Islamic Democracy vs. Islamist Democracy

A few weeks ago, on Saturday, May 5, 2012, I met with four members of the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly at a private event in Virginia. The delegation included three top leaders of Ennahda, the majority party in Tunisia, which has modernist Islamic leaning, and a leader of the Block, the party of the Turnisian president, which has socialist, secular leaning. They shared agreement on the identity of the new state as Arab and Muslim (Tunisia is nearly all Sunni Arabic speaking society). But they seemed obsessed with the Bin Ali legacy; two members served more than a decade in prison. The Block party leader is a coalition partner to Ennahada. He was very gracious in sharing the history of his group in offering their podium for Ennahda to express its views during the repressive years of the deposed dictator.

Little did I hear about the greater injustices that Bin Ali committed against the  whole people of Tunisia. Now that the election brought these parties into power, the challenge for the factions is to transform into revolutionary leaders for all Tunisians. This means they have to begin talking about politics with people at the  center of it, whether in the past or in the present or the into the future. Factional narratives of history will inform how each faction behaves and the priorities they place with regards to the  national agenda. Leaders who know what their factions feel without placing those special feelings in the general public's mood are not good national leaders.

The risk of factional narratives is that politics may become reduced into factional rivalries that alienate the vast majority of the  people who made the revolutionary outcomes possible but without committing themselves to factions. The danger implied in the slide to factionalism (whether led by one or a coalition of a few groups) is the possibility of the return to dictatorship or the development of a new form of authoritarianism. General Rachid Bin Ammar did not support his boss not for the sake of the current ruling parties, but to side with the demonstrable will of the masses (which were not chanting the names of any party or group, except the Bin Ali party they wanted out). The Turkish experience shows that generals are tempted to step into politics in the name of solving crises, when parties are engaged in infighting and the public is unhappy. Thus de-factionalizing politics by empowering people in Tunisia is in the interest of building democracy. Another alternative is the authoritarianism of factions, which may result from the inability or unwillingness to follow the natural course of the people power revolution by creating a system based on checks and balances that prevent any segment, institution or faction from excercising hegemony over the political system. In other words, current political leaders and the people who brought them to power can only ensure the ability to develop people centered narratives and political solutions by sharing power not only amongst the national elite but also with people in their localities, clubs, schools, and streets. This would force political leaders to begin referring to political memories that the general has experienced. This is the best assurance for democratic transformation. 

Is al-Nahdha Succeeding or Failing the Salafi Test?

The clashes between the Salafis and Tunisian security forces in Jendoubah http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18222810 may be seen in the West as an evidence that Ennahda government is willing to face off elements who operate outside the law. This is a premature conclusion as we are not sure that the security forces are under the control of the ruling party. Remember that this is a party that came to form a government after the Constitutional Assembly's election last year. The ancient regime's apparatus, particularly the security sector, is still largely unchanged. But the clashes imply clearer noteworthy indications:
1. While the Salafis are attempting to prove that they are more Islamic than the ruling Islamist party, Ennahda is trying to show those outside Islamic camps that it is more moderate than the Salafis and more committed to the rule of law. I am afraid that if the transition to democracy does not go well and if economic opportunity in Sidi Bouzid, where the attacks on liquor shops started, do not improve, no amount of state coercion will end the current conflict, which feeds on economic frustration. More importantly, what is lost here is a proper discussion and treatment of the roots of the problem.
2. Resorting to the coercive power of the state to settle what is essentially a cultue war over what the Islamic injunction against alcohol means for the state is not the appropriate long-term answer. Ennahda Minister of Interior spoke about the rule of law after violent attacks aimed for shut down the legal sale of alcohol. But the education and civic dialogue responses have been extremely lacking. The Salafis are ideological opponents. Their arguments have to be defeated.
3. Coercion alone will be self-defeating so long as the Salafi leaders can convince their supporters that the struggle now is between those who want Islamic law (the Salafis) and those who want power (Ennahda). This comes at a time when the ruling party has not even begun the work of dismantling the ancient regime. The majority party should remember that it came to a position of authority through a popular mass movement beyond Islamist ranks. If the political process now moves into a showdown between the various Islamist camps, which would alienate the vast majority of Tunisians, a coup is possible. This is one of the core lessons of the Turkish pre-2002 model of military-political relations.
4. A challenge to democracy should be treated with more democracy. Religious scholars agree that the consumption and sale of alcohol by Muslims is prohibited by Islamic law. Most Tunisians do not consume alcohol, but they cannot impost a ban on non-Muslims, including the millions of tourists who come to the country. More, there is no consensus among scholars that the state should be the agency to enforce that article of Islamic law, but the  state should enforce law and order. No individual or group should take law enforcement into their own hands, let alone force their views on religion and state.
5. The Tunisian Revolution started as a local protest in Sidi Bouzid, where the current problem also began. The government has the power to pass laws allowing localities to establish their own rule on the sale of alcohol. This is what many governments around the world do. Thus empowering the people of Sidi Bouzid to make a public decision about the issue is the appropriate way of handling the problem.
6. The  Salafis are likely to go along with this proposal. They have just launched their own political party; therefore, they have interest in staying within the mainstream. Giving them a window of opportunity locally may keep them busy winning hearts and minds than debating whether to support violence against alcohol stores or security forces. If they are able to convince Sidi Bouzid local government to ban the sale of alcohol, the police should enforce the law. The factionalization of politics threatens democratic transition in Tunisia if politics becomes reduced to the ability of the national political majority to impose its will over all issues and all other forces in society. The  Tunisians are learning that a people power revolution can devise people-centered solutions to political crises, but only if enlightened leaders control their factional interests in the pursuit of the greater good.