هل تنجز الثورة المصرية ديمقراطية حقيقية على أساس مفهوم"القوة للشعب"؟

الدولة المعاصرة هي بناء هيكلي لممارسة القوة السياسية (أو السلطة) في أي بلد من البلدان. إن ثورة 25 يناير المصرية حث تاريخي فريد في ممارسة السلطة الشعبية عن طريق الخروج الجماهيري الهائل للتعبير عن الإرادة الجمعية للامة. فهذا يحدث لأول مرة ليس فقط في تاريخ المسلمين السنة (الذين لم يثوروا أبدا كمجموعة سكانية متعددة الأطياف ضد حكامهم) ، ولكن أيضا في تاريخ البشرية. وسوف تعد انتكاسة للحضارة الإنسانية إذا فشل المصريون ف مأسسة هذا الإنجاز الذي قد ينتج أول ديمقراطية شعبية حقيقية في التاريخ.
إن ما تحقق لغاية الآن هو إزاحة مبارك ، النقطة العليا في هرم القوة لدولة 1952، ولكن نظامه لا يزال يحكم. عندما هتف المتظاهرون "الجيش والشعب يد واحدة" فكان هذا يعني الافتراض بأن تذوب جميع مكونات الدولة والمجتمع في بوتقة الثورة لإنشاء نظام جديد. وعلاوة على ذلك ، فإن دور المؤسسة العسكرية هو أن تكون الضامن النهائي لأمن الناس، و خصوصا عندما تحولت قوات الأمن المركزي والشرطة للعمل ضد الشعب وتخلت عن واجب الحفاظ على السلام الاجتماعي. ولكن هذه هي قراءة المصريين المدنيين لدور الجيش، وقد لا يكون الجنرالات مقتنعين بهذه القراءة للأحداث.
إذا كان الجنرالات صادقين في تصريحاتهم بالسماح بالتحول السياسي لسلطة مدنية فإنهم بحاجة لإظهار أنهم مرتاحون لفكرة "القوة للشعب" كأهم إنجازللثورة التي قلبت هرم القوة في الدولة لصالح الشعب. لكن الشعب المصري ليس دمويا ويريد أن يعطي الفرصة لكل من لم يمارسوا الاستبداد والفساد لكي يصلحوا أنفسهم ويعترفوا ويتأقلموا مع الواقع الجديد. فإما أن يصبح هذا المفهوم هو الإطار لإعادة تشكيل الدولة المصرية الجديدة وإلا فإنه قد يتم القضاء على المنجز الأساسي للثورة. لقد قام الجنرالات بتحقيق بعض من مطالب الثورة ولكنهم لم يقوموا حتى بالافراج عن السجناء السياسيين أو رفع حالة الطوارئ. بل لا يزال فلول نظام مبارك يتصرفون كما لو ان كل ما أراده الشعب قد تحقق بتنحي مبارك. إن الجنرالات لم يعربوا عن إقرارهم أو احترامهم للتغيير الجذري في الثقافة الساسية المصرية التي أصبحت تري أن موازين القوى الداخلية يجب أن تعود لوضعها الطبييعي، أي ليد المدنيين. ولن يكون دور الجيش مبررا قبل أن يقر الجنرالات أنه لن يكون بمقدورهم من الآن فصاعدا السيطرة على الحياة المدنية. إن مواجهة هذه المعضلة هي المرحلة الحالية التي تمر بها ثورة 25 يناير المصرية.
لقد سحقت الثورة المصرية الممارسات القديمة للعبة القوة السياسية ولكن تحقق هذا من حيث المبدأ فقط، و يرى الثوار أن عليهم الآن أن يحولوا هذا المكتسب إلى واقع على الأرض بسرعة وإلا فسوف تحبط الثورة. واحدة من مهام الثورة هو ردم الهوة بين ما يقوله الدستور عن كيفية وشرعية ممارسة القوة السياسية وما يحدث على الأرض. وبالتالي يجب على من يكتبون الدستور الجديد ترسيخ الاعتراف بما أنجزته ثورة 25 ينايروهو وجوب هيمنة قوة الشعب. فهذه هي القوة التي أطاحت بالنظام القديم ، وهي ذات القوة التي ينبغي أن يضفي الدستور الجديد الطابع الرسمي لها. لقد أظهر المصريون للعالم معناها من خلال تلاحمهم ووقوفهم لجانب بعضهم من أجل إرساء قواعد جديدة للفعل السياسي يكون عمادها تعزيز حرية الناس وضمان إنشاء مؤسسات ترسخ العدالة الاجتماعية بلا قهر ولكن بحماية من الدستور والقانون. وليس مهم الآن الحديث المفصل عن مأسسة سلطة الشعب ، ولكن عما إذا كان من المعترف به كمفهوم أساسي في عالم ما بعد 25 يناير 2011. وأهم القوى الفاعلة التي ينبغي أن تقر بذلك علنا هم جنرالات مصر لأن معناها الرئيس هو تقليص دور الجيش كشرط لازم لإنهاء الاستبداد وبناء نظام حر وعادل.
إذا فإن الشعب المصري الآن في طور تدريب قادة الجيش على معنى السياسة في الدولة الجديدة القائمة على مفهوم قوة الشعب. هذا واضح في رد فعل الثوريين لضرب المتظاهرين من قبل الشرطة العسكرية يوم الجمعه 25 فبراير 2011، فقد دعى الشباب للتعبئة الفورية لمواجهة العسكرفي ميدان التحرير. ولكن أظهر الجنرالات قدرا من الدهاء باصدار بيان علني يعتذر عن الحادث ويؤكد عدم صدور أوامر بضرب المتظاهرين.
الجيش هومؤسسة تمارس عملها بإصدار وتنفيذ أوامر من خلال سلسلة تنظيمية. فمن غير المعقول أن يتصرف ضباط الشرطة العسكرية المرابطون في ميدان التحريردون أمر من قياداتهم. ولذلك ينبغي للمرء أن يفترض -- حتى يتوفر دليل على العكس -- أن الأمر بتفريق المتظاهرين بالقوة جاء من أعلى، وإن لم يكن من طنطاوي نفسه فهو المسؤل عنه في نهاية الأمر. وهذا التهرب من الحقيقة يفسر على أنه دليل يظهر بأن قادة الجيش لايزالون يقودون بذات العقلية البلطجية الغير مسؤلة التي أودت بمبارك إلي نهايته. على الجنرالات أن يفهموا أن شعب ثورة 25 يناير لن يكون بمقدوره أن يسمح ببقاء قادةعسكريين (أو مدنيين) لا يفهمون معنى المصداقية في الخطاب العام. والمصداقية مطعونة في حالات اللجوء للتزليف أو لإنكار ما هو معلوم للناس بالضرورة. إن أي تكرار لمثل هذه الأحداث ستعني التصادم بين الشعب وقيادات العسكر. وهو ما يعني أن النظام المصري سيؤل إلى مآل شقيقه الليبي البئيس وسيتم تغيير جذري وكامل للنظام ليس فقط لمؤسساته وأدواته بل وحتى لأشخاصه جلهم إن لم يكن كلهم.
لقد اختبر طنطاوي وجنرالاته الثوار ووجدوا أنهم جادون وإن كانوا يمهلون. ولكنهم الشباب بدأوا يشكون في نوايا قيادات الجيش، ولعلهم بدأوا بالاعداد لاحتمال المواجهة. وبالإمكان للجيش الإقرار بالخطأ وإعلان العمل على التصحيح و الدفع بمبادرات لإظهار حسن النوايا بتحقيق مطالب إضافية نادى بها الثوار لتهدئهم. هذه هي الوسائل الوحيدة لاستعادة المصداقية لدى الشعب، وإلا فستفسر المواراة بأن قيادة الجيش لا تعي أو لا تحترم الطابع المؤسسي في الدولة المعاصرة، وهو ما يعني أن الجنرالات غير مؤهلين لقيادة الجيش فضلا عن مشاركة المدنيين في إرساء مفاهيم وأطر الدولة الجديدة.
وبغض النظر عمن سيقود، فما هو الدور المراد للجيش في الحياة المصرية الجديدة؟ هناك من يرى تسليم الملف الأمن القومي للجيش كوسيلة لاستمالة قيادات الجيش. وهذا التفكير متعجل وغير مدروس، لأنه يبطل مفهوم سلطة الشعب، فينبغي أن ينظر لأفراد وقيادات للجيش على أنهم مجموعة من الموظفين المعنيين بحماية الناس. والأمن القومي هو في صلب عمل الدولة في أية ديمقراطية فاعلة بالعالم ويتم تأمينه من خلال الحصول على الموارد العامة، مما لا بد له أن يؤثر على عمل أي حكومة. إن الأنظمة الدكتاتورية العسكرية هي التي يسمح للجنرالات فيها بمناقشة أمور عامة بمعزل عن المدنيين. هذا هو فعله نظام مبارك الذي أسقطه الشعب.
وفي المقابل، يتطلع بعض المصريون إلي العلاقة بين العسكر والمجتمع في تركيا كنموذج يمكن الاحتذاء به. لكن المدنيون الأتراك ليسوا سعداء بهذا الوضع، فالجيش هناك مازال يسيطر على جميع الجوانب الهامة في الدولة. وحتى القادة العسكريين المتقاعدين يغترون بقوتهم ومزاياهم بما يكفي للقيام أحيانا بالتفكير بمؤامرات لاسقاط الحكم المدني. وبالإضافة لذلك، فهناك فرق كبير بين عسكر مصر ونظرائهم الأتراك، لأن المصريين إن تنازلوا للمدنيين فهم يفعلون ذلك تحت ضغط الثوار وليس نتيجة لمراجعات أظهرت لهم أن الإصلاح واجب. أما قيادات الجيش التركي فقبلت بدورطليعي للسياسيين المدنيين منذ نشأة الدولة التركية الحديثة. والحقيقة التي لا يمكن أن تغفل هي أن الجنرالات المصريين مكرهون لامبادرون وهم متباطؤن بالاستجابة لمطالب الثورة، مما يعني أنهم يحاولون جاهدين تقليل خسائرهم.
ولكن هناك نموذج آخر لعلاقة المجتمع بالجيش يفضله العديد من المحتجين كما بدى في لافتات تنادي "بالدولة المدنية" و "الحكم المدني." بموجب هذا البديل الذي يعمل به في جميع الدول الديمقراطية المستقرة ، تخضع مؤسسة الجيش للسلطة المدنية بنص الدستور والقانون واللوائح الإدارية والحكومية والممارسة الفعلية. في هذه الدول يقوم ممثلو الشعب المنتخبون بإقرار الميزانية العسكرية واعلان الحرب والموافقة على تعيين القادة العسكريين. في ظل النظام المصري الحالي فإن قيادة العسكر ليست مستقلة عن الشعب والحكومة فحسب، بل إنها تسيطرعلى جميع جوانب الحياة المصرية. هذه الحالة من الدكتاتورية العسكرية هو ما قامت الثورة للإطاحة به.
الأفراد العسكريون هم أناس مثل كل مواطن مصري. لكن المؤسسة العسكرية هي حصرية و قد سعى قادتها لقهرالمصريين لمدة ستين عاما. وإذا لم تنهي الثورة المصرية هذا الوضع بعمومه فما هو إنجاز الثورة إذن؟ قدينتهي المصريون بالحصول على انتخابات حرة وبرلمان يتمتع بسلطة على الورق لكن في الواقع لا يمكنه أن يفعل الكثير لتأمين الحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية التي نادت بها الثورة واستشهد من أجلها الكثيرون. وحيهنا سوف يندفع الناس ضد قادة الثورة. أما مصر فستدخل مرحلة جديدة من الاستبداد، وربما بأسماء وعناصر منتفعة جديدة. إن قوة الشعب لا تعني اعتبارا فارغا للشعب على أنه الحكم النهائي للشرعية، بل إنها تعني تقسيم و توزيع منظومة القوة السياسية بين الشعب كأفراد وكمجموعة وبين مختلف المؤسسات بهدف منع تركيز السلطات في أيدي قلة من الناس. وفي الحالة المصرية فإن هذا يستلزم أيضا إعادة تشكيل المنظمات العسكرية والأمنية حتى لا تنشأ ظروف تمكنها من الاستحواذ على السلطة واضطهاد المواطنين مجددا. وعندها سيثري الشعب المصري الحضارة الإنسانية بمعاني وممارسات للسياسة لم تعرف من قبل.

