatrics of public mobilization or the process of voting for a group of leaders. Young Iraqis are out on the streets not because they didn't vote, but because they have nothing to lose and everything to gain from challenging governments whose leaders live by standards unknown to them. Until recently al-Maliki was paid $360,000 per year--a pay rate familiar only to the American advisors who helped in bringing him to power. A few weeks ago, he realized the unfairness of his pay rate and cut it in half. But by doing this he actually demonstrated to Iraqis who were unaware before, how their leader is so rich while they are becoming even poorer and less served than they were under their former dictator Saddam. Thus while other Arabs and Muslims are pressing political freedom, Iraqis have joined the revolution for economic freedom and justice.
Most people around the world are still watching Arabs and Muslims. The Western media, focused on power shifts, has underestimated the depth of the humane element of the rage of Arabs and Muslims. But it will only be time before the rest of the world wakes up to a new dawn in human civilization: People Power has finally broke out. It is no strange that the Arab masses are leading. They have been collectively passive, yet internalizing the lessons of unfair and inhumane relationships and conditions for 1350 years. It took western colonialism and post-colonial modern despotism to shock their political cultures into finally realizing that the true and harshest enemy is the one from within: the lack of human courage to connect with other human beings, including neighbors and relatives or others they used to suspect because they were different, in order to take the risk, the gamble, of facing off conditions, symbols and leaders of oppression and injustice.
Revolutions have always been hijacked. This is likely to either be fullfilled or Arab and Muslim societies will implode. But there is hope. The diverse elements that make the anti-dictatorship revolution only share values. They pick up lessons in organization and courage by watching one another, but each entity ultimately responds to its own conditions and specific ways of how to become free, equal and capable of enforcing a way of life where people live by their means, get the jobs they qualify for, enjoy the fruit of their labor or investment, and receive an equitable share of public cost and revenue.
Who is stopping them?: rulers who may preach some of these values but violate them in practice. What about the role of Islamists, tribal leaders and religious and ethnic minorities? These formations are offering values that now encourage people to go out to demand their basic rights. All these elements have realized that they can win only by allowing everyone else to win--fairly and squarely--for all are equal in the sight of God: they are all members of one human family. Whatever configuration of power to be had among them should be subservient, not oppresive, to all of them.
Yes, there will be smart and organized opportunists who will try to reach to the top on the shoulders of ordinary people. But thanks to education, the information revolution, and to rising common political culture, people will always come back to reassert their right to live under conditions of liberty and equity.
This is an event with interconnected episodes. The blood that is being spilled in the streets of Tripoli, Libya is making people outside Libya wonder why this country did not follow the same pattern of Tunisia and Egypt (whose revolts were much less bloody). The people outside Libya are reaching the conclusion that the concentration of power (which ultimately boils down to gunpower) in the hands of the few is a danger to their attempt to go to the promised land of freedom and justice if it does not submit culturally and institutionally to the grand idea of People Power. This is why the Tunisians are back to the streets in large crowds and both the Egyptians and Jordanians are raising their political demands. The Egyptians now want to depose the Mubarak era government and want Mubarak arrested and tried (This is not vengeance against an old man; it is the quest for justice in the face of revelations about the public funds he and his family members have been channeling to privat accounts in banks around the world). The Bahrainis and Jordanians (who are now demonstrating not only in the West Bank-majority Amman but also in the East Bank-majority Karak) are calling for constitutional changes that would curtail the despotic powers of their kings.
This is a long overdue transformation of the political cultures of Arab and Muslim peoples. They are not going back to old ways, they are actualizing for every member of the human family the true meaning of citizenship and political emancipation. To outsiders, elements of the unique cultures in every country and city may be apparent in the dress, prayers and foreign languages. But this is more reason to realize the universality of what is taking place. People are going out not to show their particularism; rather, they are using their particularism as a source of social energy to achieve what all people share: a stake in the configuration of power that frame their lives. In Benghazi today a local revolutionary council has been established to fuze tradition and modernity through the transcendant human spirit seeking to actualize the ultimate truth: that we, tribe members, doctors, street vendors, ethnics, religionists, intellectuals, women, and young people, are one.
This expression of People Power has clearly built on the best of human traditions of non-violence, human courage and dignity and truth-telling. This is a new wave not only for democracy but also for human civilization.
This is a historic Friday in the memory of the region's people, but it might be remembered as a turning point in human civilization. The organic massive expression (though chants and posters) of revultion to despotism, nepotism, factionalism, tribalism, corruption, poverty, discrimination, and cronyism directed against people's own rulers never happened before in that part of the world. To be sure, Arabs and Muslims protested before, but these movements were either against foreign rule or were localized or limited to certain regions or religious or political segments. Today all factions, clans, tribes and regions are forced to submit to popular will so as not to appear outside the mainstream. In nearly all countries demonstrators are raising their own national flags and the independence era flag of Libya, whose people are now experiencing the wrath of their falling dictator.
The powers to be are failing miserably. The strangest of all current leaders is not Qaddafi, for despite his crazed, irrational behavior he proved to be consistent. When Libyans topple him and finish cleaning up their house, they will agonize on why they have let this oppressor stay in power for so long.
But the most bizzare of all rulers are the Iraqi leaders in Baghdad and major cities in Kurdistan. Al-Maliki called the demonstrations anti-democratic and suspicious. Although he asked people in a televised address not to partake in them, people are coming out in Shia, Sunni and Kurdish areas. The security forces of the two ruling Kurdish patrons, Talibani and Barazani, are shooting at their own ethnic cohorts. The demands in Iraq do not include regime change; only an end to corruption, nepotism and the mishandling of the economy.
Iraq shows that transition to democracy is messy, but more importantly, it is about a cultural change that goes beyond the theatrics of public mobilization or the process of voting for a group of leaders. Young Iraqis are out on the streets not because they didn't vote, but because they have nothing to lose and everything to gain from challenging governments whose leaders live by standards unknown to them. Until recently al-Maliki was paid $360,000 per year--a pay rate familiar only to the American advisors who helped in bringing him to power. A few weeks ago, he realized the unfairness of his pay rate and cut it in half. But by doing this he actually demonstrated to Iraqis who were unaware before, how their leader is so rich while they are becoming even poorer and less served than they were under their former dictator Saddam. Thus while other Arabs and Muslims are pressing political freedom, Iraqis have joined the revolution for economic freedom and justice.
Most people around the world are still watching Arabs and Muslims. The Western media, focused on power shifts, has underestimated the depth of the humane element of the rage of Arabs and Muslims. But it will only be time before the rest of the world wakes up to a new dawn in human civilization: People Power has finally broke out. It is no strange that the Arab masses are leading. They have been collectively passive, yet internalizing the lessons of unfair and inhumane relationships and conditions for 1350 years. It took western colonialism and post-colonial modern despotism to shock their political cultures into finally realizing that the true and harshest enemy is the one from within: the lack of human courage to connect with other human beings, including neighbors and relatives or others they used to suspect because they were different, in order to take the risk, the gamble, of facing off conditions, symbols and leaders of oppression and injustice.
Revolutions have always been hijacked. This is likely to either be fullfilled or Arab and Muslim societies will implode. But there is hope. The diverse elements that make the anti-dictatorship revolution only share values. They pick up lessons in organization and courage by watching one another, but each entity ultimately responds to its own conditions and specific ways of how to become free, equal and capable of enforcing a way of life where people live by their means, get the jobs they qualify for, enjoy the fruit of their labor or investment, and receive an equitable share of public cost and revenue.
Who is stopping them?: rulers who may preach some of these values but violate them in practice. What about the role of Islamists, tribal leaders and religious and ethnic minorities? These formations are offering values that now encourage people to go out to demand their basic rights. All these elements have realized that they can win only by allowing everyone else to win--fairly and squarely--for all are equal in the sight of God: they are all members of one human family. Whatever configuration of power to be had among them should be subservient, not oppresive, to all of them.
Yes, there will be smart and organized opportunists who will try to reach to the top on the shoulders of ordinary people. But thanks to education, the information revolution, and to rising common political culture, people will always come back to reassert their right to live under conditions of liberty and equity.
This is an event with interconnected episodes. The blood that is being spilled in the streets of Tripoli, Libya is making people outside Libya wonder why this country did not follow the same pattern of Tunisia and Egypt (whose revolts were much less bloody). The people outside Libya are reaching the conclusion that the concentration of power (which ultimately boils down to gunpower) in the hands of the few is a danger to their attempt to go to the promised land of freedom and justice if it does not submit culturally and institutionally to the grand idea of People Power. This is why the Tunisians are back to the streets in large crowds and both the Egyptians and Jordanians are raising their political demands. The Egyptians now want to depose the Mubarak era government and want Mubarak arrested and tried (This is not vengeance against an old man; it is the quest for justice in the face of revelations about the public funds he and his family members have been channeling to privat accounts in banks around the world). The Bahrainis and Jordanians (who are now demonstrating not only in the West Bank-majority Amman but also in the East Bank-majority Karak) are calling for constitutional changes that would curtail the despotic powers of their kings.
This is a long overdue transformation of the political cultures of Arab and Muslim peoples. They are not going back to old ways, they are actualizing for every member of the human family the true meaning of citizenship and political emancipation. To outsiders, elements of the unique cultures in every country and city may be apparent in the dress, prayers and foreign languages. But this is more reason to realize the universality of what is taking place. People are going out not to show their particularism; rather, they are using their particularism as a source of social energy to achieve what all people share: a stake in the configuration of power that frame their lives. In Benghazi today a local revolutionary council has been established to fuze tradition and modernity through the transcendant human spirit seeking to actualize the ultimate truth: that we, tribe members, doctors, street vendors, ethnics, religionists, intellectuals, women, and young people, are one.
This expression of People Power has clearly built on the best of human traditions of non-violence, human courage and dignity and truth-telling. This is a new wave not only for democracy but also for human civilization.
Monday, February 21, 2011
Qaddafi Speaks: The Worldview of Dictators
As al-Qaddafi regime began to lose grip over the population in Benghazi, al-Baydha and other parts of Libya, the government television aired a taped talk by the oldest son of Qaddafi. Saif al-Islam had been propped as a reformer. At one point he went public with his opposition and the father closed down his satellite station. Now Saif al-Islam removes this mask and shows his true colors. The scorn with which he spoke to his people is unbelievable. Apparently the dictator and his son believe they are Libya; without them there will be no country and no life. The talk represents how the ruling family members see the people they rule and the world dynamics in which they live.
Saif al-Islam suddenly appears on television and begins delivering an impromptu address. Saif al-Islam has no official position in the government. But he is obviously banking on what is known by now: that there is a ruling family running the country. He is the apparent heir since he is the oldest son and it is assumed that everyone in the country will not even raise a question about whether Saif represents his father or the government.
