Islamic Democracy vs. Islamist Democracy

A few weeks ago, on Saturday, May 5, 2012, I met with four members of the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly at a private event in Virginia. The delegation included three top leaders of Ennahda, the majority party in Tunisia, which has modernist Islamic leaning, and a leader of the Block, the party of the Turnisian president, which has socialist, secular leaning. They shared agreement on the identity of the new state as Arab and Muslim (Tunisia is nearly all Sunni Arabic speaking society). But they seemed obsessed with the Bin Ali legacy; two members served more than a decade in prison. The Block party leader is a coalition partner to Ennahada. He was very gracious in sharing the history of his group in offering their podium for Ennahda to express its views during the repressive years of the deposed dictator.

Little did I hear about the greater injustices that Bin Ali committed against the  whole people of Tunisia. Now that the election brought these parties into power, the challenge for the factions is to transform into revolutionary leaders for all Tunisians. This means they have to begin talking about politics with people at the  center of it, whether in the past or in the present or the into the future. Factional narratives of history will inform how each faction behaves and the priorities they place with regards to the  national agenda. Leaders who know what their factions feel without placing those special feelings in the general public's mood are not good national leaders.

The risk of factional narratives is that politics may become reduced into factional rivalries that alienate the vast majority of the  people who made the revolutionary outcomes possible but without committing themselves to factions. The danger implied in the slide to factionalism (whether led by one or a coalition of a few groups) is the possibility of the return to dictatorship or the development of a new form of authoritarianism. General Rachid Bin Ammar did not support his boss not for the sake of the current ruling parties, but to side with the demonstrable will of the masses (which were not chanting the names of any party or group, except the Bin Ali party they wanted out). The Turkish experience shows that generals are tempted to step into politics in the name of solving crises, when parties are engaged in infighting and the public is unhappy. Thus de-factionalizing politics by empowering people in Tunisia is in the interest of building democracy. Another alternative is the authoritarianism of factions, which may result from the inability or unwillingness to follow the natural course of the people power revolution by creating a system based on checks and balances that prevent any segment, institution or faction from excercising hegemony over the political system. In other words, current political leaders and the people who brought them to power can only ensure the ability to develop people centered narratives and political solutions by sharing power not only amongst the national elite but also with people in their localities, clubs, schools, and streets. This would force political leaders to begin referring to political memories that the general has experienced. This is the best assurance for democratic transformation. 

Is al-Nahdha Succeeding or Failing the Salafi Test?

The clashes between the Salafis and Tunisian security forces in Jendoubah http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18222810 may be seen in the West as an evidence that Ennahda government is willing to face off elements who operate outside the law. This is a premature conclusion as we are not sure that the security forces are under the control of the ruling party. Remember that this is a party that came to form a government after the Constitutional Assembly's election last year. The ancient regime's apparatus, particularly the security sector, is still largely unchanged. But the clashes imply clearer noteworthy indications:
1. While the Salafis are attempting to prove that they are more Islamic than the ruling Islamist party, Ennahda is trying to show those outside Islamic camps that it is more moderate than the Salafis and more committed to the rule of law. I am afraid that if the transition to democracy does not go well and if economic opportunity in Sidi Bouzid, where the attacks on liquor shops started, do not improve, no amount of state coercion will end the current conflict, which feeds on economic frustration. More importantly, what is lost here is a proper discussion and treatment of the roots of the problem.
2. Resorting to the coercive power of the state to settle what is essentially a cultue war over what the Islamic injunction against alcohol means for the state is not the appropriate long-term answer. Ennahda Minister of Interior spoke about the rule of law after violent attacks aimed for shut down the legal sale of alcohol. But the education and civic dialogue responses have been extremely lacking. The Salafis are ideological opponents. Their arguments have to be defeated.
3. Coercion alone will be self-defeating so long as the Salafi leaders can convince their supporters that the struggle now is between those who want Islamic law (the Salafis) and those who want power (Ennahda). This comes at a time when the ruling party has not even begun the work of dismantling the ancient regime. The majority party should remember that it came to a position of authority through a popular mass movement beyond Islamist ranks. If the political process now moves into a showdown between the various Islamist camps, which would alienate the vast majority of Tunisians, a coup is possible. This is one of the core lessons of the Turkish pre-2002 model of military-political relations.
4. A challenge to democracy should be treated with more democracy. Religious scholars agree that the consumption and sale of alcohol by Muslims is prohibited by Islamic law. Most Tunisians do not consume alcohol, but they cannot impost a ban on non-Muslims, including the millions of tourists who come to the country. More, there is no consensus among scholars that the state should be the agency to enforce that article of Islamic law, but the  state should enforce law and order. No individual or group should take law enforcement into their own hands, let alone force their views on religion and state.
5. The Tunisian Revolution started as a local protest in Sidi Bouzid, where the current problem also began. The government has the power to pass laws allowing localities to establish their own rule on the sale of alcohol. This is what many governments around the world do. Thus empowering the people of Sidi Bouzid to make a public decision about the issue is the appropriate way of handling the problem.
6. The  Salafis are likely to go along with this proposal. They have just launched their own political party; therefore, they have interest in staying within the mainstream. Giving them a window of opportunity locally may keep them busy winning hearts and minds than debating whether to support violence against alcohol stores or security forces. If they are able to convince Sidi Bouzid local government to ban the sale of alcohol, the police should enforce the law. The factionalization of politics threatens democratic transition in Tunisia if politics becomes reduced to the ability of the national political majority to impose its will over all issues and all other forces in society. The  Tunisians are learning that a people power revolution can devise people-centered solutions to political crises, but only if enlightened leaders control their factional interests in the pursuit of the greater good.