The Egyptian People Power State: Is it Possible?

The contemporary state comprises structures of power in any given country. The massive Egyptian January 25th Revolution is a unique historical event not only in the history of Sunni Muslims, who never revolted as a whole (yet diverse) population group against their own rulers, but also in the history of mankind. Never before in human history has this overwhelming expression of collective will been exhibited in the way it appeared in Egypt (and Tunisia before). It will be a setback to human civilization if Egyptians fail to institutionalize the People Power that forced Mubarak to leave.
Mubarak, the tipping point of the power pyramid in the 1952 republic, has been scratched off, but his regime is still intact. When the protesters chanted “the army and the people are one hand” this meant that during a revolution all components of state and society must melt into one body to create the new order. Moreover, because the military’s job is to be the ultimate guarantor of people’s security, that institution had to step in when the Central Security Forces and Police turned against the people and abandoned their duty of maintaining domestic peace. But this is the reading of the role of the military by ordinary Egyptians; it may not be how the generals read the events since January 25, 2011.
Still, if People Power is the supreme political value in the new state, the military’s involvement in the transition should be temporary and very limited. Indeed, the Revolution will have only institutionalized oppression if it agreed to a military encroachment into civilian life. People Power means soldiers must act now on the expectation that they are going back to their barracks.
But there are threats facing the Revolution from the very people who stand to lose positions of privilege. Let’s face it: most of these people are current or former leaders in the military. This is what the 1952 regime did in Egypt. The generals who stepped in when ordinary Egyptians defeated the Mubarak security forces need to show that they are comfortable with submitting to the new reality of People Power. This reality will either be defeated or will successfully define the new Egyptian state. The generals have met some of the revolution’s demands but have not yet even released political prisoners or lifted the state of emergency. Some of the remnants of the Mubarak regime are acting as if all the people wanted was for Mubarak and his family to leave. The generals have not expressed commitment to the drastic change in the internal balance of power between civilians in the military—a change that was commanded by the revolution’s state of People Power. The generals will not lead a constructive transition before they realize that they will have no control over civilian life any more. This is the main challenge that now faces the Egyptian January 25th Revolution.
One of the tasks of the Revolution is to erase the gap between what the constitution says and what happens on the ground. Thus the writing of the new Constitution must proceed by acknowledging what the January 25th Revolution has already achieved: the dominance of the People. It is this power that deposed the ancient regime; it is this power that must be institutionalized. The new Constitution should be seen as only the formalization of this reality.
If People Power is to define the new state, then Egyptians are now in the middle of re-training the leaders of the military. This is evident in the revolutionaries’ reaction to the beating of protesters by the military police on Friday, February 25, 2011. Youth leaders reacted with an immediate call for mobilization to face-off the military in Tahrir Square. Leaders of the military exhibited shrewd skill by releasing a public statement apologizing for the incident and saying what happened was not sanctioned from above.
The military is an organization in which power is exercised though a chain of command. The military police officers who beat the protesters would not have acted without an order from above. Therefore, one should assume--until there is proof to the contrary--that the order came from the top, most likely from Tantawi himself. This is a turning point in the revolution’s history. If the military leaders do not come clean in their explanation of what happened, they will lose credibility and confrontation with the revolutionaries will become inevitable. People Power means that any leaders, military or civilian, must be capable and ready to withstand public scrutiny. A baltagiah (thuggish) mindset cannot rule free people.
But the core issues in the ongoing negotiation between society and military go beyond atmospherics. What role will the military have in Egyptian life? There are some arguments that civilians should surrender the national security file to the military in the new Egyptian state as way of placating them. This is a dangerous proposal, because it essentially nullifies People Power. The military should be seen as formations of functionaries with a certain job, as opposed to an institution relevant to the political system (for now it is the political system). In any functioning democratic state in the world, national security is one policy area. It is run through the procurement of funds and the mobilization of an organizational structure. Only in military regimes, the generals are allowed to exercise of power in ways that excludes civilians. This is the Mubarak regime that the people revolted against.
Some Egyptians look at state-society relations in Turkey as a model. But the Turkish civilians are not happy with what they have. Their military is still in control of all important aspects of state and civilian life. Even retired military leaders feel secure and resourceful enough to engage in conspiracies to topple civilian rule. Yet, never in Turkish life has the military exercised the dominant role that the Egyptian military has. But there is another model that many Egyptian protesters expressed support for in posters that read “civilian state” and “civilian rule.” Under this alternative, which is adopted in nearly all stable democratic states, the military submits to civilian control. Elected representatives decide military budget, declare war, and confirm military leaders. Under the current Egyptian system, the military is not only independent of the people and the state; it is fully in control of all aspects of Egyptian civilian life. This state of military dictatorship is what the revolution set out to change.
Military personnel are people like every other Egyptian citizen. But the institution of the military is exclusive and has allowed its leaders to oppress Egyptians for sixty years. If the January 25th Egyptian Revolution does not destroy this state of affair, Egyptians may likely end up with free elections and a parliament that on paper has power but in practice can do little to secure freedom and social justice—the two main values enunciated by the revolution and are key to reinforcing People Power.
People Power does not mean an empty respect for the people as the final arbiter of legitimacy. It means state power will have to be divided in an orderly fashion so that political power will never be allowed to fall into the hands of the few. In the Egyptian case, this entails the restructuring of military and security organizations so that they may never be able to abuse people again.
The enunciation of social justice does not mean a People Power system is a socialist state. In fact in a Muslim culture it requires the institutionalization of a free market system. Muslims should be free to earn and keep their earning unhampered by the corrupt practices of political parasites. Legal and constitutional protections should guarantee the sacredness of private property. Only such measures will prevent the sort of draconian asset sequestration campaigns that the 1952 state was famous for. But People Power means that corporate political power will be checked so as to prevent business people and their economic organizations from amassing political clout to enrich themselves—like they do in Arab feudalist regimes where the rich owns and rules. A People Power regime, then, is free and fair.

February 25, 2011 and the Transformation of Human Civilization

Millions of Arabs, Persians, Kurds, and Africans in dozens of cities in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, among other countries, are out on the streets now (Friday, February 25, 2011, 9:28 am EST) demanding either regime change or reform. Although the vast majority are Muslim, they include a substantial number of Christians; some are non-believers. The protesters are majority Shia in Bahrain and Iraq, majority Kurdish in northern Iraq, and majority Tawariq in Southern Libya. People who are out are not only common young people, but also political parties, tribal leaders, clansmen, professionals, women, and even children.

This is a historic Friday in the memory of the region's people, but it might be remembered as a turning point in human civilization. The organic massive expression (though chants and posters) of revultion to despotism, nepotism, factionalism, tribalism, corruption, poverty, discrimination, and cronyism directed against people's own rulers never happened before in that part of the world. To be sure, Arabs and Muslims protested before, but these movements were either against foreign rule or were localized or limited to certain regions or religious or political segments. Today all factions, clans, tribes and regions are forced to submit to popular will so as not to appear outside the mainstream. In nearly all countries demonstrators are raising their own national flags and the independence era flag of Libya, whose people are now experiencing the wrath of their falling dictator.

The powers to be are failing miserably. The strangest of all current leaders is not Qaddafi, for despite his crazed, irrational behavior he proved to be consistent. When Libyans topple him and finish cleaning up their house, they will agonize on why they have let this oppressor stay in power for so long.

But the most bizzare of all rulers are the Iraqi leaders in Baghdad and major cities in Kurdistan. Al-Maliki called the demonstrations anti-democratic and suspicious. Although he asked people in a televised address not to partake in them, people are coming out in Shia, Sunni and Kurdish areas. The security forces of the two ruling Kurdish patrons, Talibani and Barazani, are shooting at their own ethnic cohorts. The demands in Iraq do not include regime change; only an end to corruption, nepotism and the mishandling of the economy.

Iraq shows that transition to democracy is messy, but more importantly, it is about a cultural change that goes beyond the theatrics of public mobilization or the process of voting for a group of leaders. Young Iraqis are out on the streets not because they didn't vote, but because they have nothing to lose and everything to gain from challenging governments whose leaders live by standards unknown to them. Until recently al-Maliki was paid $360,000 per year--a pay rate familiar only to the American advisors who helped in bringing him to power. A few weeks ago, he realized the unfairness of his pay rate and cut it in half. But by doing this he actually demonstrated to Iraqis who were unaware before, how their leader is so rich while they are becoming even poorer and less served than they were under their former dictator Saddam. Thus while other Arabs and Muslims are pressing political freedom, Iraqis have joined the revolution for economic freedom and justice.