Saif al-Islam basically exibited an understanding of the world that is more in line with his father's thinking than the PR Saif al-Islam has adopted since he entered public life in 2005. All of a sudden, the reformer has realized that Libya is a tribal society that could have never come together without oil in the hands of the strongman of Libya.
Here's a slightly edited transcription of the doom and gloom he threw at the Libyans:
"We were expecting these events.
There is outside elements with supporters in the country who organized through facebook, using the incident against the Italian Consulate on February 17 as a trigger to begin something similar to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. We did arrest people to stave off the movement in Libya but now there is tumult and separatist movements threatening Libyan territorial integrity.
The world media carry rumors and exaggerate the number of killed in the unrest.
Three groups are behind the demonstrations:
1)political and professional groups with legitimate demands;
2)Islamic groups, especially in al-Baydha; they have taken over military bases and took weapons and declared an Islamic emirate;
3)common people who are jobless, drugged, mercenaries of rich people, onlookers, curious young people;
4) groups that want to split the country; and
5) baltagiah (thugs) who destroyed prisons and are now spreading chaos.
Therefore there are different trends in the country wanting to bring down the regime.
Arab media is exploiting the failure of the Libyan media to report on the unrest.
There are dangers lurking: Libya may split because it is made of tribes and clans and therefore a civil war is possible. Libya has oil in the middle and south and that is the only thing that holds Libya together. Oil will burn and people will turn against each other because they will not agree on dividing the oil wealth. How could the country stay together when 75% of the population lives in the west and it does not have oil.
Can you manage oil? There are foreign investments worth $200 billion. All this is gone now. How are you going to spend on hospitals and other services? There are 500,000 residential units ready to be handed over to people. They will not be handed over.
Every one now has arms.
Hospitals will not work and ready homes will be destroyed and oil will be burned.
But there is another way: Tomorrow we can launch a historic initiative by convening a popular conference to institute civilized laws and a constitution that will be based on local rule and a central government with limited authority over state sovereignty matters.
Otherwise, we will all settle our differences through arms. Then foreign powers will come back because they will not let oil burn and will not allow Islamic emirates.
Do not listen to al-Jazeera or the Arabs. They are just fooling you. And now they have their mercenaries spreading chaos in Libya. The Egyptians and Tunisians want to share your oil.
Don't listen to those (Libyans) living in the West enjoying citizenship and social security and urging you to go the the military camps.
The army is loyal to Qaddafi and now tens of thousands of people are out supporting Qaddafi. The army will end the tumult and restore order. We will fight to the last bullet."
Saif al-Islam suddenly appears on television and begins delivering an impromptu address. Saif al-Islam has no official position in the government. But he is obviously banking on what is known by now: that there is a ruling family running the country. He is the apparent heir since he is the oldest son and it is assumed that everyone in the country will not even raise a question about whether Saif represents his father or the government.
Saif al-Islam basically exibited an understanding of the world that is more in line with his father's thinking than the PR Saif al-Islam has adopted since he entered public life in 2005. All of a sudden, the reformer has realized that Libya is a tribal society that could have never come together without oil in the hands of the strongman of Libya.
Here's a slightly edited transcription of the doom and gloom he threw at the Libyans:
"We were expecting these events.
There is outside elements with supporters in the country who organized through facebook, using the incident against the Italian Consulate on February 17 as a trigger to begin something similar to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. We did arrest people to stave off the movement in Libya but now there is tumult and separatist movements threatening Libyan territorial integrity.
The world media carry rumors and exaggerate the number of killed in the unrest.
Three groups are behind the demonstrations:
1)political and professional groups with legitimate demands;
2)Islamic groups, especially in al-Baydha; they have taken over military bases and took weapons and declared an Islamic emirate;
3)common people who are jobless, drugged, mercenaries of rich people, onlookers, curious young people;
4) groups that want to split the country; and
5) baltagiah (thugs) who destroyed prisons and are now spreading chaos.
Therefore there are different trends in the country wanting to bring down the regime.
Arab media is exploiting the failure of the Libyan media to report on the unrest.
There are dangers lurking: Libya may split because it is made of tribes and clans and therefore a civil war is possible. Libya has oil in the middle and south and that is the only thing that holds Libya together. Oil will burn and people will turn against each other because they will not agree on dividing the oil wealth. How could the country stay together when 75% of the population lives in the west and it does not have oil.
Can you manage oil? There are foreign investments worth $200 billion. All this is gone now. How are you going to spend on hospitals and other services? There are 500,000 residential units ready to be handed over to people. They will not be handed over.
Every one now has arms.
Hospitals will not work and ready homes will be destroyed and oil will be burned.
But there is another way: Tomorrow we can launch a historic initiative by convening a popular conference to institute civilized laws and a constitution that will be based on local rule and a central government with limited authority over state sovereignty matters.
Otherwise, we will all settle our differences through arms. Then foreign powers will come back because they will not let oil burn and will not allow Islamic emirates.
Do not listen to al-Jazeera or the Arabs. They are just fooling you. And now they have their mercenaries spreading chaos in Libya. The Egyptians and Tunisians want to share your oil.
Don't listen to those (Libyans) living in the West enjoying citizenship and social security and urging you to go the the military camps.
The army is loyal to Qaddafi and now tens of thousands of people are out supporting Qaddafi. The army will end the tumult and restore order. We will fight to the last bullet."
Sunday, February 20, 2011
The Dictator of Libya Thought He was Covered
"When the people decide one day that they want (free) life, fate will have to answer" (Tunisian poet Abul Qasem al-Shabbi)
"Truly, God will not change the conditions of people until they change what is in themselves" (Quran, 13:11)
Media reports suggest that after the 2003 regime change in Iraq, Qaddafi cut a deal with western powers: He would surrender his weapons and pay reperations for the Lockerbie bombing in exchange for western silence on regime change in Libya. So, Qaddafi, who has always posed as an anti-imperialist revolutionary, has come to believe that his reign will be safe so long as he in good terms with foreign powers. He never imagined that regime change is possible from within. His day of reckoning may have just come. Massive demonstrations in Benghazi and other towns across Libya began on February 15, 2011, dubbed by revolutionaries the Tuesday of Rage. It started after security forces shot demonstrators expressing their opposition to the arrest of a lawyer in the case of the 1,200 killed in BouSliem prison.
Thus far leaders in Washington and European capitals are keeping their end of the bargain by keeping their mouths shut (although western news media is now reporting massacres. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12517327, February 20, 2011). Qaddafi has always claimed that he only sits at the helm of a people power political system. It is clear he never believed his own slogans. He cut internet and satellite communications and sent his security forces to the streets in a bid for a speedy repression of the revolt through a treatment akin to what happened in Algiers in 1988or Tiananmen Square in 1989: Kill a large number of people quickly to scare the rest of the population before the revolt picks momentum and reaches a point of no return.
The plan is being executed now ruthlessly; witnesses tell al-Jazeera the situation there looks like Gaza (2008/2009). But the indiscriminate shootings by members of the Qaddafi Brigades are not bringing out the hoped results. Living between the Egyptians on the East and Tunisians on the West, the Libyans have had enough inspiration to shed their own shackles of fear. They were enraged by the dictator's indirect moking of them when he went on national television to fault the victorious Tunisians after their dictators fled the country. The Libyans had already been fed up; now they are willing to die to topple the Qaddafi regime. Al-Jazeera reports that people are spending nights in public squares because Qaddafi is sending henchment to homes. Zantan, Warfalla and other tribal and religious leaders across the country are calling people to come out. People are protecting vital installations and surrounding special forces bases. In Al-Zawiyah, however, they burned down Qaddafi's residence. The Qaddafi forces have killed and injured are in the hundreds.
Qaddafi TV showed the dictator out demonstrating with his supporters (Revolutionary Committees and Populare Committees) in downtown Tripoli shouting epithets at al-Jazeera. Today, Febraury 20, 2011, the revolt has reached the capital. The first myrter to fall was in the area of Tajoura. Now, according to witness accounts reported by al-Jazeera there is a large demonstration in Sayyibi Street, near the opposition stronghold of Sidi Khliefa. Qaddafi has downtown heavily secured, so people are settling for localized demonstrations. Still, judges, lawyers and university professors, risking their lives to test the regime, are demonstrating at the Courts Complex in downtown.
People are sending reports to the outside world via phone. Twitter has posted phone numbers for people to send reports. Breaking the information blackout gives protesters hope that they are not isolated from the world. Qaddafi's henchmen are monitoring world media. Their morale is breaking apart, because their defenseless people are able to stay in touch with the world and remain undeterred by repression. It will be only time before the regime falls.
If Qaddafi followed his own propaganda, he should have already conceded. He has always argued that the people own and rule Libya. But now he is trying to cling to power despite the tremendous expression of people will against him. Even soldiers, officers and local members of Qaddafi's Revolutionary Committees are yielding to people power in much of Libya.
What do Libyans want? If one knows what Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Bahrainis want then it is not hard to imagine what their Libyan brothers and sisters took to the streets for. It's freedom and emanicipation. The Libyan revolutionaries are copying slogans and demands from their neighbors to the East and West, because their conditions appear similar. But the level of rage in Libya is even higher after 42 years of Qaddafi's rule that squandered the nation's wealth in failed adventures and corruption and repression. Libya is oil-rich with a relatively small population that is increasingly jobless and poor. It took Tunisians 23 days to force Ben Ali out; it took Egyptians 19 days to scratch off the tip of the Egyptian power pyramid; the Libyan revolt is now in the fourth day (February 20, 2011). It took the Egyptians 11 days to start their revolt after the departure of Ben Ali. It took the Libyans only three days to rise up after Mubarak stepped down. The accelerated movement of the anti-dictatorship tsunami has become a pattern. It is safe to predict that the overthrow of Qaddafi and his family will be much more speedy. But Libyans too will face the daunting task of transition to inclusive, democratic rule.
"Truly, God will not change the conditions of people until they change what is in themselves" (Quran, 13:11)
Media reports suggest that after the 2003 regime change in Iraq, Qaddafi cut a deal with western powers: He would surrender his weapons and pay reperations for the Lockerbie bombing in exchange for western silence on regime change in Libya. So, Qaddafi, who has always posed as an anti-imperialist revolutionary, has come to believe that his reign will be safe so long as he in good terms with foreign powers. He never imagined that regime change is possible from within. His day of reckoning may have just come. Massive demonstrations in Benghazi and other towns across Libya began on February 15, 2011, dubbed by revolutionaries the Tuesday of Rage. It started after security forces shot demonstrators expressing their opposition to the arrest of a lawyer in the case of the 1,200 killed in BouSliem prison.