Can the Arabs Produce the World's First True Democracy?

One can argue that an intrinsic democratic polity, or true democracy, takes place when people collectively exercise power. This is exactly what Arab peoples have been doing since December 17, 2010. But the people will transorm their states into true democracies when they complete their power grab and peacefully hold onto power. It will be time before we know whether this will be the fate of the Arab Spring. Let's hope it will turn out this way.

Most revolutions in the world took the form of armed rebellion. In most cases the regime was a foreign occupying force. So the Arab Spring belongs to the small number of cases in which people revolt against their own rulers. But Arab revolutions are even more unique in world history.

The revolts were triggered by the Bouazizi act of self-immolation,which runs against Muslim custom. The incident shocked people into action. They read it as a protest against a general condition of political oppression. Bouazizi's town members went to demonstrate at government buildings; this was met by a security crackdown that left more injuries, sparking a spontaneous uprising that spread from town to town. In three weeks it reached the capital and once the Bin Alis left the country, the spirit of "can do" spread in the Arab world. Three dictators are out; one regime has been completely wiped out--thanks in part to NATO; constitutions have changed or being debated, and in every Arab country there have been some significant impact. At the very least, one could say without doubt that Arab political culture is transforming; there is a collectiv people consciousness that will not accept political alienation--which most Arabs have tolerated for so long. One can appreciate this point by comparing the ongoing events in the Arab world to othe revolutions.

The Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 started by action of Protestant politicians against their own king. The French Revolution involved the grassroots but the main action began when the Bourgeoise of the Third Estate, part of the ruling elite, revolted against the nobility and the priests. The revolution ende fuedalism, empowered the parliament and gave rights to people. However, unlike Arab revolts, it did not start from people who were completely marginalized. The American Revolution was triggered by state level action when the leaders of the new colonies saw Britain as a foreign entity and wanted to separate from it.

In the Carribean, the Cuban Revolution was an armed rebellion that failed two times before coming to power. In the Eastern side of the globe, the Bolshevik October Revolution started with ideas then turned into an armed rebellion. So did the Communist Chinese Revolution.

The anti-Communist revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Euroe were triggered by a world event: the collapse of the Soviet Union in the wake of its defeat in Afghanistan. The movement began in Poland, where an organized labor union was leading the call for change. In several Eastern European countries the old communist regime leaders morphed into some form of social democrats and for the most part remained in power.

Closer to the Arab world, the Iranian Revolution stands out. Millions of Iranians took part in it, which like the Arab Spring began in the form of peaceful protest. But unlike the Arab Spring movements, the Iranian revolt followed a well stated plan of action published in 1969 by the leader of the revolution, Khomeini, in his book Velayeti Fagih. Young Mullahs began immediately mobilizing and their networks were in place to bring out masses of people; the violent reaction of the Shah led to awful bloodshed but ended with a total regime change in less than one year.

Despite all the traditions of democracy in the world and although democracy is about people empowering themselves by ruling themselves, the world is yet to witness a true democratic rule.

Western democracies are dominated by corporate interest, notwithstanding Scandinavian exceptions that value direct democracy measures; Israel promotes itself as an oasis of democracy in the Middle East, but this is a country where the center of power gravitates to Ashkenazi business and military leaders. India has a reputation of being the world's larges democracy, because the military has stayed out of politics and the country has the largest number of voters. But India is yet to complete dismantling its discriminatory caste system, which completely disenfranchises hundreds of millions of citizens.

Can the Arabs offer the world the first political systems where no tribe, company, party, social or regligious leaders group, or military general dominate? Yes they can, if they believe and work for it. Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, thinker and founder of the Tunisian Ennahda Party, which received a plurality of votes a few weeks ago, believes such system would pass much of state power to local governing bodies that are close to the needs of the citizens.

Will the national power regime in Tunisia, i.e., the political networks that developed since the creation of the post-colonia state, allow Tunisians to achieve Al-Ghannouchi vision? Will Egyptians who have had an ancient political history of strong central government go for bottom-up people power democracy? Only the continued public engagement of ordinary Arabs and youth groups can raise the likelihood of this happening. If it does, the Arab peoples will have reentered history with a big splash that might cause political Tsunamis across the world.