Most people around the world are still watching Arabs and Muslims. The Western media, focused on power shifts, has underestimated the depth of the humane element of the rage of Arabs and Muslims. But it will only be time before the rest of the world wakes up to a new dawn in human civilization: People Power has finally broke out. It is no strange that the Arab masses are leading. They have been collectively passive, yet internalizing the lessons of unfair and inhumane relationships and conditions for 1350 years. It took western colonialism and post-colonial modern despotism to shock their political cultures into finally realizing that the true and harshest enemy is the one from within: the lack of human courage to connect with other human beings, including neighbors and relatives or others they used to suspect because they were different, in order to take the risk, the gamble, of facing off conditions, symbols and leaders of oppression and injustice.

Revolutions have always been hijacked. This is likely to either be fullfilled or Arab and Muslim societies will implode. But there is hope. The diverse elements that make the anti-dictatorship revolution only share values. They pick up lessons in organization and courage by watching one another, but each entity ultimately responds to its own conditions and specific ways of how to become free, equal and capable of enforcing a way of life where people live by their means, get the jobs they qualify for, enjoy the fruit of their labor or investment, and receive an equitable share of public cost and revenue.

Who is stopping them?: rulers who may preach some of these values but violate them in practice. What about the role of Islamists, tribal leaders and religious and ethnic minorities? These formations are offering values that now encourage people to go out to demand their basic rights. All these elements have realized that they can win only by allowing everyone else to win--fairly and squarely--for all are equal in the sight of God: they are all members of one human family. Whatever configuration of power to be had among them should be subservient, not oppresive, to all of them.

Yes, there will be smart and organized opportunists who will try to reach to the top on the shoulders of ordinary people. But thanks to education, the information revolution, and to rising common political culture, people will always come back to reassert their right to live under conditions of liberty and equity.

This is an event with interconnected episodes. The blood that is being spilled in the streets of Tripoli, Libya is making people outside Libya wonder why this country did not follow the same pattern of Tunisia and Egypt (whose revolts were much less bloody). The people outside Libya are reaching the conclusion that the concentration of power (which ultimately boils down to gunpower) in the hands of the few is a danger to their attempt to go to the promised land of freedom and justice if it does not submit culturally and institutionally to the grand idea of People Power. This is why the Tunisians are back to the streets in large crowds and both the Egyptians and Jordanians are raising their political demands. The Egyptians now want to depose the Mubarak era government and want Mubarak arrested and tried (This is not vengeance against an old man; it is the quest for justice in the face of revelations about the public funds he and his family members have been channeling to privat accounts in banks around the world). The Bahrainis and Jordanians (who are now demonstrating not only in the West Bank-majority Amman but also in the East Bank-majority Karak) are calling for constitutional changes that would curtail the despotic powers of their kings.

This is a long overdue transformation of the political cultures of Arab and Muslim peoples. They are not going back to old ways, they are actualizing for every member of the human family the true meaning of citizenship and political emancipation. To outsiders, elements of the unique cultures in every country and city may be apparent in the dress, prayers and foreign languages. But this is more reason to realize the universality of what is taking place. People are going out not to show their particularism; rather, they are using their particularism as a source of social energy to achieve what all people share: a stake in the configuration of power that frame their lives. In Benghazi today a local revolutionary council has been established to fuze tradition and modernity through the transcendant human spirit seeking to actualize the ultimate truth: that we, tribe members, doctors, street vendors, ethnics, religionists, intellectuals, women, and young people, are one.

This expression of People Power has clearly built on the best of human traditions of non-violence, human courage and dignity and truth-telling. This is a new wave not only for democracy but also for human civilization.

Qaddafi Speaks: The Worldview of Dictators

As al-Qaddafi regime began to lose grip over the population in Benghazi, al-Baydha and other parts of Libya, the government television aired a taped talk by the oldest son of Qaddafi. Saif al-Islam had been propped as a reformer. At one point he went public with his opposition and the father closed down his satellite station. Now Saif al-Islam removes this mask and shows his true colors. The scorn with which he spoke to his people is unbelievable. Apparently the dictator and his son believe they are Libya; without them there will be no country and no life. The talk represents how the ruling family members see the people they rule and the world dynamics in which they live.

Saif al-Islam suddenly appears on television and begins delivering an impromptu address. Saif al-Islam has no official position in the government. But he is obviously banking on what is known by now: that there is a ruling family running the country. He is the apparent heir since he is the oldest son and it is assumed that everyone in the country will not even raise a question about whether Saif represents his father or the government.

Saif al-Islam basically exibited an understanding of the world that is more in line with his father's thinking than the PR Saif al-Islam has adopted since he entered public life in 2005. All of a sudden, the reformer has realized that Libya is a tribal society that could have never come together without oil in the hands of the strongman of Libya.

Here's a slightly edited transcription of the doom and gloom he threw at the Libyans:

"We were expecting these events.
There is outside elements with supporters in the country who organized through facebook, using the incident against the Italian Consulate on February 17 as a trigger to begin something similar to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. We did arrest people to stave off the movement in Libya but now there is tumult and separatist movements threatening Libyan territorial integrity.

The world media carry rumors and exaggerate the number of killed in the unrest.

Three groups are behind the demonstrations:
1)political and professional groups with legitimate demands;
2)Islamic groups, especially in al-Baydha; they have taken over military bases and took weapons and declared an Islamic emirate;
3)common people who are jobless, drugged, mercenaries of rich people, onlookers, curious young people;
4) groups that want to split the country; and
5) baltagiah (thugs) who destroyed prisons and are now spreading chaos.

Therefore there are different trends in the country wanting to bring down the regime.

Arab media is exploiting the failure of the Libyan media to report on the unrest.

There are dangers lurking: Libya may split because it is made of tribes and clans and therefore a civil war is possible. Libya has oil in the middle and south and that is the only thing that holds Libya together. Oil will burn and people will turn against each other because they will not agree on dividing the oil wealth. How could the country stay together when 75% of the population lives in the west and it does not have oil.

Can you manage oil? There are foreign investments worth $200 billion. All this is gone now. How are you going to spend on hospitals and other services? There are 500,000 residential units ready to be handed over to people. They will not be handed over.

Every one now has arms.

Hospitals will not work and ready homes will be destroyed and oil will be burned.

But there is another way: Tomorrow we can launch a historic initiative by convening a popular conference to institute civilized laws and a constitution that will be based on local rule and a central government with limited authority over state sovereignty matters.

Otherwise, we will all settle our differences through arms. Then foreign powers will come back because they will not let oil burn and will not allow Islamic emirates.

Do not listen to al-Jazeera or the Arabs. They are just fooling you. And now they have their mercenaries spreading chaos in Libya. The Egyptians and Tunisians want to share your oil.

Don't listen to those (Libyans) living in the West enjoying citizenship and social security and urging you to go the the military camps.

The army is loyal to Qaddafi and now tens of thousands of people are out supporting Qaddafi. The army will end the tumult and restore order. We will fight to the last bullet."

The Dictator of Libya Thought He was Covered

"When the people decide one day that they want (free) life, fate will have to answer" (Tunisian poet Abul Qasem al-Shabbi)

"Truly, God will not change the conditions of people until they change what is in themselves" (Quran, 13:11)

Media reports suggest that after the 2003 regime change in Iraq, Qaddafi cut a deal with western powers: He would surrender his weapons and pay reperations for the Lockerbie bombing in exchange for western silence on regime change in Libya. So, Qaddafi, who has always posed as an anti-imperialist revolutionary, has come to believe that his reign will be safe so long as he in good terms with foreign powers. He never imagined that regime change is possible from within. His day of reckoning may have just come. Massive demonstrations in Benghazi and other towns across Libya began on February 15, 2011, dubbed by revolutionaries the Tuesday of Rage. It started after security forces shot demonstrators expressing their opposition to the arrest of a lawyer in the case of the 1,200 killed in BouSliem prison.

Thus far leaders in Washington and European capitals are keeping their end of the bargain by keeping their mouths shut (although western news media is now reporting massacres. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12517327, February 20, 2011). Qaddafi has always claimed that he only sits at the helm of a people power political system. It is clear he never believed his own slogans. He cut internet and satellite communications and sent his security forces to the streets in a bid for a speedy repression of the revolt through a treatment akin to what happened in Algiers in 1988or Tiananmen Square in 1989: Kill a large number of people quickly to scare the rest of the population before the revolt picks momentum and reaches a point of no return.

The plan is being executed now ruthlessly; witnesses tell al-Jazeera the situation there looks like Gaza (2008/2009). But the indiscriminate shootings by members of the Qaddafi Brigades are not bringing out the hoped results. Living between the Egyptians on the East and Tunisians on the West, the Libyans have had enough inspiration to shed their own shackles of fear. They were enraged by the dictator's indirect moking of them when he went on national television to fault the victorious Tunisians after their dictators fled the country. The Libyans had already been fed up; now they are willing to die to topple the Qaddafi regime. Al-Jazeera reports that people are spending nights in public squares because Qaddafi is sending henchment to homes. Zantan, Warfalla and other tribal and religious leaders across the country are calling people to come out. People are protecting vital installations and surrounding special forces bases. In Al-Zawiyah, however, they burned down Qaddafi's residence. The Qaddafi forces have killed and injured are in the hundreds.

Qaddafi TV showed the dictator out demonstrating with his supporters (Revolutionary Committees and Populare Committees) in downtown Tripoli shouting epithets at al-Jazeera. Today, Febraury 20, 2011, the revolt has reached the capital. The first myrter to fall was in the area of Tajoura. Now, according to witness accounts reported by al-Jazeera there is a large demonstration in Sayyibi Street, near the opposition stronghold of Sidi Khliefa. Qaddafi has downtown heavily secured, so people are settling for localized demonstrations. Still, judges, lawyers and university professors, risking their lives to test the regime, are demonstrating at the Courts Complex in downtown.

People are sending reports to the outside world via phone. Twitter has posted phone numbers for people to send reports. Breaking the information blackout gives protesters hope that they are not isolated from the world. Qaddafi's henchmen are monitoring world media. Their morale is breaking apart, because their defenseless people are able to stay in touch with the world and remain undeterred by repression. It will be only time before the regime falls.

If Qaddafi followed his own propaganda, he should have already conceded. He has always argued that the people own and rule Libya. But now he is trying to cling to power despite the tremendous expression of people will against him. Even soldiers, officers and local members of Qaddafi's Revolutionary Committees are yielding to people power in much of Libya.

