I took my Washington Semester class of Islam and World Affairs to Egypt in November 2010. Cab drivers, hotel staff, and even the government-appointed security escorts, each blamed Mubarak for low incomes and lack of political freedom. I thought they were probably personalizing the blame to play on my emotions in the hope for better tips. When the revolt began demanding that Mubarak leaves, I thought at first this was a copy of the Tunisian revolution’s targeting of Ben Ali. Of course, the Tunisian revolution sparked its Egyyptian counterpart. Although Egyptians had lived different economic circumstances compared to Tunisians, both nations had dictatorships that were more similar than different. Looking back at what I experienced two months earlier, it would seem that public opinion in Egypt has been shaping around who to blame for socioeconomic problems.
As we began our field study, we were overtaken by the extreme contradictions in Egyptian political life. We visited the Egyptian Medical Syndicate (EMS) to learn about associational life. We were allowed to meet with the president, the Mubarak regime’s man. Two-thirds of the syndicate’s board members consist of leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). But we were not allowed to meet with them although they are duly elected by Egypt’s doctors and ably run the affairs of their profession. The president told us that one of his mains functions was to make sure that the EMS is not entangled in politics. Board members (of the MB) had used the EMS as a platform to conduct political activities; they were denied public space elsewhere.
At the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters, Ali Dean Hilal, a top NDP strategist told us that despite pressure from the West, the Egyptian government will not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to become a party. His reason: MB candidates would tell people that voting for their party would grant them places in Heaven. If this were an insurmountable obstacle for democracy, then MB members should have been banned from politics altogther. But they were allowed to engage in the said anti-democratic practice as indepedent candidates. So denying them legal status meant to limit their reach, not to preclude the manipulation of religion in politics.
Then I took my class to the Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Egypt's oldest and largest think tank. Dr. Dina Shehata predicted that the Muslim Brotherhood would lose big in the coming election, scheduled to be held in three weeks. She was right: the MB did did not participate in the second round, but in the first round their seats in the Parliament declined from 88 seats in 2005 to 2 in 2010. Egyptian courts issued 1500 orders invalidating election results--not a great obstacle to convene the legislature. A senior colleague of the Ahrm Center told us that the NDP is a huge, diverse umbrella and that it would win big in any election even if it was separated from the state. One student asked him whether it would be prudent then to separate party from state, he declined to entertain the thought. I asked him why doesn't Egypt follow the Turkish model in dealing with the MB. Turkey has been ruled by the AKP, an Islam-based party, for the last decade. The Ahram Center scholar said that Egypt does not have a history of democracy found in Turkey. Nearly twenty years earlier I did field research for my doctorate degree in Egypt. An old, poor farmer told me the NDP was corrupt and would be trounced if it lost state support. In today’s uprising, the NDP, with all its resources, has not been able to mobilize a fraction of number of people who paid their way into the downtown of each governorate capital. The pro-Mubarak thugs who rioted in Tahrir square and other cities are of the same type of thugs whe had been used by the NDP in the past three decades to scare opposition voters.
I took my students to the office of the Islamic Thought Institute in Zamalek, where Mr. Khalid Abdel Menem told us he wished Egypt had the sort of secularism enjoyed by the Turks. Today the Muslim Brotherhood has replaced their “Islam is the solution” slogan with “Change, Freedom and Social Justice.” But the problem with Egyptian Islamists is not the slogans but the lack of clarity and specificity of their political discourse. Now they are proceeding carefully, stressing that the revolt belongs to all Egyptians. It remains to be seen how this sentiment will shape the writing of the new social contract in Egypt (If the military regime ever allows this to happen.
Watching the events of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 on television, I see pride, dignity and self-confidence on the blooded faces of the Egyptian protesters, a sharp contrast to the body language that I could observe among the Egyptians I encountered two months ago. One particular scene caught my eye is a bearded young man being taken for treatment while chanting “We will die for our freedom!” In another scene, there is a woman engineer who told CNN reporters that she is doing well economically in Egypt, but she is camping in Tahrir Square for a better future for Egypt as a country for all Egyptians. Her daughter said she is there because she felt Mubarak treated her like an animal. Also, there was a middle- aged man with shabby clothes. His face is lit up; his reason for being in Tahrir Square: “So that someone poor like me can walk in the street with my head high.” No wonder the February 4th Friday sermon at Tahrir Square was as much a spiritual event as it was a political expression."This is not a revolution with religious goals; the revolt of the youth is an Egyptian movement of Muslims and Christians," the bearded imam said. Famous Egyptian actress Sherihan told al-Jazeera anchorman: "All shades of Egyptian society are here: Muslims, Christians and Muslim Brothers. All of us are here!" Cleary, all signs show the degenarate political culture of the NDP has given way to the rebirth of the modern Egyptian nation.
