Has the Muslim Brotherhood Transformed?

"Islam is the Solution" has been the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement since the mid-1990s. It rose in Egypt where the group is banned but tolerated as an underground movement. The group hesitated to participate in the uprising when it began on January 25, 2009, but it took only three days for the leadership, under pressure from young members, to jump in with full force. But one has to give them credit: they read the pulse of the street and have not attempted to push the slogan that identifies them. The have accepted slogans like “Change, Freedom, and Social Justice” which represent the common values they share with the populace. It is too soon to determine whether this adaptation represents a transformation in the Muslim Brotherhood culture. In my estimate, this is perhaps true for young Muslim Brothers who are also part of the Facebook and Twitter generation. But there is a great chance that there will be a spillover effect on other sectors of the movement. After all, in the Muslim Brotherhood culture, the youth have always played a central role.

In addition to being careful not to sound factional, they openly admit the facts about their role and the role of all others in the revolt. Al-Jazeera has interviewed several top leaders of the group in different parts of the country. They each agreed that the Muslim Brothers are part of the protest, along with all other opposition groups and civil society leaders. More importantly, they emphasized that most demonstrators do not belong to any organization. This might be opportunistic at this point, but it will also stand as evidence sourced to them that credit for the coming change belongs to all Egyptians, not a particular faction.

More, the Muslim Brothers have agreed to be part of a coalition that is led by Mohammad al-Baradei, allowing him to become the figurehead of the transition to the new political system in Egypt. Al-Baradei is well known in the world for his service in the UN and his Noble Prize, but he does not have deep roots in Egyptian political life. The Muslim Brohters are sending a message that they care for changing the rules of the political system more than they care for replacing the top leaders.

But it remains to be seen what rules of the new political game they will agree to. Will they endorse only rules that protect their factional interests or rules guaranteeing freedom and representation of all interests in Egyptian society? Most Egyptians, including many of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, will seek guarantees for their competing socioeconomic interests. Given the fact that their members and supporters include leaders of workers' unions and professional syndicates, their thinking about a new social contract will have to account for the competing interests within their own ranks.

But how will they guarantee freedom for Copts? They have adopted the idea of equal citizenship rights for all. But several questions remain unanswered. What guarantees will the Muslim Brotherhood accept as checks on the powers of the majority? What guarantees will they endorse to make sure that the government will not have the power to intervene in private property rights, the very abuse they suffered from under Mubarak? These questions make observers concerned about the political role of the group because it has not answered them adequately. But this is not a reason to call for their exclusion; rather, it is a reason to engage them.