What do Libyans want? If one knows what Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Bahrainis want then it is not hard to imagine what their Libyan brothers and sisters took to the streets for. It's freedom and emanicipation. The Libyan revolutionaries are copying slogans and demands from their neighbors to the East and West, because their conditions appear similar. But the level of rage in Libya is even higher after 42 years of Qaddafi's rule that squandered the nation's wealth in failed adventures and corruption and repression. Libya is oil-rich with a relatively small population that is increasingly jobless and poor. It took Tunisians 23 days to force Ben Ali out; it took Egyptians 19 days to scratch off the tip of the Egyptian power pyramid; the Libyan revolt is now in the fourth day (February 20, 2011). It took the Egyptians 11 days to start their revolt after the departure of Ben Ali. It took the Libyans only three days to rise up after Mubarak stepped down. The accelerated movement of the anti-dictatorship tsunami has become a pattern. It is safe to predict that the overthrow of Qaddafi and his family will be much more speedy. But Libyans too will face the daunting task of transition to inclusive, democratic rule.

Using People's Diversity Against them: The Pathetic Trick of Dictators

It should become clear now that sectarianism is a card dictatorial regimes in the Arab world have been using. In the 1980s, Sadat of Egypt ended a wave of protests through a heavy-handed crackdown after some misterious sectarian violence in al-Zawiyah Al-Hamra in Cairo. Habib Al-Adili, the former interior minister of Egypt is now in jail accused of being behind the bombing of a Coptic church in Alexandria in December 2010. When he was in office a few days earlier his ministry said that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber (perhaps to play on media reports of al-Qaeda threats to Copts); now on the stand, he said that the explosive material was set off by an electrical devise--as if this were an evidence of his innocense. On Taharir Square there was more amity than enmity between Muslims and Copts united in the quest for change, freedom and social justice.

The clearest example of the use of sectarianism has just taken place in Bahrain. If anything, it shows how impotent Arab rulers are. The foreign minister in that country justified the military ambush of peaceful protesters on February 17, 2011 by claiming that his government wanted to stave off a slide to sectarianism. His evidence is the claim that the protesters in Pearl Roundabout were of a certain sect (Shia). He said that there were protesters in other places in the country and the fault line between the different groups was sectarian. But the government troops attacked only one group. The following day Bahrainis were out in the streets mourning those killed in downtown before dawn. In other parts of the country there were demonstrators marching with pictures of the king. So the foreign minister's statement served as a vision that has now been fulfilled not prevented. The images played out on television clearly shows a divided country with one group cheering and another weeping.

The government acted in the most sinister fashion. Every thing the rulers said shows an intent to play the sectarian card. True, the demonstration in Pearl Roundabout was supported mainly by Shia groups, but Shias make the majority of Bahrain. The Shia opposition demands are not sectarian and are agreeable to Sunni opposition groups. They want to change their political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly a sectarian or even radical goal.

This does not mean that Bahraini Shias are saints and their activists are models of tolerance, but how does that make them different from the rest of Bahrainis? The evidence clearly shows how impotent leaders can take the easy route to consolidating their power--even if it means dividing society. The streets of Bahrain today only shows that shedding away dictatorship can be messy. Leaders of the Bahraini opposition, especially the Sunni groups, must now come out to re-establish unity. The king and his family are neither smart nor well-composed to lead.

This "turn people against one another" is now played out across the region, especially where there are popular uprisings. When sectarian divisions are missing, the illigitimate regimes have been using ethnicity, ideology or region as fault lines. Reports to al-Jazeera today (February 20, 2011) suggest that the Qaddafi regime is distributing arms to members of rival clans in Benghazi and other parts of the country in hopes that they will begin settling scores against one another. The purpose is to use the infighting to show that the sweeping violence is tribal conflicts that must be suppressed for the good of the nation. Alas, even as primordial divisions come intertwined with politics, the new element is this: the conflation is hardly organic resulting from irreconcilable differences among the different sectors of society. Rather, their diversity is now being used as weapon against them; the aim is to keep dictators in power. Now that divisiveness is instigated from the top, thoughtful, tolerant people will learn how to overcome it. The Egyptians seem to be on their way to achieving this goal (despite the isolationism of the elderly Coptic Pope and fanatcism of some Muslim groups). I hope the Bahrainis will rise above the pathetic trick of Al-Khalifa dictatorship.

Mainstream Media Behind the Curve in Reporting Arab Revolts

Bob Schieffer, the longest-serving journalist in Washington, second only to his CBS colleague Andy Rooney, spoke to my American University students on February 16, 2011. Responding to an event participant's question about the performance of U.S. media in covering the substance of the sweeping revolts in the Arab world, he said "we're still trying to figure out what is going on!" His honesty was refreshing, but it is an admission of an utter confusion and failure by mainstream media. This state of affair was not caused by lack of skill; the impotence resulted from the astonishment of the media establishment in America in the face of events that trashed everything western media has known about submissive Arabs obeying dictators and fearing the show of force.

The utter shock has led some western reporters to even violate a basic ethical and professional requirement: checking the facts before reporting them. New York Times reporter Nicholas Kristof was in Manama, Bahrain when the Al-Khalifa regime ambushed the protesters in Pearl Roundabout on February 17, 2011. He lent credence to the government's assertion that the protest was sectarian. Without sharing any facts he told world television channels that all the injured were Shia. He did not even claim survey data. Sure, the vast majority of organizers are Shia, but so is the population of Bahrain. The sectarian character of the protest is not known from the religious identity of protesters; it can be known from the demands of the movement. Those demands focused on reforming the political system into a constitutional monarchy, hardly sectarian or even radical. In fact the king has been open to such possibility since 2002.
The western media utter failure in reporting the Arab uprisings stands in sharp contrast to the performance of al-Jazeera English. I remember a few days before Mubarak stepped down Wolf Blitzer asked a Department of State official what was going on in the White House Situation Room. She told him that people there were asking about the Egyptian opposition, what they're thinking and what they want. While CNN was airing spin of pundits sitting in their Washington offices, knowing very little about so much, Al-Jazeera English was answering the very questions the American official was posing. It was ranning interviews with English speaking leaders of the protest talking about their activities and demands. Most of Al-Jazeera English reporters are either westerners or western-trained. So the problem is not the western attribute of the mainstream media.
There are two factors explaining why mainstream media has trailed behind al-Jazeera. First, most of the editors, are aging with worldviews formed in the sixties, if not earlier; their ability to catch up with fast moving events thousands of miles away is limited. Clearly fresh blood is needed. But this is not an excuse. The media in western democracies represent a fourth power; its bankruptcy in meeting the demand of the public for factual information and reasonable analysis of historic events is crucial for the very maintenance of democracy. By failing to perform the function expected by the public, the mainstream media is no mainstream at all.
Another explanation of the failure lies in the fact that the large corporate structure of the media industry is part of the political establishment that for so long has valued stability in the Middle East. While the Egyptian protesters mobilized several million demonstrators today, February 18, 2011, to celebrate the revolution and call for the removal of the remainder of the Mubarak regime, including the current government, Hilary Clinton had just announced an aid package of $150 million to it--an old school measure that does not sync with the revolutionary mood in the country. The Egyptian revolution is not over, but the Egyptian generals and the U.S. government are acting as if life were back to normal. But one has to give the U.S. government come credit that the establishment media does not deserve: the U.S. has learned from past mistakes. In 1979 the U.S. government and media agitated against the Iranian revolution, calling Iranians to side with the Shah even as the momentum was building in favor of the opposition. In 2011, the U.S. stood against the violent treatment of protesters, despite some valid misgivings about some of their leaders (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood).
In contrast, most mainstream media outlets exhibited an isolationist worldview in their interpretation of event. Journalists like Joe Klein were paraded on the various networks raising the specter of a Chinese-style Tiananmen Square massacre to end the gathering at Tahrir Square, or pundits who after the departure of Ben Ali suggested using American aid money to promote oxymoron ideas such as "discriminating democracy" to exclude even modernist Islamists like the Tunisian Ennahda (Renaissance) (See Robert Satloff editorial, Washington Post, January 30, 2011). Alas, Islamophobia is perhaps the unfortunate factor behind the mainstream media ambivalence toward the pro-democracy movement in the Arab world.

Bahrain: The Next Target of the Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution

The Bahrain revolt is picking up momentum, thanks to the insulting offer of the ruling family to buy the political freedom of Bahrainis for $2,650 per family. The Al-Khalifa plan backfired. Add to this the brutality of the security forces that killed so far 2 protesters. The ingredients for mass revolt are here: giving people victims to parade in public and offending their sense of honor and self-worth.

And the protesters are copying their Tunisian and Egyptian brothers and sisters, using the familiar slogan: "The people want to depose the regime." Yet the Bahrainis are presenting realistic demands for the new political economy they want:

release of political prisoners;
more jobs and housing;
the creation of a more representative and empowered parliament;
a new constitution written by the people; and
a new cabinet that does not include Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has been in office for 40 years.

They are not calling for the removal of the king. They want a constitutional monarchy. A deformed version of this exists already in neighboring Kuwait, where the Amir (Royal Prince) has extensive powers but has to work with a parliament that can force the Amir's nominated prime minister out of office. The opposition there has had majority in the parliament for several years now, but the ruling family, headed by their patriarch, the Amir, has managed to keep all important ministerial posts and remain firmly in charge of the oil revenues. Bahrainis do not think of Kuwait as their model; in Kuwait the power of the Sabah ruling family is now the focal point to political tension. The Bahrainis hope to immulate another country with which they have strong relations: Britain, where the palace has only symbolic role in the political power sytem. The Bahraini opposition, however has not spelled the details of the structure of government they seek, but insisted that power has to be shared. May be the Sunni king and the majority Shia opposition can figure a formula that suits their country. Ignoring the legitimate popular demands will only guarantee that the demonstrators will ask for more reforms.

So far the ruling family has been mobilizing public support from among the regime beneficiaries and among the Sunni minority, which is now being told that their security is in danger if they do not support the ruling family. This strategy is short-sighted, polarizing and counterproductive. Negotiation is the best way out. Can the king split the Shias in order to create a real majority that includes reform-minded Sunnis and Shias? If not, the use of force will only create a Sunni dictatorship oppressing a Shia population that is yearning for freedom.

Silmiyah, Silmiyah: Do the Generals Get the Message?

Tunisians and Egyptians have brought down two dictators through non-violent resistance. With perseverance, they may also topple the whole regimes of oppression. The question is where do the generals (both in the military and government) fit in the growing consciousness in the Arab world about the need for states run by those who obtain legitimacy from the people? The Tunisian military is behaving in a much more professional manner than its Egyptian counterpart. The Tunisian generals refrained from involvement in government, preferring instead to be the guarantor of a smooth transition. The Egyptian generals assisted in securing national installations and may have pressured Mubarak to step down. But now their actions seem to resemble the actions of Nasser in 1952 who established a revolutionary command council and began running the country through public statements until he consolidated civilian and military power (the root of the Mubarak regime). The 2011 generals in Egypt have already committed serious mistakes by reinstating Mubarak ministers and governors. More, instead of addressing the demands of the revolution for changing the political system, they began conducting foreign relations.