Thus far leaders in Washington and European capitals are keeping their end of the bargain by keeping their mouths shut (although western news media is now reporting massacres. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12517327, February 20, 2011). Qaddafi has always claimed that he only sits at the helm of a people power political system. It is clear he never believed his own slogans. He cut internet and satellite communications and sent his security forces to the streets in a bid for a speedy repression of the revolt through a treatment akin to what happened in Algiers in 1988or Tiananmen Square in 1989: Kill a large number of people quickly to scare the rest of the population before the revolt picks momentum and reaches a point of no return.
The plan is being executed now ruthlessly; witnesses tell al-Jazeera the situation there looks like Gaza (2008/2009). But the indiscriminate shootings by members of the Qaddafi Brigades are not bringing out the hoped results. Living between the Egyptians on the East and Tunisians on the West, the Libyans have had enough inspiration to shed their own shackles of fear. They were enraged by the dictator's indirect moking of them when he went on national television to fault the victorious Tunisians after their dictators fled the country. The Libyans had already been fed up; now they are willing to die to topple the Qaddafi regime. Al-Jazeera reports that people are spending nights in public squares because Qaddafi is sending henchment to homes. Zantan, Warfalla and other tribal and religious leaders across the country are calling people to come out. People are protecting vital installations and surrounding special forces bases. In Al-Zawiyah, however, they burned down Qaddafi's residence. The Qaddafi forces have killed and injured are in the hundreds.
Qaddafi TV showed the dictator out demonstrating with his supporters (Revolutionary Committees and Populare Committees) in downtown Tripoli shouting epithets at al-Jazeera. Today, Febraury 20, 2011, the revolt has reached the capital. The first myrter to fall was in the area of Tajoura. Now, according to witness accounts reported by al-Jazeera there is a large demonstration in Sayyibi Street, near the opposition stronghold of Sidi Khliefa. Qaddafi has downtown heavily secured, so people are settling for localized demonstrations. Still, judges, lawyers and university professors, risking their lives to test the regime, are demonstrating at the Courts Complex in downtown.
People are sending reports to the outside world via phone. Twitter has posted phone numbers for people to send reports. Breaking the information blackout gives protesters hope that they are not isolated from the world. Qaddafi's henchmen are monitoring world media. Their morale is breaking apart, because their defenseless people are able to stay in touch with the world and remain undeterred by repression. It will be only time before the regime falls.
If Qaddafi followed his own propaganda, he should have already conceded. He has always argued that the people own and rule Libya. But now he is trying to cling to power despite the tremendous expression of people will against him. Even soldiers, officers and local members of Qaddafi's Revolutionary Committees are yielding to people power in much of Libya.
What do Libyans want? If one knows what Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Bahrainis want then it is not hard to imagine what their Libyan brothers and sisters took to the streets for. It's freedom and emanicipation. The Libyan revolutionaries are copying slogans and demands from their neighbors to the East and West, because their conditions appear similar. But the level of rage in Libya is even higher after 42 years of Qaddafi's rule that squandered the nation's wealth in failed adventures and corruption and repression. Libya is oil-rich with a relatively small population that is increasingly jobless and poor. It took Tunisians 23 days to force Ben Ali out; it took Egyptians 19 days to scratch off the tip of the Egyptian power pyramid; the Libyan revolt is now in the fourth day (February 20, 2011). It took the Egyptians 11 days to start their revolt after the departure of Ben Ali. It took the Libyans only three days to rise up after Mubarak stepped down. The accelerated movement of the anti-dictatorship tsunami has become a pattern. It is safe to predict that the overthrow of Qaddafi and his family will be much more speedy. But Libyans too will face the daunting task of transition to inclusive, democratic rule.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Using People's Diversity Against them: The Pathetic Trick of Dictators
It should become clear now that sectarianism is a card dictatorial regimes in the Arab world have been using. In the 1980s, Sadat of Egypt ended a wave of protests through a heavy-handed crackdown after some misterious sectarian violence in al-Zawiyah Al-Hamra in Cairo. Habib Al-Adili, the former interior minister of Egypt is now in jail accused of being behind the bombing of a Coptic church in Alexandria in December 2010. When he was in office a few days earlier his ministry said that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber (perhaps to play on media reports of al-Qaeda threats to Copts); now on the stand, he said that the explosive material was set off by an electrical devise--as if this were an evidence of his innocense. On Taharir Square there was more amity than enmity between Muslims and Copts united in the quest for change, freedom and social justice.
The clearest example of the use of sectarianism has just taken place in Bahrain. If anything, it shows how impotent Arab rulers are. The foreign minister in that country justified the military ambush of peaceful protesters on February 17, 2011 by claiming that his government wanted to stave off a slide to sectarianism. His evidence is the claim that the protesters in Pearl Roundabout were of a certain sect (Shia). He said that there were protesters in other places in the country and the fault line between the different groups was sectarian. But the government troops attacked only one group. The following day Bahrainis were out in the streets mourning those killed in downtown before dawn. In other parts of the country there were demonstrators marching with pictures of the king. So the foreign minister's statement served as a vision that has now been fulfilled not prevented. The images played out on television clearly shows a divided country with one group cheering and another weeping.
The government acted in the most sinister fashion. Every thing the rulers said shows an intent to play the sectarian card. True, the demonstration in Pearl Roundabout was supported mainly by Shia groups, but Shias make the majority of Bahrain. The Shia opposition demands are not sectarian and are agreeable to Sunni opposition groups. They want to change their political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly a sectarian or even radical goal.
This does not mean that Bahraini Shias are saints and their activists are models of tolerance, but how does that make them different from the rest of Bahrainis? The evidence clearly shows how impotent leaders can take the easy route to consolidating their power--even if it means dividing society. The streets of Bahrain today only shows that shedding away dictatorship can be messy. Leaders of the Bahraini opposition, especially the Sunni groups, must now come out to re-establish unity. The king and his family are neither smart nor well-composed to lead.
This "turn people against one another" is now played out across the region, especially where there are popular uprisings. When sectarian divisions are missing, the illigitimate regimes have been using ethnicity, ideology or region as fault lines. Reports to al-Jazeera today (February 20, 2011) suggest that the Qaddafi regime is distributing arms to members of rival clans in Benghazi and other parts of the country in hopes that they will begin settling scores against one another. The purpose is to use the infighting to show that the sweeping violence is tribal conflicts that must be suppressed for the good of the nation. Alas, even as primordial divisions come intertwined with politics, the new element is this: the conflation is hardly organic resulting from irreconcilable differences among the different sectors of society. Rather, their diversity is now being used as weapon against them; the aim is to keep dictators in power. Now that divisiveness is instigated from the top, thoughtful, tolerant people will learn how to overcome it. The Egyptians seem to be on their way to achieving this goal (despite the isolationism of the elderly Coptic Pope and fanatcism of some Muslim groups). I hope the Bahrainis will rise above the pathetic trick of Al-Khalifa dictatorship.
The clearest example of the use of sectarianism has just taken place in Bahrain. If anything, it shows how impotent Arab rulers are. The foreign minister in that country justified the military ambush of peaceful protesters on February 17, 2011 by claiming that his government wanted to stave off a slide to sectarianism. His evidence is the claim that the protesters in Pearl Roundabout were of a certain sect (Shia). He said that there were protesters in other places in the country and the fault line between the different groups was sectarian. But the government troops attacked only one group. The following day Bahrainis were out in the streets mourning those killed in downtown before dawn. In other parts of the country there were demonstrators marching with pictures of the king. So the foreign minister's statement served as a vision that has now been fulfilled not prevented. The images played out on television clearly shows a divided country with one group cheering and another weeping.
The government acted in the most sinister fashion. Every thing the rulers said shows an intent to play the sectarian card. True, the demonstration in Pearl Roundabout was supported mainly by Shia groups, but Shias make the majority of Bahrain. The Shia opposition demands are not sectarian and are agreeable to Sunni opposition groups. They want to change their political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly a sectarian or even radical goal.
This does not mean that Bahraini Shias are saints and their activists are models of tolerance, but how does that make them different from the rest of Bahrainis? The evidence clearly shows how impotent leaders can take the easy route to consolidating their power--even if it means dividing society. The streets of Bahrain today only shows that shedding away dictatorship can be messy. Leaders of the Bahraini opposition, especially the Sunni groups, must now come out to re-establish unity. The king and his family are neither smart nor well-composed to lead.
This "turn people against one another" is now played out across the region, especially where there are popular uprisings. When sectarian divisions are missing, the illigitimate regimes have been using ethnicity, ideology or region as fault lines. Reports to al-Jazeera today (February 20, 2011) suggest that the Qaddafi regime is distributing arms to members of rival clans in Benghazi and other parts of the country in hopes that they will begin settling scores against one another. The purpose is to use the infighting to show that the sweeping violence is tribal conflicts that must be suppressed for the good of the nation. Alas, even as primordial divisions come intertwined with politics, the new element is this: the conflation is hardly organic resulting from irreconcilable differences among the different sectors of society. Rather, their diversity is now being used as weapon against them; the aim is to keep dictators in power. Now that divisiveness is instigated from the top, thoughtful, tolerant people will learn how to overcome it. The Egyptians seem to be on their way to achieving this goal (despite the isolationism of the elderly Coptic Pope and fanatcism of some Muslim groups). I hope the Bahrainis will rise above the pathetic trick of Al-Khalifa dictatorship.
Mainstream Media Behind the Curve in Reporting Arab Revolts
Bob Schieffer, the longest-serving journalist in Washington, second only to his CBS colleague Andy Rooney, spoke to my American University students on February 16, 2011. Responding to an event participant's question about the performance of U.S. media in covering the substance of the sweeping revolts in the Arab world, he said "we're still trying to figure out what is going on!" His honesty was refreshing, but it is an admission of an utter confusion and failure by mainstream media. This state of affair was not caused by lack of skill; the impotence resulted from the astonishment of the media establishment in America in the face of events that trashed everything western media has known about submissive Arabs obeying dictators and fearing the show of force.
The utter shock has led some western reporters to even violate a basic ethical and professional requirement: checking the facts before reporting them. New York Times reporter Nicholas Kristof was in Manama, Bahrain when the Al-Khalifa regime ambushed the protesters in Pearl Roundabout on February 17, 2011. He lent credence to the government's assertion that the protest was sectarian. Without sharing any facts he told world television channels that all the injured were Shia. He did not even claim survey data. Sure, the vast majority of organizers are Shia, but so is the population of Bahrain. The sectarian character of the protest is not known from the religious identity of protesters; it can be known from the demands of the movement. Those demands focused on reforming the political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly sectarian or even radical. In fact the king has been open to such possibility since 2002.
