The January 25 Revolution has shocked all Egyptians, although many of them were for years waiting for it to happen. Young Egyptians led the charge to change their regime, but the older politicians--in both regime and opposition--might still be stuck in the dynamics of the past. Today, February 6, 2011, is the day of Christian-Muslim unity at Tahrir Square in the beginnin of the Week of Sumud (Steadfastness).
But the Presidential Palace witnessed a dynamic of different sort. Vice President Omar Sulieman invited leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood for a meeting. They went despite warnings from Al-Ghad (Future) Party leader Ayman Nour that the regime is playing the game of splitting the opposition. But opposition parties have never been unified and most non-Islamist groups fit the description of veteran Egyptian journalist Muhammad Haykal "paper parties."
The MB may be large in numbers but it has no real strategists, no public relations experts and no professional negotiators. According to al-Jazeera, they went to meet with Sulieman to gauge the seriousness of the regime. The VP told them that he is dealing with a crisis without having any decision-making powers--a clear admission that Mubarak is still fully in charge. Haunted by a legacy of radical expression and a world image of extremism, the leaders continued the meeting. They presented the following road map for the transition:
"The presidency shall be assumed by the head of theSupreme Constitutional Court; a transitional government shall be formed; fair parliamentary elections in accordance with the present constitution shall be held under the supervision of the entire judiciary; the new paliament shall modify the constitution and oversee a presidential election."
After the meeting with Sulieman, MB leaders held a press conference in which they suggested that they will wait only a day or two to give Suleiman time to begin responding to popular demands. They also hinted that negotiations can proceed while protests continue. Abdel Menem Abul Futuh, member of MB Guidance Office, said that the real authority now is the military and that it is futile to contine meeting with Suleiman. But they knew this before they decided to accept the Sulieman invitation. So are they selling the revolution?
MB leaders are striving to project an image of pragmatism and skill as they play the role of mediator between the falling regime and the revolting Egyptian street in a time of transition. They justified their decision to meet by pointing out that they have already gained an important concession: a promise not to use violence against the protesters. At Tahrir Square, the demonstrators are testing the intentions of the military through small actions. They have created human chains stationed in front of tanks to stop them from moving or clearing any blocked roads in protest territory. This is a calculated move aiming to train military officers that the civilians will decide the distance (and thereby the nature of) civilian-military relations in the new state.
The protesters are handling the military with skill. The failure of the military to protect them when the regime mobs attacked them raised their doubts about the position of the military leaders. Their behavior indicates they suspect the top level of leadership is still loyal to Mubarak. But the protesters want to stay in good terms with the soldiers on the street who, if things escalate, will have to decide whether to follow the orders of their superiors.
But the VP seems to aim at a nubmer of objectives: (1) regaining the initiative by meeting with the opposition on his terms, which he has achieved for now; (2) splitting the opposition, which he has not yet; and (3) gaining time to break the will of demonstrators; but their numbers are holding steady. Yesterday, Egyptian Television showed him meeting with young men and women. He also met with the self-initiated Committee of Wise People, a group of highly respected independent leaders and former high ranking government officials. But the protesters in Tahrir Square said none of the leaders meeting with Sulieman speak for the revolutionary youth coalition, which is now the main organizing force of the daily activities of the uprising.
The next episode hinges on any new initiative from the protesters, the Mubarak inner circle or the military. In Tunisia, it took four weeks before Ben Ali departed the country. Egypt is still in Day 12. As for the MB, they have two days (by their own announcement) before they will have to re-evaluate their position or to begin losing credibility with the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square. To head off such possibility, they held a press conference after the meeting to re-align themselves with the street. The MB leaders claimed that they did not want the regime to claim that the protesters closed the path of a peaceful resolution. They insisted that they presented the demands of the revolting people and will continue to insist that Mubarak steps down. The regime has used the MB as a scapegoat for its repressive rule; now it is offering them the chance to sharpen their leadership skills. But this is not the final chapter in the exchange. Al-Baradei who was not invited to meet with Sulieman criticized the idea of meeting with a regime whose legitimacy has evaporated. He made this statement after Mustafa al-Naggar, a leader of al-Baradei's National Coalition for Change met with Sulieman. MB leader Abdul Menem Abul Futouh shared a similar doubts about the utility of meetings and emphasized that no one has the right to speak on behalf of the young protesters who launched the revolt and continue to be the main force in it. While the Mubarak regime may now believe it has retained control, the opposition believes it has shown good will but came out thinking that the regime has not gotten the message of the people. The next week is planned for further mobilization, not only around Tahrir Square but also in schools and neighborhoods across the country.