The revolutionaries asked the military to take speedy action to dismantle the regime of oppression, by first lifting the emergency law (which has been effectively dismantled by the people) and acknowledging that the old constitution has been nullified by the revolution. The latter step is something the generals need because all their actions thus do not conform to the old constitution. That document stipulates the installation of the speaker of the parliament in the absence of the president. Instead, Omar Suleiman announced that the president handed over authority to the military. The deposed president had no constitutional power to take such action. For all practical purposes, Egypt is now ruled by coup leaders. They are appeasing people by promising democracy and a civilian authority. They have taken measures against some NDP leaders whose corruption is known to the public. The military leaders are playing a game of politics. They are calculating that most Egyptians should now be satisfied with such steps. But these are Egyptians of the old political culture that personalized leadership and politics. Many, if not most, of these Egyptians probably did not partake in demonstrations.

Facing a revolting young population, the aging generals must be recalling the 1950s, when they were young, for clues. But the Egyptians today understand the language of peoplehood, rights, citizenship, institutions and how all this relate to the structure of state power. It is this structure that the January 25 Revolution set out to change. The demise of Mubarak was only the first step. The generals are hoping the people would revert to the old ways now the man they hated is gone. They may be in for a rude awakening this Friday February 18, 2011.

The generals and their interim government have their eyes on restoring normalcy. If this is the new Egypt, many Egyptians wonder, it looks like the old one save one person. The dictator was corrupt and is suspected of having stolen billions from the wealth of his nation. But he did not do the rest of offensive acts that characterized his system of oppression. Many Egyptians feel insulted that Tantawi and Fiqqi are acting as if the revolution has done its job.

Clearly the gap between the people and the remainder of the Mubarak regime remains wide. This Friday, February 18, 2011, may witness another eruption if the High Council of the Armed Forces does not meet a substantive revolutionary demand. Lifting the emergency law would be the easiest to institute.

In the absence of this or other actions, two possibilities are on the horizon: (1) the revolt will be rekindled to bring down the top military brass (many Egyptians think the low ranks and foot soldiers are with the people), or (2) the Egyptians may need another thirty years to develop a political culture that de-personalizes power.

It's Not Over: The January 25 Revolution Enters a Most Critical Phase

Fissures have already begun to appear regarding the post-Mubarak era. For Western powers, the ideal poitical structure that could emerge in Egypt is something similar to the Turkish model, where there is a civilian democracy that can be deposed anytime by a powerful military. But this may not be what Egyptians want. Egyptians today have a very clear understanding of their modern political history; going against the emerging anti-dictatorship culture will only guarantee confrontation with the new political leaders, who may not necessarily want to diminish the role of the military.

The generals have remained loyal to their patron Mubarak but ultimately seemed to have coaxed him into agreeing to step down. It was people power that forced the generals to pressure Mubarak to concede, but the remaining generals have yet to accept people power as the defining character of the new structure of political power (not government). Their third statement only remarked that the High Military Council of the Armed Forces, the wielder of national political power now, understands that "it is not a substitute for a legitimacy agreeable to the people." But they did not acknowledge that that the current regime is effectively a coup. The current constitution calls for the Speaker of the Parliament to take over in the absence of the president.
This is reminiscent of the regime that took over in Egypt in 1952, claiming to project the people’s will. The only difference between Tantawi and Nasser is that the latter, an ultimate opportunist, rode a wave of popular protest to depose the colonial era king, then moved to establish The Revolutionary Command Council. That was Nasser’s transition power structure. At the time he was a junior military leader. He used the council to bypass the top brass of the military without actually having to confront them, which he did later by purging them to clear his way to the top. Ultimately, he managed to concentrate civilian and military powers in his hands. Mubarak inherited this power structure from Sadat, Nasser's successor.
The current military leader Tantawi does not need a revolutionary council. He is now the head of the state in its civilian and military structures. If the announcement of Omar Suleiman is accurate, Mubarak handed power over to Tantawi, which means the regime has not changed, except that it is completely removed from any façade of constitutional legitimacy. Egyptian civilian leaders understand this dynamic very clearly. Some of them immediately issued statements aired on Al-Jazeera right after Mubarak stepped down. These included a statement read Justice Mohamed Fouad, Vice President of the State Council, who had joined the revolutionaries at Tahrir Square. The statement called for a transitional government of politically independent experts, excluding political trends and parties to manage the country's affairs, ending in free and fair elections in nine months. He also called for securing freedom of expression and association for the people and for a constitutional convention to produce a new constitution that would put to a popular referendum. The statement also called the military leaders to adopt these steps and the demands of the revolution and completely side with the people.
This statement was signed by a previously unknown group called Masses of the January 25 Revolution, but it is headed by a senior civil servant. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest sociopolitical NGO in Egypt, offered a different vision for the transition that calls for handing over presidential powers to the head of the High Constitutional Court to lead the transition to a civilian government. Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the National Coalition for Change, specifically named the establishment of a civilian power structure as the goal of the revolution. Obviously, civilian Egyptian politicians agree on what they want for the new Egyptian state. They want this reflected in the transitional period. The 1952 popular uprising was hijacked by the military that ultimately produced a dictatorial rule; the Mubarak regime was only the most corrupt and oppressive manifestation of it. Today' Egyptian generals have abandoned the theatrical politics of empty promises and gestures that Nasser introduced to post-colonial Egypt. Tantawi does not claim credit for the 2011 revolution like Nasser did. But Tantawi and his comrades have power. Their statements thus far neither oppose nor support the popular wish of civilian rule. Their fourth statement did not declare the nullification of emergency law but reinstated Mubarak’s corrupt ministers and governors. They have already offended the sensitivities of the public. The Egyptian revolution is far from over. It's most critical phase has just begun.

Pharaoh is Gone: The Next Phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution

Today the Algerian government arrested Ali Belhaj,leader of the banned Front of Islamic Salvation, for a sermon he gave. But Internet anti-dictatorship activists in Algeria had already dubbed tomorrow their January 25th. The removal of Mubarak less than 24 hours before the dawn of the planned Algerian protest may have given a great boost to the Algerian revolutionaries. We'll see if Algeria proves to be ripe for the next phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution. We have learned from Egypt and Tunisia that Facebook communication works only if there are people on the ground with adequate organization ready to take action and build momentum. The April 6 movement in Egypt began in 2008. They called for an April 2009 strike, but then the response was limited. With the success of the Tunisian revolution in forcing Ben Ali out, many Egyptians began thinking they could the same to their dictator if they shed away fear and believe in themselves. Young opposition leaders siezed the moment. They heeded the Arab saying "hit the iron rod when it's hot."

Algeria may prove to be a tougher case. Although there have been protests since January 14, the country has a multi-party system that includes the MB and other Islamists. But the state is military-controlled like Egypt. Algerians have an elected president but they know that when push comes to shove, he does not call the shots. Even in normal times he does not make the most important decisions in the country. With Egyptians now openly calling for a political system controlled by civilians, Algerians might be thinking that they too deserve what Egyptians hope for. Algerian society is not as homogeneous as its Egyptian or Tunisian counterpart. But this may not hinder a mass uprising. The major division in the country produced the Berber-Arab tension, but this is mitigated by the fact that nearly all Algerians are Sunni. Berbers are now leading the charge for change. With Sunni Arabs joining, the country might have a chance in producing the first multicultural civilian state in North Africa.

The current pro-democracy revolt in the Arab world is spearheaded by a generation that grew up under repression but with full awareness of the language of freedom and rights. Egypt and Tunisia tell that declining economic conditions mix with high education levels to produce a good recipe for revolt. Educated people know how to link their living to the upper structures of power in their state.

But Arab countries vary. A Syrian friend of mine tells me that Friday, February 4, 2011, failed to be the Syrian Day of Rage because the regime carried out a psychological terror blitzkrieg. People woke up in Damascus to find the pictures of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad hung at every corner, letting anyone thinking of responding to the cyber activists know that the security forces are there in their neighborhood. The fear tactic worked. But for the long run the regime may have aided in its own demise. Most Syrians never heard of the Internet call to demonstration. But now Asad is telling them that all of them are suspect and they must fear reprisals if they respond to anti-regime instigators. This may force passive Syrians to begin thinking seriously about the possibility that fear is holding them from marching into the path of freedom. Facing one's fear is the first step; the Asad regime has forced it on people. The Syrian regime may have won a battle, but the revolt for freedom is a long term process.

But there is another important obstacle in Syria. The largest opposition group, the MB, had been banned since 1982 and membership in the group is punishable by death after a band of their militants embarked on a campaign of sectarian violence against Alawite security targets. The insurrection was put down violently: the old city of Hama was leveled by air strikes, killing more than 20,000 people and leaving 100,000 refugees. But the regime has grown increasingly dependent on the Alawite minority as a social support base for the regime. A pro-democracy opposition have better a chance of success if it deals with the fears of Alawites under a political system of people power should be the first order of business.

In Bahrain a Sunni family rules a country that has a majority Shia population. The rulers have allowed a measure of representation but has relinquished no power whatsover. In other countries there are grassroots demands for power sharing but ruling families engage in various forms of posturing about political reform without offering any tangible concessions. These are: Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Libya (which began as a military regime before turning into a family rule). The level of political participation varies widely in these countries; Kuwait has a strong parliament and the opposition has a majority, but every resource and instrument of power (oil revenues, military and security forces and burearucracy) is in the hands of Sabah family.

There are other forms of power structures in the Arab world: Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania are military regimes that have allowed extensive measures of freedom but where power rests with those who the group that has the most guns. In the United Arab Emirates and Qatar there are no visible movements from top or bottom for power sharing. But this might change soon, given the spread of the Arab Anti-dictatorship Revolution.

Lebanon and Palestine are exceptional cases. The former is a confessional democracy that witnessed the rise of Hizbullah's military wing under two decades of Israeli occupation. The latter has distorted power structures because of the Israeli occupation. The state has to be free before a clear picture of power emerges. At the society level Palestine and Lebanon offer the most extensive and developed expression of political diversity.