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Has the Muslim Brotherhood Transformed?
"Islam is the Solution" has been the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement since the mid-1990s. It rose in Egypt where the group is banned but tolerated as an underground movement. The group hesitated to participate in the uprising when it began on January 25, 2009, but it took only three days for the leadership, under pressure from young members, to jump in with full force. But one has to give them credit: they read the pulse of the street and have not attempted to push the slogan that identifies them. The have accepted slogans like “Change, Freedom, and Social Justice” which represent the common values they share with the populace. It is too soon to determine whether this adaptation represents a transformation in the Muslim Brotherhood culture. In my estimate, this is perhaps true for young Muslim Brothers who are also part of the Facebook and Twitter generation. But there is a great chance that there will be a spillover effect on other sectors of the movement. After all, in the Muslim Brotherhood culture, the youth have always played a central role.
In addition to being careful not to sound factional, they openly admit the facts about their role and the role of all others in the revolt. Al-Jazeera has interviewed several top leaders of the group in different parts of the country. They each agreed that the Muslim Brothers are part of the protest, along with all other opposition groups and civil society leaders. More importantly, they emphasized that most demonstrators do not belong to any organization. This might be opportunistic at this point, but it will also stand as evidence sourced to them that credit for the coming change belongs to all Egyptians, not a particular faction.
More, the Muslim Brothers have agreed to be part of a coalition that is led by Mohammad al-Baradei, allowing him to become the figurehead of the transition to the new political system in Egypt. Al-Baradei is well known in the world for his service in the UN and his Noble Prize, but he does not have deep roots in Egyptian political life. The Muslim Brohters are sending a message that they care for changing the rules of the political system more than they care for replacing the top leaders.
But it remains to be seen what rules of the new political game they will agree to. Will they endorse only rules that protect their factional interests or rules guaranteeing freedom and representation of all interests in Egyptian society? Most Egyptians, including many of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, will seek guarantees for their competing socioeconomic interests. Given the fact that their members and supporters include leaders of workers' unions and professional syndicates, their thinking about a new social contract will have to account for the competing interests within their own ranks.
But how will they guarantee freedom for Copts? They have adopted the idea of equal citizenship rights for all. But several questions remain unanswered. What guarantees will the Muslim Brotherhood accept as checks on the powers of the majority? What guarantees will they endorse to make sure that the government will not have the power to intervene in private property rights, the very abuse they suffered from under Mubarak? These questions make observers concerned about the political role of the group because it has not answered them adequately. But this is not a reason to call for their exclusion; rather, it is a reason to engage them.
In addition to being careful not to sound factional, they openly admit the facts about their role and the role of all others in the revolt. Al-Jazeera has interviewed several top leaders of the group in different parts of the country. They each agreed that the Muslim Brothers are part of the protest, along with all other opposition groups and civil society leaders. More importantly, they emphasized that most demonstrators do not belong to any organization. This might be opportunistic at this point, but it will also stand as evidence sourced to them that credit for the coming change belongs to all Egyptians, not a particular faction.
More, the Muslim Brothers have agreed to be part of a coalition that is led by Mohammad al-Baradei, allowing him to become the figurehead of the transition to the new political system in Egypt. Al-Baradei is well known in the world for his service in the UN and his Noble Prize, but he does not have deep roots in Egyptian political life. The Muslim Brohters are sending a message that they care for changing the rules of the political system more than they care for replacing the top leaders.
But it remains to be seen what rules of the new political game they will agree to. Will they endorse only rules that protect their factional interests or rules guaranteeing freedom and representation of all interests in Egyptian society? Most Egyptians, including many of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, will seek guarantees for their competing socioeconomic interests. Given the fact that their members and supporters include leaders of workers' unions and professional syndicates, their thinking about a new social contract will have to account for the competing interests within their own ranks.
