The clashes between the Salafis and Tunisian security forces in Jendoubah http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18222810 may be seen in the West as an evidence that Ennahda government is willing to face off elements who operate outside the law. This is a premature conclusion as we are not sure that the security forces are under the control of the ruling party. Remember that this is a party that came to form a government after the Constitutional Assembly's election last year. The ancient regime's apparatus, particularly the security sector, is still largely unchanged. But the clashes imply clearer noteworthy indications:
1. While the Salafis are attempting to prove that they are more Islamic than the ruling Islamist party, Ennahda is trying to show those outside Islamic camps that it is more moderate than the Salafis and more committed to the rule of law. I am afraid that if the transition to democracy does not go well and if economic opportunity in Sidi Bouzid, where the attacks on liquor shops started, do not improve, no amount of state coercion will end the current conflict, which feeds on economic frustration. More importantly, what is lost here is a proper discussion and treatment of the roots of the problem.
2. Resorting to the coercive power of the state to settle what is essentially a cultue war over what the Islamic injunction against alcohol means for the state is not the appropriate long-term answer. Ennahda Minister of Interior spoke about the rule of law after violent attacks aimed for shut down the legal sale of alcohol. But the education and civic dialogue responses have been extremely lacking. The Salafis are ideological opponents. Their arguments have to be defeated.
3. Coercion alone will be self-defeating so long as the Salafi leaders can convince their supporters that the struggle now is between those who want Islamic law (the Salafis) and those who want power (Ennahda). This comes at a time when the ruling party has not even begun the work of dismantling the ancient regime. The majority party should remember that it came to a position of authority through a popular mass movement beyond Islamist ranks. If the political process now moves into a showdown between the various Islamist camps, which would alienate the vast majority of Tunisians, a coup is possible. This is one of the core lessons of the Turkish pre-2002 model of military-political relations.
4. A challenge to democracy should be treated with more democracy. Religious scholars agree that the consumption and sale of alcohol by Muslims is prohibited by Islamic law. Most Tunisians do not consume alcohol, but they cannot impost a ban on non-Muslims, including the millions of tourists who come to the country. More, there is no consensus among scholars that the state should be the agency to enforce that article of Islamic law, but the state should enforce law and order. No individual or group should take law enforcement into their own hands, let alone force their views on religion and state.
5. The Tunisian Revolution started as a local protest in Sidi Bouzid, where the current problem also began. The government has the power to pass laws allowing localities to establish their own rule on the sale of alcohol. This is what many governments around the world do. Thus empowering the people of Sidi Bouzid to make a public decision about the issue is the appropriate way of handling the problem.
6. The Salafis are likely to go along with this proposal. They have just launched their own political party; therefore, they have interest in staying within the mainstream. Giving them a window of opportunity locally may keep them busy winning hearts and minds than debating whether to support violence against alcohol stores or security forces. If they are able to convince Sidi Bouzid local government to ban the sale of alcohol, the police should enforce the law. The factionalization of politics threatens democratic transition in Tunisia if politics becomes reduced to the ability of the national political majority to impose its will over all issues and all other forces in society. The Tunisians are learning that a people power revolution can devise people-centered solutions to political crises, but only if enlightened leaders control their factional interests in the pursuit of the greater good.
1. While the Salafis are attempting to prove that they are more Islamic than the ruling Islamist party, Ennahda is trying to show those outside Islamic camps that it is more moderate than the Salafis and more committed to the rule of law. I am afraid that if the transition to democracy does not go well and if economic opportunity in Sidi Bouzid, where the attacks on liquor shops started, do not improve, no amount of state coercion will end the current conflict, which feeds on economic frustration. More importantly, what is lost here is a proper discussion and treatment of the roots of the problem.
2. Resorting to the coercive power of the state to settle what is essentially a cultue war over what the Islamic injunction against alcohol means for the state is not the appropriate long-term answer. Ennahda Minister of Interior spoke about the rule of law after violent attacks aimed for shut down the legal sale of alcohol. But the education and civic dialogue responses have been extremely lacking. The Salafis are ideological opponents. Their arguments have to be defeated.
3. Coercion alone will be self-defeating so long as the Salafi leaders can convince their supporters that the struggle now is between those who want Islamic law (the Salafis) and those who want power (Ennahda). This comes at a time when the ruling party has not even begun the work of dismantling the ancient regime. The majority party should remember that it came to a position of authority through a popular mass movement beyond Islamist ranks. If the political process now moves into a showdown between the various Islamist camps, which would alienate the vast majority of Tunisians, a coup is possible. This is one of the core lessons of the Turkish pre-2002 model of military-political relations.
4. A challenge to democracy should be treated with more democracy. Religious scholars agree that the consumption and sale of alcohol by Muslims is prohibited by Islamic law. Most Tunisians do not consume alcohol, but they cannot impost a ban on non-Muslims, including the millions of tourists who come to the country. More, there is no consensus among scholars that the state should be the agency to enforce that article of Islamic law, but the state should enforce law and order. No individual or group should take law enforcement into their own hands, let alone force their views on religion and state.
5. The Tunisian Revolution started as a local protest in Sidi Bouzid, where the current problem also began. The government has the power to pass laws allowing localities to establish their own rule on the sale of alcohol. This is what many governments around the world do. Thus empowering the people of Sidi Bouzid to make a public decision about the issue is the appropriate way of handling the problem.
6. The Salafis are likely to go along with this proposal. They have just launched their own political party; therefore, they have interest in staying within the mainstream. Giving them a window of opportunity locally may keep them busy winning hearts and minds than debating whether to support violence against alcohol stores or security forces. If they are able to convince Sidi Bouzid local government to ban the sale of alcohol, the police should enforce the law. The factionalization of politics threatens democratic transition in Tunisia if politics becomes reduced to the ability of the national political majority to impose its will over all issues and all other forces in society. The Tunisians are learning that a people power revolution can devise people-centered solutions to political crises, but only if enlightened leaders control their factional interests in the pursuit of the greater good.
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