The western media utter failure in reporting the Arab uprisings stands in sharp contrast to the performance of al-Jazeera English. I remember a few days before Mubarak stepped down Wolf Blitzer asked a Department of State official what was going on in the White House Situation Room. She told him that people there were asking about the Egyptian opposition, what they're thinking and what they want. While CNN was airing spin of pundits sitting in their Washington offices, knowing very little about so much, Al-Jazeera English was answering the very questions the American official was posing. It was ranning interviews with English speaking leaders of the protest talking about their activities and demands. Most of Al-Jazeera English reporters are either westerners or western-trained. So the problem is not the western attribute of the mainstream media.
There are two factors explaining why mainstream media has trailed behind al-Jazeera. First, most of the editors, are aging with worldviews formed in the sixties, if not earlier; their ability to catch up with fast moving events thousands of miles away is limited. Clearly fresh blood is needed. But this is not an excuse. The media in western democracies represent a fourth power; its bankruptcy in meeting the demand of the public for factual information and reasonable analysis of historic events is crucial for the very maintenance of democracy. By failing to perform the function expected by the public, the mainstream media is no mainstream at all.
Another explanation of the failure lies in the fact that the large corporate structure of the media industry is part of the political establishment that for so long has valued stability in the Middle East. While the Egyptian protesters mobilized several million demonstrators today, February 18, 2011, to celebrate the revolution and call for the removal of the remainder of the Mubarak regime, including the current government, Hilary Clinton had just announced an aid package of $150 million to it--an old school measure that does not sync with the revolutionary mood in the country. The Egyptian revolution is not over, but the Egyptian generals and the U.S. government are acting as if life were back to normal. But one has to give the U.S. government come credit that the establishment media does not deserve: the U.S. has learned from past mistakes. In 1979 the U.S. government and media agitated against the Iranian revolution, calling Iranians to side with the Shah even as the momentum was building in favor of the opposition. In 2011, the U.S. stood against the violent treatment of protesters, despite some valid misgivings about some of their leaders (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood).
In contrast, most mainstream media outlets exhibited an isolationist worldview in their interpretation of event. Journalists like Joe Klein were paraded on the various networks raising the specter of a Chinese-style Tiananmen Square massacre to end the gathering at Tahrir Square, or pundits who after the departure of Ben Ali suggested using American aid money to promote oxymoron ideas such as "discriminating democracy" to exclude even modernist Islamists like the Tunisian Ennahda (Renaissance) (See Robert Satloff editorial, Washington Post, January 30, 2011). Alas, Islamophobia is perhaps the unfortunate factor behind the mainstream media ambivalence toward the pro-democracy movement in the Arab world.
The utter shock has led some western reporters to even violate a basic ethical and professional requirement: checking the facts before reporting them. New York Times reporter Nicholas Kristof was in Manama, Bahrain when the Al-Khalifa regime ambushed the protesters in Pearl Roundabout on February 17, 2011. He lent credence to the government's assertion that the protest was sectarian. Without sharing any facts he told world television channels that all the injured were Shia. He did not even claim survey data. Sure, the vast majority of organizers are Shia, but so is the population of Bahrain. The sectarian character of the protest is not known from the religious identity of protesters; it can be known from the demands of the movement. Those demands focused on reforming the political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly sectarian or even radical. In fact the king has been open to such possibility since 2002.
The western media utter failure in reporting the Arab uprisings stands in sharp contrast to the performance of al-Jazeera English. I remember a few days before Mubarak stepped down Wolf Blitzer asked a Department of State official what was going on in the White House Situation Room. She told him that people there were asking about the Egyptian opposition, what they're thinking and what they want. While CNN was airing spin of pundits sitting in their Washington offices, knowing very little about so much, Al-Jazeera English was answering the very questions the American official was posing. It was ranning interviews with English speaking leaders of the protest talking about their activities and demands. Most of Al-Jazeera English reporters are either westerners or western-trained. So the problem is not the western attribute of the mainstream media.
There are two factors explaining why mainstream media has trailed behind al-Jazeera. First, most of the editors, are aging with worldviews formed in the sixties, if not earlier; their ability to catch up with fast moving events thousands of miles away is limited. Clearly fresh blood is needed. But this is not an excuse. The media in western democracies represent a fourth power; its bankruptcy in meeting the demand of the public for factual information and reasonable analysis of historic events is crucial for the very maintenance of democracy. By failing to perform the function expected by the public, the mainstream media is no mainstream at all.
Another explanation of the failure lies in the fact that the large corporate structure of the media industry is part of the political establishment that for so long has valued stability in the Middle East. While the Egyptian protesters mobilized several million demonstrators today, February 18, 2011, to celebrate the revolution and call for the removal of the remainder of the Mubarak regime, including the current government, Hilary Clinton had just announced an aid package of $150 million to it--an old school measure that does not sync with the revolutionary mood in the country. The Egyptian revolution is not over, but the Egyptian generals and the U.S. government are acting as if life were back to normal. But one has to give the U.S. government come credit that the establishment media does not deserve: the U.S. has learned from past mistakes. In 1979 the U.S. government and media agitated against the Iranian revolution, calling Iranians to side with the Shah even as the momentum was building in favor of the opposition. In 2011, the U.S. stood against the violent treatment of protesters, despite some valid misgivings about some of their leaders (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood).
In contrast, most mainstream media outlets exhibited an isolationist worldview in their interpretation of event. Journalists like Joe Klein were paraded on the various networks raising the specter of a Chinese-style Tiananmen Square massacre to end the gathering at Tahrir Square, or pundits who after the departure of Ben Ali suggested using American aid money to promote oxymoron ideas such as "discriminating democracy" to exclude even modernist Islamists like the Tunisian Ennahda (Renaissance) (See Robert Satloff editorial, Washington Post, January 30, 2011). Alas, Islamophobia is perhaps the unfortunate factor behind the mainstream media ambivalence toward the pro-democracy movement in the Arab world.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Bahrain: The Next Target of the Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution
The Bahrain revolt is picking up momentum, thanks to the insulting offer of the ruling family to buy the political freedom of Bahrainis for $2,650 per family. The Al-Khalifa plan backfired. Add to this the brutality of the security forces that killed so far 2 protesters. The ingredients for mass revolt are here: giving people victims to parade in public and offending their sense of honor and self-worth.
And the protesters are copying their Tunisian and Egyptian brothers and sisters, using the familiar slogan: "The people want to depose the regime." Yet the Bahrainis are presenting realistic demands for the new political economy they want:
release of political prisoners;
more jobs and housing;
the creation of a more representative and empowered parliament;
a new constitution written by the people; and
a new cabinet that does not include Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in office for 40 years.
They are not calling for the removal of the king. They want a constitutional monarchy. A deformed version of this exists already in neighboring Kuwait, where the Amir (Royal Prince) has extensive powers but has to work with a parliament that can force the Amir's nominated prime minister out of office. The opposition there has had majority in the parliament for several years now, but the ruling family, headed by their patriarch, the Amir, has managed to keep all important ministerial posts and remain firmly in charge of the oil revenues. Bahrainis do not think of Kuwait as their model; in Kuwait the power of the Sabah ruling family is now the focal point to political tension. The Bahrainis hope to immulate another country with which they have strong relations: Britain, where the palace has only symbolic role in the political power sytem. The Bahraini opposition, however has not spelled the details of the structure of government they seek, but insisted that power has to be shared. May be the Sunni king and the majority Shia opposition can figure a formula that suits their country. Ignoring the legitimate popular demands will only guarantee that the demonstrators will ask for more reforms.
So far the ruling family has been mobilizing public support from among the regime beneficiaries and among the Sunni minority, which is now being told that their security is in danger if they do not support the ruling family. This strategy is short-sighted, polarizing and counterproductive. Negotiation is the best way out. Can the king split the Shias in order to create a real majority that includes reform-minded Sunnis and Shias? If not, the use of force will only create a Sunni dictatorship oppressing a Shia population that is yearning for freedom.
And the protesters are copying their Tunisian and Egyptian brothers and sisters, using the familiar slogan: "The people want to depose the regime." Yet the Bahrainis are presenting realistic demands for the new political economy they want:
release of political prisoners;
more jobs and housing;
the creation of a more representative and empowered parliament;
a new constitution written by the people; and
a new cabinet that does not include Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in office for 40 years.
They are not calling for the removal of the king. They want a constitutional monarchy. A deformed version of this exists already in neighboring Kuwait, where the Amir (Royal Prince) has extensive powers but has to work with a parliament that can force the Amir's nominated prime minister out of office. The opposition there has had majority in the parliament for several years now, but the ruling family, headed by their patriarch, the Amir, has managed to keep all important ministerial posts and remain firmly in charge of the oil revenues. Bahrainis do not think of Kuwait as their model; in Kuwait the power of the Sabah ruling family is now the focal point to political tension. The Bahrainis hope to immulate another country with which they have strong relations: Britain, where the palace has only symbolic role in the political power sytem. The Bahraini opposition, however has not spelled the details of the structure of government they seek, but insisted that power has to be shared. May be the Sunni king and the majority Shia opposition can figure a formula that suits their country. Ignoring the legitimate popular demands will only guarantee that the demonstrators will ask for more reforms.
So far the ruling family has been mobilizing public support from among the regime beneficiaries and among the Sunni minority, which is now being told that their security is in danger if they do not support the ruling family. This strategy is short-sighted, polarizing and counterproductive. Negotiation is the best way out. Can the king split the Shias in order to create a real majority that includes reform-minded Sunnis and Shias? If not, the use of force will only create a Sunni dictatorship oppressing a Shia population that is yearning for freedom.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Silmiyah, Silmiyah: Do the Generals Get the Message?
Tunisians and Egyptians have brought down two dictators through non-violent resistance. With perseverance, they may also topple the whole regimes of oppression. The question is where do the generals (both in the military and government) fit in the growing consciousness in the Arab world about the need for states run by those who obtain legitimacy from the people? The Tunisian military is behaving in a much more professional manner than its Egyptian counterpart. The Tunisian generals refrained from involvement in government, preferring instead to be the guarantor of a smooth transition. The Egyptian generals assisted in securing national installations and may have pressured Mubarak to step down. But now their actions seem to resemble the actions of Nasser in 1952 who established a revolutionary command council and began running the country through public statements until he consolidated civilian and military power (the root of the Mubarak regime). The 2011 generals in Egypt have already committed serious mistakes by reinstating Mubarak ministers and governors. More, instead of addressing the demands of the revolution for changing the political system, they began conducting foreign relations.
The revolutionaries asked the military to take speedy action to dismantle the regime of oppression, by first lifting the emergency law (which has been effectively dismantled by the people) and acknowledging that the old constitution has been nullified by the revolution. The latter step is something the generals need because all their actions thus do not conform to the old constitution. That document stipulates the installation of the speaker of the parliament in the absence of the president. Instead, Omar Suleiman announced that the president handed over authority to the military. The deposed president had no constitutional power to take such action. For all practical purposes, Egypt is now ruled by coup leaders. They are appeasing people by promising democracy and a civilian authority. They have taken measures against some NDP leaders whose corruption is known to the public. The military leaders are playing a game of politics. They are calculating that most Egyptians should now be satisfied with such steps. But these are Egyptians of the old political culture that personalized leadership and politics. Many, if not most, of these Egyptians probably did not partake in demonstrations.