But how will they guarantee freedom for Copts? They have adopted the idea of equal citizenship rights for all. But several questions remain unanswered. What guarantees will the Muslim Brotherhood accept as checks on the powers of the majority? What guarantees will they endorse to make sure that the government will not have the power to intervene in private property rights, the very abuse they suffered from under Mubarak? These questions make observers concerned about the political role of the group because it has not answered them adequately. But this is not a reason to call for their exclusion; rather, it is a reason to engage them.
Q & A on Egypt's January 25th Revolution
Questions from Lupe
Do you think Mubarak will leave soon?
Most likely. He is lashing out in a counterproductive way. His Baltagiah (the term Egyptians use for security officers and ruling party operatives attacking protesters) had 10 days to plan their come back. They were too few, too violent. They made no stand in other parts of the country. Their barbarism exhausted all good will Mubarak had with the U.S. government. But members of his regime will try to hang on because they stand to lose a lot. If the Egyptians come out in huge numbers tomorrow after Friday prayers, the only option Mubarak will have is to begin using heavy weaponry. From all indications, the Egyptian military will not cooperate with him. He is increasingly isolated.
Do you think the National Democratic Party (NDP) power has dissipated?
The events showed the NDP for what it is a top-down regime apparatus to create a beneficiary group from society. The most enthusiastic members are the most opportunistic. Where are they now? A few thousands of them demonstrated in Cairo (compared to hundreds of thousands there). But they were not able to mobilize in the rest of Egypt. This is not a party in the real sense of the word. In a new democratic Egypt state and party will have to be separate. When this happens there will be no NDP because it never learned to operate on its own.
What about al-Wafd Party’s announcement that it is suspending it’s activities in the revolt?
Al-Wafd is a small group that is now calculating its position in the wake of the violent attack on the protesters yesterday. If the revolt regains momentum tomorrow, they will likely rejoin. Opportunism is a counterproductive policy during revolutionary times. Their position will likely cost them a lot in the post revolution era.
What effects do you think this revolution of the people will have on other nation-states that have been similarly situated?
What we are witnessing today is Arab political culture being transformed. It a matter of a few weeks you have revolutions in two states and serious regime concessions in two other regimes, Jordan and Yemen. This tsunami is only building up. There will be ups and downs and the new political elites will make mistakes, but Arab politics as we know it is no more.
Questions from Fanny
What is the Muslim Brotherhood thinking about the future of Egypt?
The Muslim Brotherhood are the best organized group in the revolt, but they acknowledge and work with all other groups and independent voices. On February 5, 2011, Esam al-Aryan, member of the Guidance Office, told Al-Jazeera that the group wants a democratic, civil government that guarantees political freedom for everyone and have an Islamic cultural reference. As the Egyptians proceed with their discussion of a new social contract between state and society, the Muslim Brotherhood will have to compromise on what an Islamic cultural reference means to assuage the fears of Copts.
What if the Muslim Brotherhood is only showing tolerance until they grab power? This highly unlikely because they have practiced the tolerance they are showing today for half a century. Yes, there is authoritarianism within Muslim Brotherhood ranks, but this is true for other groups as well. Arab political culture today is anti-dictatorship; but Arabs will develop democratic mores through trial and error. If the Muslim Brothers come to power and renege on the commitments they made, their fate will be like the fate of the regimes they have deposed.
Do you think Mubarak will leave soon?
Most likely. He is lashing out in a counterproductive way. His Baltagiah (the term Egyptians use for security officers and ruling party operatives attacking protesters) had 10 days to plan their come back. They were too few, too violent. They made no stand in other parts of the country. Their barbarism exhausted all good will Mubarak had with the U.S. government. But members of his regime will try to hang on because they stand to lose a lot. If the Egyptians come out in huge numbers tomorrow after Friday prayers, the only option Mubarak will have is to begin using heavy weaponry. From all indications, the Egyptian military will not cooperate with him. He is increasingly isolated.
Do you think the National Democratic Party (NDP) power has dissipated?