Showing posts with label Muslim Brotherhood. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muslim Brotherhood. Show all posts
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Thursday, February 3, 2011
People Power in the Arab World: The American Response
People power may have come to the Arabs. Two anti-dictatorship revolutions are in the making. It took only two weeks for the second to start and other Arab masses are watching restlessly, while Arab leaders are totally confused, shaky and do not appear to comprehend what is happening. The most enlightened among them is one of the youngest: King Abdullah of Jordan. He has already dismissed his government and criticized the sham election it ran last year. We are at a turning point in Arab and Muslim world history (Arabs are only 20 percent of Muslims, but they are the largest ethnic group). What should the U.S. do?
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build good will with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. American government response was rather confused until Mubarak sent his violent henchmen to make their stand on February 2, 2011. Fortunately, this changed with the U.S. condemnation of the regime’s violence.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (this option is more consistent with the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood).
Do not exaggerate the Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Al-Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were a few thousand people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
Mohamed Nimer is assistant professor of Islam and World Affairs. He is the author of “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: Citizens with Foreign Attachments?”
Do not miss more chances to connect with the Arab masses. They are dying to be free; embrace them to build good will with them. Stay away from actions and statements that could inflame anti-Americanism and possibly prejudice U.S. options with the new players of the evolving Arab polity. America needs a leader who understands that this moment requires a forward-looking president who understands the tremendous transformation in Arab political culture that has already occurred. American government response was rather confused until Mubarak sent his violent henchmen to make their stand on February 2, 2011. Fortunately, this changed with the U.S. condemnation of the regime’s violence.
Open dialogue with the opposition. The presence of the opposition is evident in Arab civil society, which is comprised of NGOs, professional syndicates and worker unions in addition to many political groups that have had dialogue amongst themselves on political reform since the mid-1990s. This explains the quick move of Egyptians and Tunisians to form self-defense committees to provide security when the police in their respective countries abandoned their responsibility. In Egypt, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large on American thinking. America has to learn how to cope with the growing Islamist influence. A serious dialogue with the Muslim Brothers should aim to move them in one of two directions: (1) become a Muslim democratic party willing to share power, or (2) follow the model of the Turkish Gulen Movement, stressing a mission of service and fostering social harmony while allowing members to form or join political parties on their own (this option is more consistent with the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood).
Do not exaggerate the Islamist influence. Most Egyptians and Tunisians took to the streets to put an end to poverty, corruption and oppression. Today, Islamist Rachid al-Ghannouchi, exiled leader of the Al-Nahda Movement, returned back to Tunisia; there were a few thousand people waiting to welcome him—hardly comparable to the 1979 return of Khomeini to Iran. Al-Nahda will have its rightful place in shaping the transformation of Tunisia from dictatorship to democracy. Islamists can come to power in the new Arab democracies, but the emerging anti-dictatorial culture in the Arab world will check their authoritarian tendencies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers built their social base through a track record of attending to the needs of people. Their members have grown in a political culture dominated by the language of rights--despite living conditions of oppression. Should Islamists come to power they will face one of two possibilities: (1) become the religious version of the regimes they replaced and face a popular revolt, or (2) embrace a political discourse focusing on morality in the pursuit of peoples’ needs.
Investigate the internal politics of Islamist groups. Internal Islamist politics has never been subjected to public scrutiny because it has never been seen as high-stakes happenings. This has changed. From now on, what goes on in their private meetings will influence state-level dynamics. The U.S. can make better foreign policy decisions toward them by knowing them closely. This is particularly important given the fact that Arab Islamists do not have central figures whose words are final.
Engage American Muslims with foreign attachments. They can be a bridge to popular groups in the region. The current stigma placed on them should be eased if they agree to play a constructive role in the next phase of Arab-American relations. Most importantly, reaching out to them may assure their commitment to domestic peace should unrest in the Middle East extends over a period of time.
Mohamed Nimer is assistant professor of Islam and World Affairs. He is the author of “The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: Citizens with Foreign Attachments?”