Facing a revolting young population, the aging generals must be recalling the 1950s, when they were young, for clues. But the Egyptians today understand the language of peoplehood, rights, citizenship, institutions and how all this relate to the structure of state power. It is this structure that the January 25 Revolution set out to change. The demise of Mubarak was only the first step. The generals are hoping the people would revert to the old ways now the man they hated is gone. They may be in for a rude awakening this Friday February 18, 2011.
The generals and their interim government have their eyes on restoring normalcy. If this is the new Egypt, many Egyptians wonder, it looks like the old one save one person. The dictator was corrupt and is suspected of having stolen billions from the wealth of his nation. But he did not do the rest of offensive acts that characterized his system of oppression. Many Egyptians feel insulted that Tantawi and Fiqqi are acting as if the revolution has done its job.
Clearly the gap between the people and the remainder of the Mubarak regime remains wide. This Friday, February 18, 2011, may witness another eruption if the High Council of the Armed Forces does not meet a substantive revolutionary demand. Lifting the emergency law would be the easiest to institute.
In the absence of this or other actions, two possibilities are on the horizon: (1) the revolt will be rekindled to bring down the top military brass (many Egyptians think the low ranks and foot soldiers are with the people), or (2) the Egyptians may need another thirty years to develop a political culture that de-personalizes power.
The revolutionaries asked the military to take speedy action to dismantle the regime of oppression, by first lifting the emergency law (which has been effectively dismantled by the people) and acknowledging that the old constitution has been nullified by the revolution. The latter step is something the generals need because all their actions thus do not conform to the old constitution. That document stipulates the installation of the speaker of the parliament in the absence of the president. Instead, Omar Suleiman announced that the president handed over authority to the military. The deposed president had no constitutional power to take such action. For all practical purposes, Egypt is now ruled by coup leaders. They are appeasing people by promising democracy and a civilian authority. They have taken measures against some NDP leaders whose corruption is known to the public. The military leaders are playing a game of politics. They are calculating that most Egyptians should now be satisfied with such steps. But these are Egyptians of the old political culture that personalized leadership and politics. Many, if not most, of these Egyptians probably did not partake in demonstrations.
Facing a revolting young population, the aging generals must be recalling the 1950s, when they were young, for clues. But the Egyptians today understand the language of peoplehood, rights, citizenship, institutions and how all this relate to the structure of state power. It is this structure that the January 25 Revolution set out to change. The demise of Mubarak was only the first step. The generals are hoping the people would revert to the old ways now the man they hated is gone. They may be in for a rude awakening this Friday February 18, 2011.
The generals and their interim government have their eyes on restoring normalcy. If this is the new Egypt, many Egyptians wonder, it looks like the old one save one person. The dictator was corrupt and is suspected of having stolen billions from the wealth of his nation. But he did not do the rest of offensive acts that characterized his system of oppression. Many Egyptians feel insulted that Tantawi and Fiqqi are acting as if the revolution has done its job.
Clearly the gap between the people and the remainder of the Mubarak regime remains wide. This Friday, February 18, 2011, may witness another eruption if the High Council of the Armed Forces does not meet a substantive revolutionary demand. Lifting the emergency law would be the easiest to institute.
In the absence of this or other actions, two possibilities are on the horizon: (1) the revolt will be rekindled to bring down the top military brass (many Egyptians think the low ranks and foot soldiers are with the people), or (2) the Egyptians may need another thirty years to develop a political culture that de-personalizes power.
Friday, February 11, 2011
It's Not Over: The January 25 Revolution Enters a Most Critical Phase
Fissures have already begun to appear regarding the post-Mubarak era. For Western powers, the ideal poitical structure that could emerge in Egypt is something similar to the Turkish model, where there is a civilian democracy that can be deposed anytime by a powerful military. But this may not be what Egyptians want. Egyptians today have a very clear understanding of their modern political history; going against the emerging anti-dictatorship culture will only guarantee confrontation with the new political leaders, who may not necessarily want to diminish the role of the military.
The generals have remained loyal to their patron Mubarak but ultimately seemed to have coaxed him into agreeing to step down. It was people power that forced the generals to pressure Mubarak to concede, but the remaining generals have yet to accept people power as the defining character of the new structure of political power (not government). Their third statement only remarked that the High Military Council of the Armed Forces, the wielder of national political power now, understands that "it is not a substitute for a legitimacy agreeable to the people." But they did not acknowledge that that the current regime is effectively a coup. The current constitution calls for the Speaker of the Parliament to take over in the absence of the president.
This is reminiscent of the regime that took over in Egypt in 1952, claiming to project the people’s will. The only difference between Tantawi and Nasser is that the latter, an ultimate opportunist, rode a wave of popular protest to depose the colonial era king, then moved to establish The Revolutionary Command Council. That was Nasser’s transition power structure. At the time he was a junior military leader. He used the council to bypass the top brass of the military without actually having to confront them, which he did later by purging them to clear his way to the top. Ultimately, he managed to concentrate civilian and military powers in his hands. Mubarak inherited this power structure from Sadat, Nasser's successor.
The current military leader Tantawi does not need a revolutionary council. He is now the head of the state in its civilian and military structures. If the announcement of Omar Suleiman is accurate, Mubarak handed power over to Tantawi, which means the regime has not changed, except that it is completely removed from any façade of constitutional legitimacy. Egyptian civilian leaders understand this dynamic very clearly. Some of them immediately issued statements aired on Al-Jazeera right after Mubarak stepped down. These included a statement read Justice Mohamed Fouad, Vice President of the State Council, who had joined the revolutionaries at Tahrir Square. The statement called for a transitional government of politically independent experts, excluding political trends and parties to manage the country's affairs, ending in free and fair elections in nine months. He also called for securing freedom of expression and association for the people and for a constitutional convention to produce a new constitution that would put to a popular referendum. The statement also called the military leaders to adopt these steps and the demands of the revolution and completely side with the people.
This statement was signed by a previously unknown group called Masses of the January 25 Revolution, but it is headed by a senior civil servant. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest sociopolitical NGO in Egypt, offered a different vision for the transition that calls for handing over presidential powers to the head of the High Constitutional Court to lead the transition to a civilian government. Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the National Coalition for Change, specifically named the establishment of a civilian power structure as the goal of the revolution. Obviously, civilian Egyptian politicians agree on what they want for the new Egyptian state. They want this reflected in the transitional period. The 1952 popular uprising was hijacked by the military that ultimately produced a dictatorial rule; the Mubarak regime was only the most corrupt and oppressive manifestation of it. Today' Egyptian generals have abandoned the theatrical politics of empty promises and gestures that Nasser introduced to post-colonial Egypt. Tantawi does not claim credit for the 2011 revolution like Nasser did. But Tantawi and his comrades have power. Their statements thus far neither oppose nor support the popular wish of civilian rule. Their fourth statement did not declare the nullification of emergency law but reinstated Mubarak’s corrupt ministers and governors. They have already offended the sensitivities of the public. The Egyptian revolution is far from over. It's most critical phase has just begun.
The generals have remained loyal to their patron Mubarak but ultimately seemed to have coaxed him into agreeing to step down. It was people power that forced the generals to pressure Mubarak to concede, but the remaining generals have yet to accept people power as the defining character of the new structure of political power (not government). Their third statement only remarked that the High Military Council of the Armed Forces, the wielder of national political power now, understands that "it is not a substitute for a legitimacy agreeable to the people." But they did not acknowledge that that the current regime is effectively a coup. The current constitution calls for the Speaker of the Parliament to take over in the absence of the president.
This is reminiscent of the regime that took over in Egypt in 1952, claiming to project the people’s will. The only difference between Tantawi and Nasser is that the latter, an ultimate opportunist, rode a wave of popular protest to depose the colonial era king, then moved to establish The Revolutionary Command Council. That was Nasser’s transition power structure. At the time he was a junior military leader. He used the council to bypass the top brass of the military without actually having to confront them, which he did later by purging them to clear his way to the top. Ultimately, he managed to concentrate civilian and military powers in his hands. Mubarak inherited this power structure from Sadat, Nasser's successor.
The current military leader Tantawi does not need a revolutionary council. He is now the head of the state in its civilian and military structures. If the announcement of Omar Suleiman is accurate, Mubarak handed power over to Tantawi, which means the regime has not changed, except that it is completely removed from any façade of constitutional legitimacy. Egyptian civilian leaders understand this dynamic very clearly. Some of them immediately issued statements aired on Al-Jazeera right after Mubarak stepped down. These included a statement read Justice Mohamed Fouad, Vice President of the State Council, who had joined the revolutionaries at Tahrir Square. The statement called for a transitional government of politically independent experts, excluding political trends and parties to manage the country's affairs, ending in free and fair elections in nine months. He also called for securing freedom of expression and association for the people and for a constitutional convention to produce a new constitution that would put to a popular referendum. The statement also called the military leaders to adopt these steps and the demands of the revolution and completely side with the people.
This statement was signed by a previously unknown group called Masses of the January 25 Revolution, but it is headed by a senior civil servant. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest sociopolitical NGO in Egypt, offered a different vision for the transition that calls for handing over presidential powers to the head of the High Constitutional Court to lead the transition to a civilian government. Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the National Coalition for Change, specifically named the establishment of a civilian power structure as the goal of the revolution. Obviously, civilian Egyptian politicians agree on what they want for the new Egyptian state. They want this reflected in the transitional period. The 1952 popular uprising was hijacked by the military that ultimately produced a dictatorial rule; the Mubarak regime was only the most corrupt and oppressive manifestation of it. Today' Egyptian generals have abandoned the theatrical politics of empty promises and gestures that Nasser introduced to post-colonial Egypt. Tantawi does not claim credit for the 2011 revolution like Nasser did. But Tantawi and his comrades have power. Their statements thus far neither oppose nor support the popular wish of civilian rule. Their fourth statement did not declare the nullification of emergency law but reinstated Mubarak’s corrupt ministers and governors. They have already offended the sensitivities of the public. The Egyptian revolution is far from over. It's most critical phase has just begun.
Pharaoh is Gone: The Next Phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution
Today the Algerian government arrested Ali Belhaj,leader of the banned Front of Islamic Salvation, for a sermon he gave. But Internet anti-dictatorship activists in Algeria had already dubbed tomorrow their January 25th. The removal of Mubarak less than 24 hours before the dawn of the planned Algerian protest may have given a great boost to the Algerian revolutionaries. We'll see if Algeria proves to be ripe for the next phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution. We have learned from Egypt and Tunisia that Facebook communication works only if there are people on the ground with adequate organization ready to take action and build momentum. The April 6 movement in Egypt began in 2008. They called for an April 2009 strike, but then the response was limited. With the success of the Tunisian revolution in forcing Ben Ali out, many Egyptians began thinking they could the same to their dictator if they shed away fear and believe in themselves. Young opposition leaders siezed the moment. They heeded the Arab saying "hit the iron rod when it's hot."