The events showed the NDP for what it is a top-down regime apparatus to create a beneficiary group from society. The most enthusiastic members are the most opportunistic. Where are they now? A few thousands of them demonstrated in Cairo (compared to hundreds of thousands there). But they were not able to mobilize in the rest of Egypt. This is not a party in the real sense of the word. In a new democratic Egypt state and party will have to be separate. When this happens there will be no NDP because it never learned to operate on its own.
What about al-Wafd Party’s announcement that it is suspending it’s activities in the revolt?
Al-Wafd is a small group that is now calculating its position in the wake of the violent attack on the protesters yesterday. If the revolt regains momentum tomorrow, they will likely rejoin. Opportunism is a counterproductive policy during revolutionary times. Their position will likely cost them a lot in the post revolution era.
What effects do you think this revolution of the people will have on other nation-states that have been similarly situated?
What we are witnessing today is Arab political culture being transformed. It a matter of a few weeks you have revolutions in two states and serious regime concessions in two other regimes, Jordan and Yemen. This tsunami is only building up. There will be ups and downs and the new political elites will make mistakes, but Arab politics as we know it is no more.
Questions from Fanny
What is the Muslim Brotherhood thinking about the future of Egypt?
The Muslim Brotherhood are the best organized group in the revolt, but they acknowledge and work with all other groups and independent voices. On February 5, 2011, Esam al-Aryan, member of the Guidance Office, told Al-Jazeera that the group wants a democratic, civil government that guarantees political freedom for everyone and have an Islamic cultural reference. As the Egyptians proceed with their discussion of a new social contract between state and society, the Muslim Brotherhood will have to compromise on what an Islamic cultural reference means to assuage the fears of Copts.
What if the Muslim Brotherhood is only showing tolerance until they grab power? This highly unlikely because they have practiced the tolerance they are showing today for half a century. Yes, there is authoritarianism within Muslim Brotherhood ranks, but this is true for other groups as well. Arab political culture today is anti-dictatorship; but Arabs will develop democratic mores through trial and error. If the Muslim Brothers come to power and renege on the commitments they made, their fate will be like the fate of the regimes they have deposed.
People Power in the Arab World: The American Response
People power may have come to the Arabs. Two anti-dictatorship revolutions are in the making. It took only two weeks for the second to start and other Arab masses are watching restlessly, while Arab leaders are totally confused, shaky and do not appear to comprehend what is happening. The most enlightened among them is one of the youngest: King Abdullah of Jordan. He has already dismissed his government and criticized the sham election it ran last year. We are at a turning point in Arab and Muslim world history (Arabs are only 20 percent of Muslims, but they are the largest ethnic group). What should the U.S. do?
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build good will with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. American government response was rather confused until Mubarak sent his violent henchmen to make their stand on February 2, 2011. Fortunately, this changed with the U.S. condemnation of the regime’s violence.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (this option is more consistent with the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood).
Do not exaggerate the Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Al-Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were a few thousand people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
Mohamed Nimer is assistant professor of Islam and World Affairs. He is the author of “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: Citizens with Foreign Attachments?”
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build good will with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. American government response was rather confused until Mubarak sent his violent henchmen to make their stand on February 2, 2011. Fortunately, this changed with the U.S. condemnation of the regime’s violence.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (this option is more consistent with the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood).
Do not exaggerate the Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Al-Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were a few thousand people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
Mohamed Nimer is assistant professor of Islam and World Affairs. He is the author of “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: Citizens with Foreign Attachments?”
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
The 2011 Arab anti-Dictatorship Revolution: What Should the U.S. Do?
People power may have come to the Arabs. Two anti-dictatorship revolutions are in the making. It took only two weeks for the second to start and other Arab masses are watching restlessly, while Arab leaders are totally confused, shaky and do not appear to comprehend what is happening. The most enlightened among them is one of the youngest: King Abdullah of Jordan. He has already dismissed his government and criticized the sham election it ran last year. We are at a turning point in Arab and Muslim world history (Arabs are only 20 percent of Muslims, but they are the largest ethnic group). What should the U.S. do?
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build political capital with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. The U.S. should show good will by siding with the people against the regime. America is edging in this direction grudgingly. Do not miss more chances to connect emotionally with the Arabs.