Despite the variety of forms of government, the question at hand has to do with the nature of state political power. So far Lebanon may not even last as a state and Palestine is being dismembered under the cover of a peace process. In the rest of the Arab countries all powers ultimately tend to rest with the person on the top of the politcal pyramid. Tunisia and Egypt have toppled their dictators. The order of business for them now is to move to recognizing the people as collectivity as the sovereign. In Egypt, the transitional military regime that took power after Mubarak departed has acknowledged that it is not a replacement of the "legitimacy that people accept." What this means will soon appear in the actions of the military leaders. The revolution here is entering a new phase.

Hesitant Egyptian Generals are Shackled by People Power

In Tahrir Square people have been disappointed by the position of the military generals who are still trying to hold the stick from the middle between Mubarak and the Egyptian people. Their televised first meeting, which did not include their Commander in Chief Mubarak, and Statement 1, which did not mention the president, gave the impression that the generals understand the sentiment of the people and have decided to topple Mubarak. Then the military waited 12 hours to ponder their position following the disappointing speeches of Mubarak and his VP. The generals issued Statement 2 on behalf of the High Council of the Armed Forces, announcing that they will move to secure the transition to a new government in accordance with the directions of Mubarak. But they also attempted to appease the demonstrator's feelings by suggesting that the military sympathizes with their legimate demand of free, democratic government. Yet the only action they took is to continue the meeting while calling people to return back to normal life.

Like Mubarak, the generals were too slow for the pace of the revolutionaries. They do not seem to understand (or appreciate) the transfomation that has occurred in Egypt. Egyptian demonstration leaders in different parts of the country are telling Al-Jazeera that Egyptian society has been reborn. Egyptians discovered they could do without government control institutions. When the police pulled out of the streets, people formed local committees to police their own neighborhoods. Egyptian food markets are operating and the prices have not changed without the watch of government inspectors. People are realizing that private markets and the public functions that they control over can operate, without the oppressive, corrupt and bankrupt regime.

The government closed the banks and the stock market; demonstrators tell al-Jazeera that there is no reason why these institutions should be closed and that they would be willing to protect them, just as they rushed to protect the Egyptian Museum before military tanks arrived to the scene. Egyptians striking in factories and other institutions could go right back to work whenever they choose--bar any subbotage by the regime. The loss of tourism is transient and is understandable given the current instability. But tourists did not go to Egypt to make a statement of support to Mubarak; they went there because of the wonderful tourist attractions that Egypt has. Egypt should become even more attractive for tourists when it becomes free. Egyptians tell reporters that they are not bothered by the current losses; they are willing to sacrifice for the long haul until their revolt succeeds.

While parts of Egyptian life have come to a standstill for 18 days and the intial uprising has turned into a full-fleged revolt, the generals are jockeying for their place in the future. The generals do not understand the dynamics of people power. The collective will of the Egyptians is now focused on removing what they see as a dictatorial regime. Appeasing the regime means going down with it. The generals watched while the Mubarak baltagiah threw fire balls on peaceful protesters. The generals stayed put when the police abandoned their responsibility for internal security--except for guarding major national institutions. And now they are using Statement 2 to position their institution for a place in the new Egypt as a guarantor of stability and legitimacy. They are probably thinking of the Turkish model. What is missing is the relevance of this thinking to positioning the military in the unfolding events and emotions on the streets of Egypt. People are losing trust in them. People are wondering, if the preservation of the nation calls for the steps the generals outlined, why do not they proceed? Why do they act like Sulieman, throwing the ball in the revolution's court?

There is war in the country between the people and their top political leaders. Outside Cairo, demonstrators have taken over state buildings, liberating their own country and forcing Mubarak governers out in Asyut and Tanta. In Cairo, people are going out spontaneously in millions calling Mubarak murderer, untrustworthy, and corrupt. People's anger was so visible when protesters realized in the middle of Mubarak's speech yesterday (Feberuary 10, 2011) that he was not stepping down and began chanting angry revolutionary slogans. If Statement 3 does not realign the emotions of the generals with those of the Egyptians, the top brass may go down with Mubarak and the military will likely become separate from and subservient to the civilian government of the New Egypt.This is what many protesters want anyway. They might have their wish.

The Day of March: Point of No Return for the Egyptian January 25 Revolution

Egyptians in the various governorates estimate that nearly 20 million people have taken to the streets today (February 11, 2011). All sectors of Egyptian civil society have joined as associations showing their professional identity: doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc. Protestrs are chanting: "Depart means leave," "Mubarak the pilot: how did you accumulate 70 billion?" "Husni Mubarak is Fraud, Omar Sulieman is Fraud" and "revolution, revolution until victory." If one excludes the population groups of below 12 and above 65, the sick and those who are home to care for them, one can reasonablly say that most Egyptians are voting in a referundum unparalled in modern history.

They are calling on the various military units in the field to join them. They are moving peacefully on the symbols of state power: pesidential palaces, government TV station buildings and other state installations. In Cairo, the demonstrators are now facing off the heavily armed troops and snipers of the Republican Guards and remnants of Central Security Forces protecting al-Uruba Palace, where Mubarak lives and works.Some individual demonstrators have tried to throw rocks, but the organizers are holding them off; the organizers want the revolt to remain peaceful. "silmiyah, silmiya," they are chanting. But large, angry crowds standing face to face against the armed protecters of the the dictator is not an event where the Peace Train song will be most popular.

Watching the live al-Jazeera coverage, I heard some people chant "Blood is the price of freedom!" But most of the chants take the form of repeating the main failures of the regime: corruption, polic abuse, inequality, lack of compassion toward the poor, ineffective management, and so forth.

In the meanwhile, there are reports of suspicious movements by regime loyalists. Armed members of the NDP and baltagiah (regime thugs) are breaking into buildings and forcing residents out. Obviously, waiting for the right moment to begin firing. This is in preparation for the chaos that Mubarak predicted. But thus far every move the regime and its loyalts have taken backfired. The most prominent of such moves was the baltigiah violence in Tahrir Square, which showed the world how small, violent and thoughtless the pro-Mubarak mobs are. If they are preparing for civil war, their actions are scaring the protesters into committing themselves to non-violent resistence. It does not make sense for unarmed civilians with political demands to give in to pointless, unfair fight, when they are clearly gaining momentum. This might get out of control, which has already happened last week. But as they did before, the protesters will regroup and continue the revolt. The regime is doing every thing to push them in this direction: the concessions they offer is itnerpreted as weakness that emboldens the protesters. Promising change without taking measures to launch it shows the lack of credibility and enrages angry and disappointed citizens.

Things might get ugly, but it is not likely that today will be decisive. Revolutions are messay business. In Tunisia Ben Ali left after 4 weeks of protests. Egypt's previous revolutions took much longer. The 1919 revolt agains the British took 2 years. That revolt was violent; it was against a foreign military power. Now Egyptians are revolting against a domestic military regime. Many people yesterday said that blood was in the air. But thanks to the disciplined organizers, January 25 may remain peaceful.

18 American Scholars Support a Moral U.S. Policy toward Egypt

“We the signatories of this statement are scholars and public policy analysts concerned about the implications of the ongoing upheaval in Egypt for the future of U.S. (and Western) relations with the Muslim world. We applaud the decisions the American and European governments made yesterday (February 2, 2011) to side with the Egyptian people in the face of what seems to be planned violence and scare tactics by the failing Mubarak regime. History will credit the Western powers for siding with the values of democracy and human rights in a world-historical moment, despite the caution that might have been called for due to uncertainties about the future of the political system in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. Clearly, Western leaders have decided to read the events accurately and place themselves on the correct side of the future. This principled position combining realpolitik with the best of American ideals is truly path-breaking. While much of the cause of freedom in the Arab world is being written by the bravery and blood of the courageous Egyptian people, we know that history will record that February 2, 2011 was a turning point in relations between the West and the Islamic world.”

Signatories

Mohamed Nimer, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Antony T. Sullivan,Associate Professor, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan
Judith Shapiro,Director, NRSD Program, American University
Gary Weaver, Professor School of International Service, American University
Boaz Atzili, Assistant Professor,School of International Service, American University
Jeni Sall, President, Genesis Research Associates Inc.
Easten Law, Instructor, Washington Mentorship Program, American University
Emad Shahin, Associate Professor, Conflict and Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame
Margaret E. Smith, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University
Eve Bratman, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
Carl LeVan, Assistant Professor, School of International Service American University
John P. Entelis, Professor, Middle East Studies Program, Fordham University
Julie A. Mertus, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Wanda Wigfall-Williams, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Mohamed Abu-Nimer, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Claudia E. Anyaso, Adjunct Professor, Washington Semester, American University
Robert A. Pastor, Professor, School of International Service, American University
Anthony Wanis-St. John, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

To Members of the Youth Coalition for the Egyptian Revolution

Dear Brothers and Sisters:

Assalamu Alaykum. I admire your bravery and stand for freedom against dictatorship. You are truly role models for all young people around the world.

You are the first generation of young people in modern Egypt wh come together, work together and bleed together to become free. Your sacrifices are transforming the political cultures of Egyptians, Arabs, Muslims and all freedom-loving peoples.

I wonder what you do during down time. Here is a suggestion that can bring more attention and admiration to your cause: Turn Tahrir Square into a forum where Egyptians build consensus on a new social contract defining the state and it relations with society. Write and discuss a new state constitution.

You may think that you lack expertise in political systems and constitutional law. Consider this: Most Americans who wrote the U.S. constitution were not in those professions either. Some of them were in their thirties. Today there are many web resources you could use. You could also invite experts in these areas from among those who demonstrate with you to draft basic parameters for the new Egyptian constitution. Use the American Constitution as an example that youcan adapt to your culture and state. It is perhaps the best constitution in the world. It is consistent with Islamic and Coptic teachings. It is short and deals with principles defining state powers and rights of citizens. The American political system is stable because American leaders believe they derive their power from the constitution, not from the persons in political position. This is why Americans call their political system "A government of laws, not a government of men." But you can consider all other human experiences that respond to the questions you face today.

I am addressing you because I love Egypt and its good-natured people who treated me well on different occasions when I came to the country to work and study. I hope that your revolution achieve the political transformation you say you seek. More important than forcing Mubarak to step down(which you rightfully demand) is to change the Egyptian state system in ways that make it responsive to the aspirations of all citizens and segments of society, including those who do not participate in your demonstrations. This will happen if you and other Egyptians deliberate and agree on the key issues defining the powers of the state and rights of people.

If all the sacrifices you have offered end up replacing the National Democratic Party with another group, then your revolution will have amounted to a regime change. The previous regime lasted for 30 years; yours may not last 3. If I understand your demonstration slogans correctly, you do not want to only change the strongmen and the group that benefits from their rule; you want to free yourselves and all Egyptians by becoming equal citizens. This way you can create a state that will last for your lifetime and beyond.