Algeria may prove to be a tougher case. Although there have been protests since January 14, the country has a multi-party system that includes the MB and other Islamists. But the state is military-controlled like Egypt. Algerians have an elected president but they know that when push comes to shove, he does not call the shots. Even in normal times he does not make the most important decisions in the country. With Egyptians now openly calling for a political system controlled by civilians, Algerians might be thinking that they too deserve what Egyptians hope for. Algerian society is not as homogeneous as its Egyptian or Tunisian counterpart. But this may not hinder a mass uprising. The major division in the country produced the Berber-Arab tension, but this is mitigated by the fact that nearly all Algerians are Sunni. Berbers are now leading the charge for change. With Sunni Arabs joining, the country might have a chance in producing the first multicultural civilian state in North Africa.
The current pro-democracy revolt in the Arab world is spearheaded by a generation that grew up under repression but with full awareness of the language of freedom and rights. Egypt and Tunisia tell that declining economic conditions mix with high education levels to produce a good recipe for revolt. Educated people know how to link their living to the upper structures of power in their state.
But Arab countries vary. A Syrian friend of mine tells me that Friday, February 4, 2011, failed to be the Syrian Day of Rage because the regime carried out a psychological terror blitzkrieg. People woke up in Damascus to find the pictures of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad hung at every corner, letting anyone thinking of responding to the cyber activists know that the security forces are there in their neighborhood. The fear tactic worked. But for the long run the regime may have aided in its own demise. Most Syrians never heard of the Internet call to demonstration. But now Asad is telling them that all of them are suspect and they must fear reprisals if they respond to anti-regime instigators. This may force passive Syrians to begin thinking seriously about the possibility that fear is holding them from marching into the path of freedom. Facing one's fear is the first step; the Asad regime has forced it on people. The Syrian regime may have won a battle, but the revolt for freedom is a long term process.
But there is another important obstacle in Syria. The largest opposition group, the MB, had been banned since 1982 and membership in the group is punishable by death after a band of their militants embarked on a campaign of sectarian violence against Alawite security targets. The insurrection was put down violently: the old city of Hama was leveled by air strikes, killing more than 20,000 people and leaving 100,000 refugees. But the regime has grown increasingly dependent on the Alawite minority as a social support base for the regime. A pro-democracy opposition have better a chance of success if it deals with the fears of Alawites under a political system of people power should be the first order of business.
In Bahrain a Sunni family rules a country that has a majority Shia population. The rulers have allowed a measure of representation but has relinquished no power whatsover. In other countries there are grassroots demands for power sharing but ruling families engage in various forms of posturing about political reform without offering any tangible concessions. These are: Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Libya (which began as a military regime before turning into a family rule). The level of political participation varies widely in these countries; Kuwait has a strong parliament and the opposition has a majority, but every resource and instrument of power (oil revenues, military and security forces and burearucracy) is in the hands of Sabah family.
There are other forms of power structures in the Arab world: Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania are military regimes that have allowed extensive measures of freedom but where power rests with those who the group that has the most guns. In the United Arab Emirates and Qatar there are no visible movements from top or bottom for power sharing. But this might change soon, given the spread of the Arab Anti-dictatorship Revolution.
Lebanon and Palestine are exceptional cases. The former is a confessional democracy that witnessed the rise of Hizbullah's military wing under two decades of Israeli occupation. The latter has distorted power structures because of the Israeli occupation. The state has to be free before a clear picture of power emerges. At the society level Palestine and Lebanon offer the most extensive and developed expression of political diversity.
Despite the variety of forms of government, the question at hand has to do with the nature of state political power. So far Lebanon may not even last as a state and Palestine is being dismembered under the cover of a peace process. In the rest of the Arab countries all powers ultimately tend to rest with the person on the top of the politcal pyramid. Tunisia and Egypt have toppled their dictators. The order of business for them now is to move to recognizing the people as collectivity as the sovereign. In Egypt, the transitional military regime that took power after Mubarak departed has acknowledged that it is not a replacement of the "legitimacy that people accept." What this means will soon appear in the actions of the military leaders. The revolution here is entering a new phase.
Algeria may prove to be a tougher case. Although there have been protests since January 14, the country has a multi-party system that includes the MB and other Islamists. But the state is military-controlled like Egypt. Algerians have an elected president but they know that when push comes to shove, he does not call the shots. Even in normal times he does not make the most important decisions in the country. With Egyptians now openly calling for a political system controlled by civilians, Algerians might be thinking that they too deserve what Egyptians hope for. Algerian society is not as homogeneous as its Egyptian or Tunisian counterpart. But this may not hinder a mass uprising. The major division in the country produced the Berber-Arab tension, but this is mitigated by the fact that nearly all Algerians are Sunni. Berbers are now leading the charge for change. With Sunni Arabs joining, the country might have a chance in producing the first multicultural civilian state in North Africa.
The current pro-democracy revolt in the Arab world is spearheaded by a generation that grew up under repression but with full awareness of the language of freedom and rights. Egypt and Tunisia tell that declining economic conditions mix with high education levels to produce a good recipe for revolt. Educated people know how to link their living to the upper structures of power in their state.
But Arab countries vary. A Syrian friend of mine tells me that Friday, February 4, 2011, failed to be the Syrian Day of Rage because the regime carried out a psychological terror blitzkrieg. People woke up in Damascus to find the pictures of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad hung at every corner, letting anyone thinking of responding to the cyber activists know that the security forces are there in their neighborhood. The fear tactic worked. But for the long run the regime may have aided in its own demise. Most Syrians never heard of the Internet call to demonstration. But now Asad is telling them that all of them are suspect and they must fear reprisals if they respond to anti-regime instigators. This may force passive Syrians to begin thinking seriously about the possibility that fear is holding them from marching into the path of freedom. Facing one's fear is the first step; the Asad regime has forced it on people. The Syrian regime may have won a battle, but the revolt for freedom is a long term process.
But there is another important obstacle in Syria. The largest opposition group, the MB, had been banned since 1982 and membership in the group is punishable by death after a band of their militants embarked on a campaign of sectarian violence against Alawite security targets. The insurrection was put down violently: the old city of Hama was leveled by air strikes, killing more than 20,000 people and leaving 100,000 refugees. But the regime has grown increasingly dependent on the Alawite minority as a social support base for the regime. A pro-democracy opposition have better a chance of success if it deals with the fears of Alawites under a political system of people power should be the first order of business.
In Bahrain a Sunni family rules a country that has a majority Shia population. The rulers have allowed a measure of representation but has relinquished no power whatsover. In other countries there are grassroots demands for power sharing but ruling families engage in various forms of posturing about political reform without offering any tangible concessions. These are: Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Libya (which began as a military regime before turning into a family rule). The level of political participation varies widely in these countries; Kuwait has a strong parliament and the opposition has a majority, but every resource and instrument of power (oil revenues, military and security forces and burearucracy) is in the hands of Sabah family.
There are other forms of power structures in the Arab world: Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania are military regimes that have allowed extensive measures of freedom but where power rests with those who the group that has the most guns. In the United Arab Emirates and Qatar there are no visible movements from top or bottom for power sharing. But this might change soon, given the spread of the Arab Anti-dictatorship Revolution.
Lebanon and Palestine are exceptional cases. The former is a confessional democracy that witnessed the rise of Hizbullah's military wing under two decades of Israeli occupation. The latter has distorted power structures because of the Israeli occupation. The state has to be free before a clear picture of power emerges. At the society level Palestine and Lebanon offer the most extensive and developed expression of political diversity.
Despite the variety of forms of government, the question at hand has to do with the nature of state political power. So far Lebanon may not even last as a state and Palestine is being dismembered under the cover of a peace process. In the rest of the Arab countries all powers ultimately tend to rest with the person on the top of the politcal pyramid. Tunisia and Egypt have toppled their dictators. The order of business for them now is to move to recognizing the people as collectivity as the sovereign. In Egypt, the transitional military regime that took power after Mubarak departed has acknowledged that it is not a replacement of the "legitimacy that people accept." What this means will soon appear in the actions of the military leaders. The revolution here is entering a new phase.
Hesitant Egyptian Generals are Shackled by People Power
In Tahrir Square people have been disappointed by the position of the military generals who are still trying to hold the stick from the middle between Mubarak and the Egyptian people. Their televised first meeting, which did not include their Commander in Chief Mubarak, and Statement 1, which did not mention the president, gave the impression that the generals understand the sentiment of the people and have decided to topple Mubarak. Then the military waited 12 hours to ponder their position following the disappointing speeches of Mubarak and his VP. The generals issued Statement 2 on behalf of the High Council of the Armed Forces, announcing that they will move to secure the transition to a new government in accordance with the directions of Mubarak. But they also attempted to appease the demonstrator's feelings by suggesting that the military sympathizes with their legimate demand of free, democratic government. Yet the only action they took is to continue the meeting while calling people to return back to normal life.
Like Mubarak, the generals were too slow for the pace of the revolutionaries. They do not seem to understand (or appreciate) the transfomation that has occurred in Egypt. Egyptian demonstration leaders in different parts of the country are telling Al-Jazeera that Egyptian society has been reborn. Egyptians discovered they could do without government control institutions. When the police pulled out of the streets, people formed local committees to police their own neighborhoods. Egyptian food markets are operating and the prices have not changed without the watch of government inspectors. People are realizing that private markets and the public functions that they control over can operate, without the oppressive, corrupt and bankrupt regime.
The government closed the banks and the stock market; demonstrators tell al-Jazeera that there is no reason why these institutions should be closed and that they would be willing to protect them, just as they rushed to protect the Egyptian Museum before military tanks arrived to the scene. Egyptians striking in factories and other institutions could go right back to work whenever they choose--bar any subbotage by the regime. The loss of tourism is transient and is understandable given the current instability. But tourists did not go to Egypt to make a statement of support to Mubarak; they went there because of the wonderful tourist attractions that Egypt has. Egypt should become even more attractive for tourists when it becomes free. Egyptians tell reporters that they are not bothered by the current losses; they are willing to sacrifice for the long haul until their revolt succeeds.