Don’t give much time to the Mubarak regime. Egyptians are screaming loudly they want the whole regime gone, not just Mubarak and his ministers. Mubarak’s attempt to bring political figures with clean hands is too little too late. The U.S. president owes it to the people of America to look out for their interest. It is time to recognize that the U.S. alliance with Mubarak has failed. All indications show that the revolt is gaining momentum. To cling to old notions of stability while reality is evidently changing is irresponsible.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (I prefer this option).
Do not exaggerate Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were 1000 people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
See article posted at:
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build political capital with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. The U.S. should show good will by siding with the people against the regime. America is edging in this direction grudgingly. Do not miss more chances to connect emotionally with the Arabs.
Don’t give much time to the Mubarak regime. Egyptians are screaming loudly they want the whole regime gone, not just Mubarak and his ministers. Mubarak’s attempt to bring political figures with clean hands is too little too late. The U.S. president owes it to the people of America to look out for their interest. It is time to recognize that the U.S. alliance with Mubarak has failed. All indications show that the revolt is gaining momentum. To cling to old notions of stability while reality is evidently changing is irresponsible.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (I prefer this option).
Do not exaggerate Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were 1000 people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
See article posted at:
The Muslim Brotherhood: Twenty Years of Factional Politics
Kuwait, 1991: After the Sabah ruling family escaped the Saddam invasion, Shia and Sunni Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), took charge of providing public services and resisting the Iraqi military—effectively becoming American allies. The Kuwaiti MB denounced their mother organization for standing against the U.S.-led war to evict Iraq from Kuwait. They sent a delegation to Washington only to be rebuffed by then Senator George Mitchell who told them that the U.S. deals only with the Sabah family. They established a political arm, the Islamic Constitutional Movement, which has operated as a de-facto political party, although Kuwaiti Constitution does not allow for parties (in the name of preventing divisiveness). Today, different Sunni and Shia Islamists make a plurality of the Kuwaiti Parliament. They clash amongst themselves on social and sectarian issues but sometimes join forces to gain concessions from the ruling family.
Algeria, 1992: After the cancellation of the free election that was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) a civil war ensued. HIMS, a small Algerian MB group, did not take sides in the conflict but criticized FIS for demagoguery and the security forces for brutality. Later HIMS participated in governments but then split; one faction continues to be part of the government.
Jordan, 1993: The MB forms Islamic Action Front (IAF), now the largest opposition legal party. The king manipulates the electoral process, which the IAF tolerated until 2010, when they decided to boycott the election. Seeking to head off the Tunisian-Egyptian political tsunami, the king dismissed his government and admitted that there were mistakes. But he appointed an old guard ally to lead the dialogue with the opposition, which thinks the king overture is not satisfactory.
Yemen, 1994: The Islamist Reform Party, rooted in MB movement, joined the North Yemen military in a successful bid to unify the north and south of the country. Detesting the Saleh politics of marginalization and increased reliance on his clan, the Reform Party joined forces with the southern opposition against the ruling party. Then the Reform Party joins demonstrators encouraged by the success of the Tunisian revolution. On February 2, 2011, the president announced he will not run again nor will he name his son to succeed him. The Reform Party announced the continuation of their drive for comprehensive political reform. Protesters called February 4, 2011 “Friday of Rage”.
Iraq, 2003: The Sunni MB joined pro-Iran Shia groups al-Dawa and the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq as well as ethnic and religious Kurds in a de-facto alliance with the U.S. to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Shias briefly fought other Shias led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Islamic Party, which thus far suffered on factional split led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.
Palestine, 2006: A plurality of Palestinians voted for Hamas, the political branch of the MB, to express dissatisfaction with the failing peace process and the worsening of quality of life in the Occupied Territories. Fatah, entrenched in the West Bank, conspired with Israel to deny Hamas the exercise of power after allowing them to run in the election. Hamas could not overpower Fatah in the West Bank but routed them in Gaza. They ran a government and withstood the subsequent Western boycott and suffocating Israeli siege. Two years later, Hamas survived the Israeli bombardment of Gazan civilian targets that destroyed all infrastructure and 14% of the strip. Hamas emerged cautious in its rhetoric, insisting on resistance but willing to accept a two-state solution.