During the era of dictatorship, state, government, parliament, and military referred to a group of people submitting to the wishes of one leader. In the new Egypt you seek, the state should be the institutions with defined powers and relationships amongst themselves and vis a vis the citizens, the whole people of Egypt, whose vote must be the ultimate source of the legitimate exercise of power. This is what shura and democracy mean.

If you begin thinking and discussing state and society in such manner, you will force the leaders who negotiate solutions to take you seriously. Right now, regime leaders think you are a problem; opposition leaders believe you are a bargaining chip. You are aware of this and reacted by organizing yourselves. You have sent a message that young people count and must be heard. But you need to begin putting forward credible ideas about change. Don't limit yourself to the immediate phase of power handover. Show older Egyptians that you can also lead the public conversation about the new Egyptian state.

You have begun the work of tranforming the Egyptian state away from dictatorship. But what what political culture are your shaping? It is your actions and statements that will tell. If you want to chart Egyptian politics on the course of inclusion, then talk the talk and walk the walk.

Long Live the Shebab of the Egyptian Revolution and all Egptians--free, compassionate and just.

What is the Muslim Brotherhood Learning?

Watching al-Jazeera Arabic coverage of the unfolding Egyptian revolution, I believe the following two assertion are supported by evidence: (1) Egyptian culture has been Islamized. This is evident not only in the scenes of prayers on Tahrir Square; it is also evident in the apparent receptivity of the protesters to Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-like slogans and leaders. Unconfirmed media estimates of MB participation range between 15 to 30 percent, but these figures are hardly reliable. Western reporters are perhaps using deceptive profiles to guess who is a member of the MB. We don't know what criteria that they using or the basis for such estimates.(2) The Islamization of the culture has meant that the MB is now a welcome part of the emerging Egyptian polity. This is good for Egyptian democracy, because it is helping the largest organization shed away decades of insecurity. Egyptian MB leaders today feel they are part of the people, not apart from them.

That insecurity is the reason why the MB threw their full weight in the revolt only when they felt they had popular cover. Other Egyptians will always remind the MB old guard that the MB did not start the January 25 revolution, but Egyptians will not blame the MB for their initial hesitation. Egyptians will soon praise the MB for being the only force in Egyptian society that have consistently stood against and suffered the wrath of the military regime.

When Mubarak and his television blamed the MB for the protests, more Egyptians took to the streets. The regime's MB scare tactic backfired. But the MB fear that they might still be singled out for special reprisals. They have been using their influence in the protest to stress that their expression is peaceful, chanting "silmiyah, silmiyah" and instructing fellow protesters not to engage in violence. Clearly, they are implementing a long-held position that the people have the right to depose their corrupt, oppressive rulers. The MB and other Egyptians are doing it in the best traditions of non-violence. Future Egyptian governments will have no choice but to step down should people power turn against them.

With sectors of society coming out with specific set of demands on any future government, Egypt's future leaders, including the MB, are learning that governing in a state of people power is about responding to the demands of constituencies. The MB are the most experienced group in Egypt in dealing with people's needs, serving those needs is how they built their support base. But catering to a whole population and being in charge of a nation's economy is a different ball game. Here lies in the major challenge to the MB or any other coming government. They have very little to offer the depressed factory workers, government employees and others who want improvement in the quality of life. The MB response for now is to suggest that they will share the burden of reform with all other citizens. Clearly, the MB is showing that they have learned how to operate in a democracy, where they are one faction that knows its limits.

Mohamed Nimer's Blog: The 2011 Arab anti-Dictatorship Revolution: What Should the U.S. Do?

http://www.newevangelicalpartnership.org/?q=blog/391

Meeting Sulieman: The Muslim Brotherhood Gambit

The January 25 Revolution has shocked all Egyptians, although many of them were for years waiting for it to happen. Young Egyptians led the charge to change their regime, but the older politicians--in both regime and opposition--might still be stuck in the dynamics of the past. Today, February 6, 2011, is the day of Christian-Muslim unity at Tahrir Square in the beginnin of the Week of Sumud (Steadfastness).

But the Presidential Palace witnessed a dynamic of different sort. Vice President Omar Sulieman invited leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood for a meeting. They went despite warnings from Al-Ghad (Future) Party leader Ayman Nour that the regime is playing the game of splitting the opposition. But opposition parties have never been unified and most non-Islamist groups fit the description of veteran Egyptian journalist Muhammad Haykal "paper parties."

The MB may be large in numbers but it has no real strategists, no public relations experts and no professional negotiators. According to al-Jazeera, they went to meet with Sulieman to gauge the seriousness of the regime. The VP told them that he is dealing with a crisis without having any decision-making powers--a clear admission that Mubarak is still fully in charge. Haunted by a legacy of radical expression and a world image of extremism, the leaders continued the meeting. They presented the following road map for the transition:

"The presidency shall be assumed by the head of theSupreme Constitutional Court; a transitional government shall be formed; fair parliamentary elections in accordance with the present constitution shall be held under the supervision of the entire judiciary; the new paliament shall modify the constitution and oversee a presidential election."

After the meeting with Sulieman, MB leaders held a press conference in which they suggested that they will wait only a day or two to give Suleiman time to begin responding to popular demands. They also hinted that negotiations can proceed while protests continue. Abdel Menem Abul Futuh, member of MB Guidance Office, said that the real authority now is the military and that it is futile to contine meeting with Suleiman. But they knew this before they decided to accept the Sulieman invitation. So are they selling the revolution?

MB leaders are striving to project an image of pragmatism and skill as they play the role of mediator between the falling regime and the revolting Egyptian street in a time of transition. They justified their decision to meet by pointing out that they have already gained an important concession: a promise not to use violence against the protesters. At Tahrir Square, the demonstrators are testing the intentions of the military through small actions. They have created human chains stationed in front of tanks to stop them from moving or clearing any blocked roads in protest territory. This is a calculated move aiming to train military officers that the civilians will decide the distance (and thereby the nature of) civilian-military relations in the new state.

The protesters are handling the military with skill. The failure of the military to protect them when the regime mobs attacked them raised their doubts about the position of the military leaders. Their behavior indicates they suspect the top level of leadership is still loyal to Mubarak. But the protesters want to stay in good terms with the soldiers on the street who, if things escalate, will have to decide whether to follow the orders of their superiors.

But the VP seems to aim at a nubmer of objectives: (1) regaining the initiative by meeting with the opposition on his terms, which he has achieved for now; (2) splitting the opposition, which he has not yet; and (3) gaining time to break the will of demonstrators; but their numbers are holding steady. Yesterday, Egyptian Television showed him meeting with young men and women. He also met with the self-initiated Committee of Wise People, a group of highly respected independent leaders and former high ranking government officials. But the protesters in Tahrir Square said none of the leaders meeting with Sulieman speak for the revolutionary youth coalition, which is now the main organizing force of the daily activities of the uprising.

The next episode hinges on any new initiative from the protesters, the Mubarak inner circle or the military. In Tunisia, it took four weeks before Ben Ali departed the country. Egypt is still in Day 12. As for the MB, they have two days (by their own announcement) before they will have to re-evaluate their position or to begin losing credibility with the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square. To head off such possibility, they held a press conference after the meeting to re-align themselves with the street. The MB leaders claimed that they did not want the regime to claim that the protesters closed the path of a peaceful resolution. They insisted that they presented the demands of the revolting people and will continue to insist that Mubarak steps down. The regime has used the MB as a scapegoat for its repressive rule; now it is offering them the chance to sharpen their leadership skills. But this is not the final chapter in the exchange. Al-Baradei who was not invited to meet with Sulieman criticized the idea of meeting with a regime whose legitimacy has evaporated. He made this statement after Mustafa al-Naggar, a leader of al-Baradei's National Coalition for Change met with Sulieman. MB leader Abdul Menem Abul Futouh shared a similar doubts about the utility of meetings and emphasized that no one has the right to speak on behalf of the young protesters who launched the revolt and continue to be the main force in it. While the Mubarak regime may now believe it has retained control, the opposition believes it has shown good will but came out thinking that the regime has not gotten the message of the people. The next week is planned for further mobilization, not only around Tahrir Square but also in schools and neighborhoods across the country.

Coptic Positions on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution

Al-Jazeera (Arabic) reported on Suday, February 6, 2011 on the sermon of Father Fawzi Khalil who led a mass at Tahrir Square for Coptic, Anglican, and Catholic Christians particpating in the revolt. The priest emphasized that Egyptians are looking for the future with hope for a free Egypt. After the mass, Muslims offered a prayer for the 300 myrters of the uprising.

Once the religious services were over, There were large Chrisitian crosses and Qur'ans on display. A statement from 300 Coptic religious and lay leaders supporting the uprising was read. Then music was played along with nationalist Egyptian songs, while a Muslim cleric conducted a wedding ceremony for a young couple. Egyptian diverse culture has never exhibitd this festive public unity--perhaps never since 1952. All groups seem interested in demonstrating that the makers of the new Egypt understand religious diversity can be expressed at the same time and in the same space where people are fighting to exercise the right to define for themselves what common good they share.

Still, there is serious debate among Copts about their role in Egyptian politics, inlcuding the uprising. Coptic Pope Shenouda supports President Mubarak for fear of that the status of Copts may further deteriorate in a democracy dominated by Muslims. The Coptic Church has repeatedly complained of restrictions on the building of churches under Mubarak; the Pope fears that those restrictions will only increase in the post-Mubarak era. The Coptic minority of less than 10 percent is between the rock of revolution and the hard place of dictatorship. This Pope was arrested by the previous leader of Egypt, Sadat, in the wake of sectarian violence. Many Muslims give him the benefit of the doubt, having to think of the rights of the Copts under the rule of a Muslim dictator.

But the Pope's position is not unanimously followed by members of the church. This is evidenced in today's Christian mass at the epicenter of the revolt. Secular Christian George Ishaq, founder of Kifaya Movement, is among the groups that called for the January 25the Day of Rage, which launched the revolt. There are other Christians who believe the current Pope has an isolationist tendency and does not speak for Copts on political matters. Local priests take public positions that are consistent with the interests of their congregations, irrespective of the political positions of the Pope.

Copts are still reeling from the unprecedented attack on an Alexandria church on New Year's day. The government blamed an extremist group in Gaza, but many Copts remain skeptical. Communal violence and anti-governement protests by copts erupted in the wake of the bombing, but this was not the only incident that sparked such violence. One of the awful qualities of the Mubarak regime is the inexusable neglect apart. Suppressing activists from both sides was always his preferred method (which he learned from his predecessor). When tensions rose the only regime response has been more crackdown. Now Egyptian Muslims and Christians have a chance to write a new social contract to address the root causes of tension and to create constitutional and legal mechanisms capable of promoting freedom of religion for all and amity between Copts and Muslims.