While parts of Egyptian life have come to a standstill for 18 days and the intial uprising has turned into a full-fleged revolt, the generals are jockeying for their place in the future. The generals do not understand the dynamics of people power. The collective will of the Egyptians is now focused on removing what they see as a dictatorial regime. Appeasing the regime means going down with it. The generals watched while the Mubarak baltagiah threw fire balls on peaceful protesters. The generals stayed put when the police abandoned their responsibility for internal security--except for guarding major national institutions. And now they are using Statement 2 to position their institution for a place in the new Egypt as a guarantor of stability and legitimacy. They are probably thinking of the Turkish model. What is missing is the relevance of this thinking to positioning the military in the unfolding events and emotions on the streets of Egypt. People are losing trust in them. People are wondering, if the preservation of the nation calls for the steps the generals outlined, why do not they proceed? Why do they act like Sulieman, throwing the ball in the revolution's court?
There is war in the country between the people and their top political leaders. Outside Cairo, demonstrators have taken over state buildings, liberating their own country and forcing Mubarak governers out in Asyut and Tanta. In Cairo, people are going out spontaneously in millions calling Mubarak murderer, untrustworthy, and corrupt. People's anger was so visible when protesters realized in the middle of Mubarak's speech yesterday (Feberuary 10, 2011) that he was not stepping down and began chanting angry revolutionary slogans. If Statement 3 does not realign the emotions of the generals with those of the Egyptians, the top brass may go down with Mubarak and the military will likely become separate from and subservient to the civilian government of the New Egypt.This is what many protesters want anyway. They might have their wish.
Like Mubarak, the generals were too slow for the pace of the revolutionaries. They do not seem to understand (or appreciate) the transfomation that has occurred in Egypt. Egyptian demonstration leaders in different parts of the country are telling Al-Jazeera that Egyptian society has been reborn. Egyptians discovered they could do without government control institutions. When the police pulled out of the streets, people formed local committees to police their own neighborhoods. Egyptian food markets are operating and the prices have not changed without the watch of government inspectors. People are realizing that private markets and the public functions that they control over can operate, without the oppressive, corrupt and bankrupt regime.
The government closed the banks and the stock market; demonstrators tell al-Jazeera that there is no reason why these institutions should be closed and that they would be willing to protect them, just as they rushed to protect the Egyptian Museum before military tanks arrived to the scene. Egyptians striking in factories and other institutions could go right back to work whenever they choose--bar any subbotage by the regime. The loss of tourism is transient and is understandable given the current instability. But tourists did not go to Egypt to make a statement of support to Mubarak; they went there because of the wonderful tourist attractions that Egypt has. Egypt should become even more attractive for tourists when it becomes free. Egyptians tell reporters that they are not bothered by the current losses; they are willing to sacrifice for the long haul until their revolt succeeds.
While parts of Egyptian life have come to a standstill for 18 days and the intial uprising has turned into a full-fleged revolt, the generals are jockeying for their place in the future. The generals do not understand the dynamics of people power. The collective will of the Egyptians is now focused on removing what they see as a dictatorial regime. Appeasing the regime means going down with it. The generals watched while the Mubarak baltagiah threw fire balls on peaceful protesters. The generals stayed put when the police abandoned their responsibility for internal security--except for guarding major national institutions. And now they are using Statement 2 to position their institution for a place in the new Egypt as a guarantor of stability and legitimacy. They are probably thinking of the Turkish model. What is missing is the relevance of this thinking to positioning the military in the unfolding events and emotions on the streets of Egypt. People are losing trust in them. People are wondering, if the preservation of the nation calls for the steps the generals outlined, why do not they proceed? Why do they act like Sulieman, throwing the ball in the revolution's court?
There is war in the country between the people and their top political leaders. Outside Cairo, demonstrators have taken over state buildings, liberating their own country and forcing Mubarak governers out in Asyut and Tanta. In Cairo, people are going out spontaneously in millions calling Mubarak murderer, untrustworthy, and corrupt. People's anger was so visible when protesters realized in the middle of Mubarak's speech yesterday (Feberuary 10, 2011) that he was not stepping down and began chanting angry revolutionary slogans. If Statement 3 does not realign the emotions of the generals with those of the Egyptians, the top brass may go down with Mubarak and the military will likely become separate from and subservient to the civilian government of the New Egypt.This is what many protesters want anyway. They might have their wish.
The Day of March: Point of No Return for the Egyptian January 25 Revolution
Egyptians in the various governorates estimate that nearly 20 million people have taken to the streets today (February 11, 2011). All sectors of Egyptian civil society have joined as associations showing their professional identity: doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc. Protestrs are chanting: "Depart means leave," "Mubarak the pilot: how did you accumulate 70 billion?" "Husni Mubarak is Fraud, Omar Sulieman is Fraud" and "revolution, revolution until victory." If one excludes the population groups of below 12 and above 65, the sick and those who are home to care for them, one can reasonablly say that most Egyptians are voting in a referundum unparalled in modern history.
They are calling on the various military units in the field to join them. They are moving peacefully on the symbols of state power: pesidential palaces, government TV station buildings and other state installations. In Cairo, the demonstrators are now facing off the heavily armed troops and snipers of the Republican Guards and remnants of Central Security Forces protecting al-Uruba Palace, where Mubarak lives and works.Some individual demonstrators have tried to throw rocks, but the organizers are holding them off; the organizers want the revolt to remain peaceful. "silmiyah, silmiya," they are chanting. But large, angry crowds standing face to face against the armed protecters of the the dictator is not an event where the Peace Train song will be most popular.
Watching the live al-Jazeera coverage, I heard some people chant "Blood is the price of freedom!" But most of the chants take the form of repeating the main failures of the regime: corruption, polic abuse, inequality, lack of compassion toward the poor, ineffective management, and so forth.
In the meanwhile, there are reports of suspicious movements by regime loyalists. Armed members of the NDP and baltagiah (regime thugs) are breaking into buildings and forcing residents out. Obviously, waiting for the right moment to begin firing. This is in preparation for the chaos that Mubarak predicted. But thus far every move the regime and its loyalts have taken backfired. The most prominent of such moves was the baltigiah violence in Tahrir Square, which showed the world how small, violent and thoughtless the pro-Mubarak mobs are. If they are preparing for civil war, their actions are scaring the protesters into committing themselves to non-violent resistence. It does not make sense for unarmed civilians with political demands to give in to pointless, unfair fight, when they are clearly gaining momentum. This might get out of control, which has already happened last week. But as they did before, the protesters will regroup and continue the revolt. The regime is doing every thing to push them in this direction: the concessions they offer is itnerpreted as weakness that emboldens the protesters. Promising change without taking measures to launch it shows the lack of credibility and enrages angry and disappointed citizens.
Things might get ugly, but it is not likely that today will be decisive. Revolutions are messay business. In Tunisia Ben Ali left after 4 weeks of protests. Egypt's previous revolutions took much longer. The 1919 revolt agains the British took 2 years. That revolt was violent; it was against a foreign military power. Now Egyptians are revolting against a domestic military regime. Many people yesterday said that blood was in the air. But thanks to the disciplined organizers, January 25 may remain peaceful.
They are calling on the various military units in the field to join them. They are moving peacefully on the symbols of state power: pesidential palaces, government TV station buildings and other state installations. In Cairo, the demonstrators are now facing off the heavily armed troops and snipers of the Republican Guards and remnants of Central Security Forces protecting al-Uruba Palace, where Mubarak lives and works.Some individual demonstrators have tried to throw rocks, but the organizers are holding them off; the organizers want the revolt to remain peaceful. "silmiyah, silmiya," they are chanting. But large, angry crowds standing face to face against the armed protecters of the the dictator is not an event where the Peace Train song will be most popular.
Watching the live al-Jazeera coverage, I heard some people chant "Blood is the price of freedom!" But most of the chants take the form of repeating the main failures of the regime: corruption, polic abuse, inequality, lack of compassion toward the poor, ineffective management, and so forth.
In the meanwhile, there are reports of suspicious movements by regime loyalists. Armed members of the NDP and baltagiah (regime thugs) are breaking into buildings and forcing residents out. Obviously, waiting for the right moment to begin firing. This is in preparation for the chaos that Mubarak predicted. But thus far every move the regime and its loyalts have taken backfired. The most prominent of such moves was the baltigiah violence in Tahrir Square, which showed the world how small, violent and thoughtless the pro-Mubarak mobs are. If they are preparing for civil war, their actions are scaring the protesters into committing themselves to non-violent resistence. It does not make sense for unarmed civilians with political demands to give in to pointless, unfair fight, when they are clearly gaining momentum. This might get out of control, which has already happened last week. But as they did before, the protesters will regroup and continue the revolt. The regime is doing every thing to push them in this direction: the concessions they offer is itnerpreted as weakness that emboldens the protesters. Promising change without taking measures to launch it shows the lack of credibility and enrages angry and disappointed citizens.
Things might get ugly, but it is not likely that today will be decisive. Revolutions are messay business. In Tunisia Ben Ali left after 4 weeks of protests. Egypt's previous revolutions took much longer. The 1919 revolt agains the British took 2 years. That revolt was violent; it was against a foreign military power. Now Egyptians are revolting against a domestic military regime. Many people yesterday said that blood was in the air. But thanks to the disciplined organizers, January 25 may remain peaceful.
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
18 American Scholars Support a Moral U.S. Policy toward Egypt
“We the signatories of this statement are scholars and public policy analysts concerned about the implications of the ongoing upheaval in Egypt for the future of U.S. (and Western) relations with the Muslim world. We applaud the decisions the American and European governments made yesterday (February 2, 2011) to side with the Egyptian people in the face of what seems to be planned violence and scare tactics by the failing Mubarak regime. History will credit the Western powers for siding with the values of democracy and human rights in a world-historical moment, despite the caution that might have been called for due to uncertainties about the future of the political system in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. Clearly, Western leaders have decided to read the events accurately and place themselves on the correct side of the future. This principled position combining realpolitik with the best of American ideals is truly path-breaking. While much of the cause of freedom in the Arab world is being written by the bravery and blood of the courageous Egyptian people, we know that history will record that February 2, 2011 was a turning point in relations between the West and the Islamic world.”
Signatories
Mohamed Nimer, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Antony T. Sullivan,Associate Professor, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan
Judith Shapiro,Director, NRSD Program, American University
Gary Weaver, Professor School of International Service, American University
Boaz Atzili, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Jeni Sall, President, Genesis Research Associates Inc.
Easten Law, Instructor, Washington Mentorship Program, American University
Emad Shahin, Associate Professor, Conflict and Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame
Margaret E. Smith, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University
Eve Bratman, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
Carl LeVan, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
John P. Entelis, Professor, Middle East Studies Program, Fordham University
Julie A. Mertus, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Wanda Wigfall-Williams, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Mohamed Abu-Nimer, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Claudia E. Anyaso, Adjunct Professor, Washington Semester, American University
Robert A. Pastor, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Anthony Wanis-St. John, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Signatories
Mohamed Nimer, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Antony T. Sullivan,Associate Professor, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan
Judith Shapiro,Director, NRSD Program, American University
Gary Weaver, Professor School of International Service, American University
Boaz Atzili, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Jeni Sall, President, Genesis Research Associates Inc.