Lebanon, 2006: The MB branch, the Islamic Group, is active in Sunni areas, especially the stronghold of Tarablus in the north. Despite a small following, they are an important player in the country’s fractured sectarian democracy. The group moved closer to Hizbullah during and after the impressive performance of the latter in the war with Israel. The confrontation between the Shia Hizbullah and the Sunni Future bloc (led by the former PM), split the MB. The founder, Islamic thinker Fathi Yaken, aligned with Hizbullah while the bulk of the MB remained closer to Future bloc.
Tunisia, 2010: Islamists were nearly absent in the unrest that began in December 17, 2010 and forced the former dictator Ben Ali from office on January 14, 2011. On January 30, 2011, founder of Ennahda Movement (the most progressive MB-like group), returns to his country after 21 years in exile. In 1988 he approved the ban on polygamy as a valid Islamic ijtihad (reinterpretation). Thousands of supporters welcomed him. His first statement was that his group will not contest the coming presidential election and he will not run for any political seat.
Egypt, 2011: The MB (where the movement was founded in 1928) holds on joining the mass protests that began in January 25 until the following Friday, January 28, 2011. The revolt has many voices, of which the MB is the largest organization. Diversity characterizes the Muslim Brothers themselves who essentially represent a social movement akin to the Turkish Gulen Movement, with the exception that Gulen is apolitical and emphasizes intercultural and interfaith relations while the MB is political and tends to be less open. Due to waves of repression, they have not developed a specific political program catering to a certain constituency. Their appeal used to be limited to the educated middle class, but now workers and some upper class Egyptians support them. The effective policies of the NDP precluded the emergence of rivals with self-initiating, mass following.
Sudan, 2011: The Islamist al-Bashir government has allowed a referendum on South Sudan secession. The country will split peacefully after decades of civil war. The ruling Islamists had taken over power in 1989 under Hasan al-Turabi’s leadership who split from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, a marginal group in Sudan’s politics.
Syria, 2011: Syria today is simmering; there have been spontaneous demonstrations since January 14; the government has been intervening in Facebook and Twitter communications. The MB is the largest opposition group, but it is banned. Membership in the MB is punishable by death, though the law is not enforced. This law was promulgated after the failed 1982 insurrection by a militant group of the MB in the city of Hama. The regime then (led by the father of the current president) bombed the city, killing thousands and forcing many members of the group to flee to other Arab and Western countries.
Libya, 2011: The MB is a banned underground organization. Qaddafi attacks them regularly on state television. He has also criticized the Tunisian people for their revolt against Ben Ali.
Morocco, 2011: The largest social group in the country, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement, is denied a legal status. Al-Tajdid (a MB-like group) has formed a political party under the authoritarian monarchy of Muhammad the Fifth and is represented in the parliament. The political system includes two Egyptian NDP-like parties dependent on state patronage, with other parties allowed to operate in a limited space.
Saudi Arabia, 2011: The MB took a conscious decision not to organize in the kingdom, whose merchants fund many MB affiliated social and religious activities. But there are some intellectuals with MB leaning. But the Basic Law of 1992 bans political parties on account that they produce un-Islamic divisive politics. King Abdulla h criticized the Egyptian protesters.
Algeria, 1992: After the cancellation of the free election that was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) a civil war ensued. HIMS, a small Algerian MB group, did not take sides in the conflict but criticized FIS for demagoguery and the security forces for brutality. Later HIMS participated in governments but then split; one faction continues to be part of the government.
Jordan, 1993: The MB forms Islamic Action Front (IAF), now the largest opposition legal party. The king manipulates the electoral process, which the IAF tolerated until 2010, when they decided to boycott the election. Seeking to head off the Tunisian-Egyptian political tsunami, the king dismissed his government and admitted that there were mistakes. But he appointed an old guard ally to lead the dialogue with the opposition, which thinks the king overture is not satisfactory.
Yemen, 1994: The Islamist Reform Party, rooted in MB movement, joined the North Yemen military in a successful bid to unify the north and south of the country. Detesting the Saleh politics of marginalization and increased reliance on his clan, the Reform Party joined forces with the southern opposition against the ruling party. Then the Reform Party joins demonstrators encouraged by the success of the Tunisian revolution. On February 2, 2011, the president announced he will not run again nor will he name his son to succeed him. The Reform Party announced the continuation of their drive for comprehensive political reform. Protesters called February 4, 2011 “Friday of Rage”.