The Rise of Youth Coalition of the Egyptian Revolution

Egypt has been simmering with slow-paced social unrest for years. Strikes by different sectors of society have been increasing. The success of the Tunisian January 14, 2011 Revolution, marked by the departure of dictator Ben Ali, has given a large segment of the restless population in Egypt a hope that they too could bring down their dictator. This is why the most popular revolutionary slogan has been Irhal (Leave).

Some observers are concerned that the Muslim Brotherhood Movement might be the main instigator or beneficiary of the revolt. The Muslim Brothers do not hide their role, but their leadership hesitated to jump in until the third day of the revolution, when it became apparent that the uprising is gaining momentum. If there is an engine to the Egyptian revolt it is the young bloggers and groups. These people are highly educated, jobless and thus have a very strong motivation to rise up. They have been speaking openly in anticipation for January 25th. Check out the 6 April Movement blogpost: http://6aprilmove.blogspot.com/. They had hoped that April 6, 2009 would start the revolt, but the Egyptian masses were not ready. The Tunisian spark ignited the Egyptian revolution.

The youth movement was joined by other groups to call for January 25th demonstration, coinciding with the National Police Day in Egypt. Ironically, it was the police that was tasked with the failed operation of suppressing the revolt. Among the organizers were the Kifaya (Enough) Movement, founded by lay Christian George Ishaq. The populist nature of his non-violent resistence attracted many Egyptians, both Coptic and Muslim. Another group, the National Association for Change,is led by the world-renouned Muhammad al-Baradei. Moreover, young Muslim Brothers and members of secular opposition also joined from day one. These young activists experienced the dictatorial rule of the Mubarak regime since their teenage years. At schools, election of student unions are controlled by the regime. Administraters at universities are forced to exclude students who are suspected of regime opposition connections from running in student elections.

The January 25 turnout exceeded the expectations of the organizers. In many places they did not have local leaders to organize the activities. That day marked the emergence of many newborn leaders who took to the street expecting someone else will lead them--only to find out that they have natural leadership skills. It is this self-confidence that motivated the people who turned out in the first day to carry on, allowing the revolt to pick momentum. January 28th was a Friday, the weekly day of prayer when Muslims congregate at noon. That was the day when the Muslim Brotherhood threw its full weight behind the Revolution. Reporters suggest that the impressive numbers of demonstrators increased tenfold.

That's when the Mubarak regime fell apart. Mubarak realized that scapegoating the Muslim Brotherhood to teach other Egyptians the lesson of submission can no longer work. Fortunately, Mubarak did not have Plan B. He now has been left to face off the revolting masses, which left 300 people dead and ten times more injured. When that only brough more people to the streets, Mubarak copied Ben Ali's attempt to saw anarchy and security throughout the country. He pulled out the police from neighborhoods where officers were providing security against thieves and other criminal. That left peopl to fend for themselves. And like the Tunisians, Egyptians protected their lives and property. Again, young people have been on the front lines of providing volunteer security for their neighborhoods.

On February 4, a self-styled group called the Wise People Committee announced a proposal for a transitional period to begin after Mubarak steps down. Vice Presient Omar Soleiman has already met with them. But the highly educated youth, who still carry the heaviest burden of organizing the revolt, did not like the fact that no one has consulted with them. They began selecting their own leaders to make sure that they speak for themselves, hence the birth of the Coalition for the Egyptian Revolution's Youth. Some of their spokespersons have already make their debut on international television insisting that the only plitical legitimacy that exists in Egypt today is that of the revolution. They distanced themselves from the groups that have been meeting with the Mubarak regime and presented demands of change that assure the removal of obstacles to the right of young people to run for parliamentary elections.

Israel and the Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution of 2011

At this time of growing Arab pride and emancipation, Israelis who care about peace should not act to provoke knee-jerk reactions among Arabs. Israel is not back to square one with the Egyptian state, but Israel never moved much beyond that square with the people of Egypt. Perhaps, this is the time for Israeli civil society groups to show good will toward a neighboring nation in its fight against oppression. But the first order of business of peace loving Israelis is to challenge the extremists in their government to recommit themselves to supporting basic human rights for non-Jews.

The Islamophobic Israeli PM, along with his supporters in Washington, communicate belligerence that boils down to a self-defeating message that Israel can feel safe only if the Arabs are controlled by oppressors. Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggested using U.S aid to convince Arab leaders to write discrimination into their constitutions. He called this betrayal of American values "Discriminating Democracy". (Washington Post, 1/30/2011). Israeli leaders right and left praise Mubarak for his friendship, but they have nothing good to say about Egyptians turning inward to clean their political house. Instead they are busy hyping the spector of another Iran in Egypt. In response, one junior Muslim Brotherhood leader suggested that Egypt should prepare for war.

Obviously, peacemaking will be more difficult with proud Arab peoples. Israel will condemn itself to isolation if it fails to explore the cultural aspects of peace. Israel now has a window of opportunity to explore this negleted aspect of peacemaking. But there are some obstacles. Egyptians are struggling now to transition to a civilian-led state that caters to the needs of its population. Israel on the other hand is a militant society. Israeli non-senior adults are either full time or part-time combatants. Perhaps this is time for Israeli NGOs to project a softer image of Israel to Arab audiences.

More importantly, Israeli leaders must rethink their approach to peace now that they can have a chance for the first time in their history to talk to governments who can bring their populations on board. The first question is the grounds on which Israel will stand to talk to Arab democracies that rule through agreements. Currently Israel refuses to negotiate on the basis of the Road Map or UN resolutions. Israel seems only interested in continuous meetings with Arab leaders while it pursues an inhumane siege of Gaza and aggressive settlement activities in the West Bank. To many Egyptians, Israel has already violated the Camp David Accord with Egypt. The agreement created a framework for ending the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

The Israelis should muster the confidence to see the spreading anti-dictatorship spirit in the Arab world as an historical opportunity. Instead of feeling a rising threat, Israelis should read the course of history more accurately. They also should come to appreciate the fact that Arabs have strong reasons to feel that Israel, the only country in the region with nuclear weapons, is a threat to their existence and prosperity. But Arabs should give Israel some time to absorb the sudden change. Israelis had been accostomed to work with Arab strongmen who were able to control their peoples while the Israelis pursued occupation. Israel must appreciate that the new freedoms will mean that anti-Israel voices will enjoy large spaces to vent their frustration; but Cairo and other Arab capitals will not rush going to war.

The new Arab leaders will cater first and foremost to their voters. But they do not have much to offer their populations except the removal of obstacles that have arrested the ability of young people to fullfil their dreams. Israeli leaders who will choose to connect with the good side of Arab youths are the visionaries who will serve their people properly and champion the cause of peace.

How Dictators Think

The unfolding events of the Egyptian January 25th Revolution, part of the Great Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution of 2011, revealed important clues about the megalomania that dictators suffer from. Mubarak’s apparent obsession with the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood was his game plan to maintain the support of Western powers fearful of obscurantist, populist Islamists.
Mubarak’s failure to recognize the political shortcomings of his two predecessors is now chasing him out of office. The young Egyptians who lead the uprising today had each realized that the regime will never build the institutions of freedom, representation and opportunity they need to live in dignity. Yet Mubarak is completely delusional: a great number of his citizens have independently reached the conclusion that he is the source of their woes; his response is to insist that they should give him more time to prove that the collective judgment of his people was misguided.
Like other dictators, Mubarak worked for decades to build his power through campaigns of isolating and cracking down on opposition groups. Clearly his strategy cannot work anymore. But Mubarak does not seem to accept the fact that he has exhausted MB-phobia. Despite the apparent breadth of the revolt, Mubarak still resorted to the same old scare tactics of the past. Dictators usually believe that true people actually love them. The only way Mubarak will believe that his people want him to leave is if the whole 85 million people took to the streets. But this never happened in any revolution.
Mubarak’s true obsession lies in the security he derives from feeling in control of others. In the face of an undeniable massive revolt across Egypt against him, he still wants to believe that he is able to set the terms of the relationship with the people he controlled for three decades. It did not matter to him that his bid to stay in charge is not realistic. Nor did he give much thought to the fact that because of his old age and poor health, he might not even survive the next seven months anyway. But all these considerations are beside the point.
Dictators are fooled by their power, but like other human beings, they communicate fear while trying to project resolve. Mubarak stood before television cameras thinking that he would express self-confidence. But fearing the fate of Ben Ali, who was forced out by his own military, the Egyptian dictator concedes power to his circle of confidants, who are now more able to depose him. Perhaps he trusts that his control-controlled relationship with them is unshakable. Responding to fear is apparent in the behavior of Mubarak’s dictator brother Qaddafi. Attempting to head off an uprising in his country, he issued a subliminal warning to his people through the condemnation of their Tunisian brethren. But all he did was reveals to Libyans that he was shaken by what happened to Ben Ali. This demonstration of weakness has emboldened Libyans who had already been inspired by the Tunisians; hence the start of the unrest in Libya. In contrast, Mubarak, perhaps because he feels closer to a natural exit from life, stood in a televised address to act as a victim of instigators who are not compassionate enough to wait on an old man seven more months. He tried to sound indignant when he revealed for the first time that he never wanted another term in office nor is he seeking to appoint his son as successor.
But the pathetic nature of the Mubarak dictatorial state of mind was most evident in his reaction to the violence of the mobs that have been doing his dirty work for many years. As world television screens were showing the mayhem they created in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and the response of the brave protesters to repel the attacks, Mubarak went on CNN to up the ante. He suggested that if he stepped down, chaos would descend on Egypt. If Mubarak’s obstinacy was meant to protect his legacy, it brought about the opposite outcome. He couldn’t have chosen a worse time for the interview: the midst of the pointless rioting of his supporters. Thanks to Christiane Amanpour, we know more about the cultish mentality of dictators and their isolationist worldviews. The world had a chance to learn how the baltagiah (literally, thugs) played an important role in maintaining the Mubarak dictatorship. They comprise a small class of violent functionaries who have operated in civilian clothes, allowing the regime to distance itself from them. But they have often been the same persons whose barbarism has terrorized ordinary people into submitting to the will of the regime during election seasons and times of political tension.
Ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians have understood that the reason dictators have been able to control them without having to always use a massive number of security forces armed with deadly weapons is the fear that have been instilled in people’s hearts. The Tunisians collectively broke the wall of fear, leading to the chain of reactions that are changing the course of Arab political culture.