Easten Law, Instructor, Washington Mentorship Program, American University
Emad Shahin, Associate Professor, Conflict and Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame
Margaret E. Smith, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University
Eve Bratman, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
Carl LeVan, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
John P. Entelis, Professor, Middle East Studies Program, Fordham University
Julie A. Mertus, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Wanda Wigfall-Williams, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Mohamed Abu-Nimer, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Claudia E. Anyaso, Adjunct Professor, Washington Semester, American University
Robert A. Pastor, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Anthony Wanis-St. John, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Monday, February 7, 2011
To Members of the Youth Coalition for the Egyptian Revolution
Dear Brothers and Sisters:
Assalamu Alaykum. I admire your bravery and stand for freedom against dictatorship. You are truly role models for all young people around the world.
You are the first generation of young people in modern Egypt wh come together, work together and bleed together to become free. Your sacrifices are transforming the political cultures of Egyptians, Arabs, Muslims and all freedom-loving peoples.
I wonder what you do during down time. Here is a suggestion that can bring more attention and admiration to your cause: Turn Tahrir Square into a forum where Egyptians build consensus on a new social contract defining the state and it relations with society. Write and discuss a new state constitution.
You may think that you lack expertise in political systems and constitutional law. Consider this: Most Americans who wrote the U.S. constitution were not in those professions either. Some of them were in their thirties. Today there are many web resources you could use. You could also invite experts in these areas from among those who demonstrate with you to draft basic parameters for the new Egyptian constitution. Use the American Constitution as an example that youcan adapt to your culture and state. It is perhaps the best constitution in the world. It is consistent with Islamic and Coptic teachings. It is short and deals with principles defining state powers and rights of citizens. The American political system is stable because American leaders believe they derive their power from the constitution, not from the persons in political position. This is why Americans call their political system "A government of laws, not a government of men." But you can consider all other human experiences that respond to the questions you face today.
I am addressing you because I love Egypt and its good-natured people who treated me well on different occasions when I came to the country to work and study. I hope that your revolution achieve the political transformation you say you seek. More important than forcing Mubarak to step down(which you rightfully demand) is to change the Egyptian state system in ways that make it responsive to the aspirations of all citizens and segments of society, including those who do not participate in your demonstrations. This will happen if you and other Egyptians deliberate and agree on the key issues defining the powers of the state and rights of people.
If all the sacrifices you have offered end up replacing the National Democratic Party with another group, then your revolution will have amounted to a regime change. The previous regime lasted for 30 years; yours may not last 3. If I understand your demonstration slogans correctly, you do not want to only change the strongmen and the group that benefits from their rule; you want to free yourselves and all Egyptians by becoming equal citizens. This way you can create a state that will last for your lifetime and beyond.
During the era of dictatorship, state, government, parliament, and military referred to a group of people submitting to the wishes of one leader. In the new Egypt you seek, the state should be the institutions with defined powers and relationships amongst themselves and vis a vis the citizens, the whole people of Egypt, whose vote must be the ultimate source of the legitimate exercise of power. This is what shura and democracy mean.
If you begin thinking and discussing state and society in such manner, you will force the leaders who negotiate solutions to take you seriously. Right now, regime leaders think you are a problem; opposition leaders believe you are a bargaining chip. You are aware of this and reacted by organizing yourselves. You have sent a message that young people count and must be heard. But you need to begin putting forward credible ideas about change. Don't limit yourself to the immediate phase of power handover. Show older Egyptians that you can also lead the public conversation about the new Egyptian state.
You have begun the work of tranforming the Egyptian state away from dictatorship. But what what political culture are your shaping? It is your actions and statements that will tell. If you want to chart Egyptian politics on the course of inclusion, then talk the talk and walk the walk.
Long Live the Shebab of the Egyptian Revolution and all Egptians--free, compassionate and just.
Assalamu Alaykum. I admire your bravery and stand for freedom against dictatorship. You are truly role models for all young people around the world.
You are the first generation of young people in modern Egypt wh come together, work together and bleed together to become free. Your sacrifices are transforming the political cultures of Egyptians, Arabs, Muslims and all freedom-loving peoples.
I wonder what you do during down time. Here is a suggestion that can bring more attention and admiration to your cause: Turn Tahrir Square into a forum where Egyptians build consensus on a new social contract defining the state and it relations with society. Write and discuss a new state constitution.
You may think that you lack expertise in political systems and constitutional law. Consider this: Most Americans who wrote the U.S. constitution were not in those professions either. Some of them were in their thirties. Today there are many web resources you could use. You could also invite experts in these areas from among those who demonstrate with you to draft basic parameters for the new Egyptian constitution. Use the American Constitution as an example that youcan adapt to your culture and state. It is perhaps the best constitution in the world. It is consistent with Islamic and Coptic teachings. It is short and deals with principles defining state powers and rights of citizens. The American political system is stable because American leaders believe they derive their power from the constitution, not from the persons in political position. This is why Americans call their political system "A government of laws, not a government of men." But you can consider all other human experiences that respond to the questions you face today.
I am addressing you because I love Egypt and its good-natured people who treated me well on different occasions when I came to the country to work and study. I hope that your revolution achieve the political transformation you say you seek. More important than forcing Mubarak to step down(which you rightfully demand) is to change the Egyptian state system in ways that make it responsive to the aspirations of all citizens and segments of society, including those who do not participate in your demonstrations. This will happen if you and other Egyptians deliberate and agree on the key issues defining the powers of the state and rights of people.
If all the sacrifices you have offered end up replacing the National Democratic Party with another group, then your revolution will have amounted to a regime change. The previous regime lasted for 30 years; yours may not last 3. If I understand your demonstration slogans correctly, you do not want to only change the strongmen and the group that benefits from their rule; you want to free yourselves and all Egyptians by becoming equal citizens. This way you can create a state that will last for your lifetime and beyond.
During the era of dictatorship, state, government, parliament, and military referred to a group of people submitting to the wishes of one leader. In the new Egypt you seek, the state should be the institutions with defined powers and relationships amongst themselves and vis a vis the citizens, the whole people of Egypt, whose vote must be the ultimate source of the legitimate exercise of power. This is what shura and democracy mean.
If you begin thinking and discussing state and society in such manner, you will force the leaders who negotiate solutions to take you seriously. Right now, regime leaders think you are a problem; opposition leaders believe you are a bargaining chip. You are aware of this and reacted by organizing yourselves. You have sent a message that young people count and must be heard. But you need to begin putting forward credible ideas about change. Don't limit yourself to the immediate phase of power handover. Show older Egyptians that you can also lead the public conversation about the new Egyptian state.
You have begun the work of tranforming the Egyptian state away from dictatorship. But what what political culture are your shaping? It is your actions and statements that will tell. If you want to chart Egyptian politics on the course of inclusion, then talk the talk and walk the walk.
Long Live the Shebab of the Egyptian Revolution and all Egptians--free, compassionate and just.
What is the Muslim Brotherhood Learning?
Watching al-Jazeera Arabic coverage of the unfolding Egyptian revolution, I believe the following two assertion are supported by evidence: (1) Egyptian culture has been Islamized. This is evident not only in the scenes of prayers on Tahrir Square; it is also evident in the apparent receptivity of the protesters to Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-like slogans and leaders. Unconfirmed media estimates of MB participation range between 15 to 30 percent, but these figures are hardly reliable. Western reporters are perhaps using deceptive profiles to guess who is a member of the MB. We don't know what criteria that they using or the basis for such estimates.(2) The Islamization of the culture has meant that the MB is now a welcome part of the emerging Egyptian polity. This is good for Egyptian democracy, because it is helping the largest organization shed away decades of insecurity. Egyptian MB leaders today feel they are part of the people, not apart from them.
That insecurity is the reason why the MB threw their full weight in the revolt only when they felt they had popular cover. Other Egyptians will always remind the MB old guard that the MB did not start the January 25 revolution, but Egyptians will not blame the MB for their initial hesitation. Egyptians will soon praise the MB for being the only force in Egyptian society that have consistently stood against and suffered the wrath of the military regime.
When Mubarak and his television blamed the MB for the protests, more Egyptians took to the streets. The regime's MB scare tactic backfired. But the MB fear that they might still be singled out for special reprisals. They have been using their influence in the protest to stress that their expression is peaceful, chanting "silmiyah, silmiyah" and instructing fellow protesters not to engage in violence. Clearly, they are implementing a long-held position that the people have the right to depose their corrupt, oppressive rulers. The MB and other Egyptians are doing it in the best traditions of non-violence. Future Egyptian governments will have no choice but to step down should people power turn against them.
With sectors of society coming out with specific set of demands on any future government, Egypt's future leaders, including the MB, are learning that governing in a state of people power is about responding to the demands of constituencies. The MB are the most experienced group in Egypt in dealing with people's needs, serving those needs is how they built their support base. But catering to a whole population and being in charge of a nation's economy is a different ball game. Here lies in the major challenge to the MB or any other coming government. They have very little to offer the depressed factory workers, government employees and others who want improvement in the quality of life. The MB response for now is to suggest that they will share the burden of reform with all other citizens. Clearly, the MB is showing that they have learned how to operate in a democracy, where they are one faction that knows its limits.
That insecurity is the reason why the MB threw their full weight in the revolt only when they felt they had popular cover. Other Egyptians will always remind the MB old guard that the MB did not start the January 25 revolution, but Egyptians will not blame the MB for their initial hesitation. Egyptians will soon praise the MB for being the only force in Egyptian society that have consistently stood against and suffered the wrath of the military regime.
When Mubarak and his television blamed the MB for the protests, more Egyptians took to the streets. The regime's MB scare tactic backfired. But the MB fear that they might still be singled out for special reprisals. They have been using their influence in the protest to stress that their expression is peaceful, chanting "silmiyah, silmiyah" and instructing fellow protesters not to engage in violence. Clearly, they are implementing a long-held position that the people have the right to depose their corrupt, oppressive rulers. The MB and other Egyptians are doing it in the best traditions of non-violence. Future Egyptian governments will have no choice but to step down should people power turn against them.
With sectors of society coming out with specific set of demands on any future government, Egypt's future leaders, including the MB, are learning that governing in a state of people power is about responding to the demands of constituencies. The MB are the most experienced group in Egypt in dealing with people's needs, serving those needs is how they built their support base. But catering to a whole population and being in charge of a nation's economy is a different ball game. Here lies in the major challenge to the MB or any other coming government. They have very little to offer the depressed factory workers, government employees and others who want improvement in the quality of life. The MB response for now is to suggest that they will share the burden of reform with all other citizens. Clearly, the MB is showing that they have learned how to operate in a democracy, where they are one faction that knows its limits.
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