Iraq, 2003: The Sunni MB joined pro-Iran Shia groups al-Dawa and the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq as well as ethnic and religious Kurds in a de-facto alliance with the U.S. to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Shias briefly fought other Shias led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Islamic Party, which thus far suffered on factional split led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.
Palestine, 2006: A plurality of Palestinians voted for Hamas, the political branch of the MB, to express dissatisfaction with the failing peace process and the worsening of quality of life in the Occupied Territories. Fatah, entrenched in the West Bank, conspired with Israel to deny Hamas the exercise of power after allowing them to run in the election. Hamas could not overpower Fatah in the West Bank but routed them in Gaza. They ran a government and withstood the subsequent Western boycott and suffocating Israeli siege. Two years later, Hamas survived the Israeli bombardment of Gazan civilian targets that destroyed all infrastructure and 14% of the strip. Hamas emerged cautious in its rhetoric, insisting on resistance but willing to accept a two-state solution.
Lebanon, 2006: The MB branch, the Islamic Group, is active in Sunni areas, especially the stronghold of Tarablus in the north. Despite a small following, they are an important player in the country’s fractured sectarian democracy. The group moved closer to Hizbullah during and after the impressive performance of the latter in the war with Israel. The confrontation between the Shia Hizbullah and the Sunni Future bloc (led by the former PM), split the MB. The founder, Islamic thinker Fathi Yaken, aligned with Hizbullah while the bulk of the MB remained closer to Future bloc.
Tunisia, 2010: Islamists were nearly absent in the unrest that began in December 17, 2010 and forced the former dictator Ben Ali from office on January 14, 2011. On January 30, 2011, founder of Ennahda Movement (the most progressive MB-like group), returns to his country after 21 years in exile. In 1988 he approved the ban on polygamy as a valid Islamic ijtihad (reinterpretation). Thousands of supporters welcomed him. His first statement was that his group will not contest the coming presidential election and he will not run for any political seat.
Egypt, 2011: The MB (where the movement was founded in 1928) holds on joining the mass protests that began in January 25 until the following Friday, January 28, 2011. The revolt has many voices, of which the MB is the largest organization. Diversity characterizes the Muslim Brothers themselves who essentially represent a social movement akin to the Turkish Gulen Movement, with the exception that Gulen is apolitical and emphasizes intercultural and interfaith relations while the MB is political and tends to be less open. Due to waves of repression, they have not developed a specific political program catering to a certain constituency. Their appeal used to be limited to the educated middle class, but now workers and some upper class Egyptians support them. The effective policies of the NDP precluded the emergence of rivals with self-initiating, mass following.
Sudan, 2011: The Islamist al-Bashir government has allowed a referendum on South Sudan secession. The country will split peacefully after decades of civil war. The ruling Islamists had taken over power in 1989 under Hasan al-Turabi’s leadership who split from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, a marginal group in Sudan’s politics.
Syria, 2011: Syria today is simmering; there have been spontaneous demonstrations since January 14; the government has been intervening in Facebook and Twitter communications. The MB is the largest opposition group, but it is banned. Membership in the MB is punishable by death, though the law is not enforced. This law was promulgated after the failed 1982 insurrection by a militant group of the MB in the city of Hama. The regime then (led by the father of the current president) bombed the city, killing thousands and forcing many members of the group to flee to other Arab and Western countries.
Libya, 2011: The MB is a banned underground organization. Qaddafi attacks them regularly on state television. He has also criticized the Tunisian people for their revolt against Ben Ali.
Morocco, 2011: The largest social group in the country, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement, is denied a legal status. Al-Tajdid (a MB-like group) has formed a political party under the authoritarian monarchy of Muhammad the Fifth and is represented in the parliament. The political system includes two Egyptian NDP-like parties dependent on state patronage, with other parties allowed to operate in a limited space.
Saudi Arabia, 2011: The MB took a conscious decision not to organize in the kingdom, whose merchants fund many MB affiliated social and religious activities. But there are some intellectuals with MB leaning. But the Basic Law of 1992 bans political parties on account that they produce un-Islamic divisive politics. King Abdulla h criticized the Egyptian protesters.
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