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
The Muslim Brotherhood: Twenty Years of Factional Politics
Kuwait, 1991: After the Sabah ruling family escaped the Saddam invasion, Shia and Sunni Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), took charge of providing public services and resisting the Iraqi military—effectively becoming American allies. The Kuwaiti MB denounced their mother organization for standing against the U.S.-led war to evict Iraq from Kuwait. They sent a delegation to Washington only to be rebuffed by then Senator George Mitchell who told them that the U.S. deals only with the Sabah family. They established a political arm, the Islamic Constitutional Movement, which has operated as a de-facto political party, although Kuwaiti Constitution does not allow for parties (in the name of preventing divisiveness). Today, different Sunni and Shia Islamists make a plurality of the Kuwaiti Parliament. They clash amongst themselves on social and sectarian issues but sometimes join forces to gain concessions from the ruling family.
Algeria, 1992: After the cancellation of the free election that was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) a civil war ensued. HIMS, a small Algerian MB group, did not take sides in the conflict but criticized FIS for demagoguery and the security forces for brutality. Later HIMS participated in governments but then split; one faction continues to be part of the government.
Jordan, 1993: The MB forms Islamic Action Front (IAF), now the largest opposition legal party. The king manipulates the electoral process, which the IAF tolerated until 2010, when they decided to boycott the election. Seeking to head off the Tunisian-Egyptian political tsunami, the king dismissed his government and admitted that there were mistakes. But he appointed an old guard ally to lead the dialogue with the opposition, which thinks the king overture is not satisfactory.
Yemen, 1994: The Islamist Reform Party, rooted in MB movement, joined the North Yemen military in a successful bid to unify the north and south of the country. Detesting the Saleh politics of marginalization and increased reliance on his clan, the Reform Party joined forces with the southern opposition against the ruling party. Then the Reform Party joins demonstrators encouraged by the success of the Tunisian revolution. On February 2, 2011, the president announced he will not run again nor will he name his son to succeed him. The Reform Party announced the continuation of their drive for comprehensive political reform. Protesters called February 4, 2011 “Friday of Rage”.
Iraq, 2003: The Sunni MB joined pro-Iran Shia groups al-Dawa and the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq as well as ethnic and religious Kurds in a de-facto alliance with the U.S. to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Shias briefly fought other Shias led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Islamic Party, which thus far suffered on factional split led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.
Palestine, 2006: A plurality of Palestinians voted for Hamas, the political branch of the MB, to express dissatisfaction with the failing peace process and the worsening of quality of life in the Occupied Territories. Fatah, entrenched in the West Bank, conspired with Israel to deny Hamas the exercise of power after allowing them to run in the election. Hamas could not overpower Fatah in the West Bank but routed them in Gaza. They ran a government and withstood the subsequent Western boycott and suffocating Israeli siege. Two years later, Hamas survived the Israeli bombardment of Gazan civilian targets that destroyed all infrastructure and 14% of the strip. Hamas emerged cautious in its rhetoric, insisting on resistance but willing to accept a two-state solution.
Lebanon, 2006: The MB branch, the Islamic Group, is active in Sunni areas, especially the stronghold of Tarablus in the north. Despite a small following, they are an important player in the country’s fractured sectarian democracy. The group moved closer to Hizbullah during and after the impressive performance of the latter in the war with Israel. The confrontation between the Shia Hizbullah and the Sunni Future bloc (led by the former PM), split the MB. The founder, Islamic thinker Fathi Yaken, aligned with Hizbullah while the bulk of the MB remained closer to Future bloc.
Tunisia, 2010: Islamists were nearly absent in the unrest that began in December 17, 2010 and forced the former dictator Ben Ali from office on January 14, 2011. On January 30, 2011, founder of Ennahda Movement (the most progressive MB-like group), returns to his country after 21 years in exile. In 1988 he approved the ban on polygamy as a valid Islamic ijtihad (reinterpretation). Thousands of supporters welcomed him. His first statement was that his group will not contest the coming presidential election and he will not run for any political seat.
Egypt, 2011: The MB (where the movement was founded in 1928) holds on joining the mass protests that began in January 25 until the following Friday, January 28, 2011. The revolt has many voices, of which the MB is the largest organization. Diversity characterizes the Muslim Brothers themselves who essentially represent a social movement akin to the Turkish Gulen Movement, with the exception that Gulen is apolitical and emphasizes intercultural and interfaith relations while the MB is political and tends to be less open. Due to waves of repression, they have not developed a specific political program catering to a certain constituency. Their appeal used to be limited to the educated middle class, but now workers and some upper class Egyptians support them. The effective policies of the NDP precluded the emergence of rivals with self-initiating, mass following.
Sudan, 2011: The Islamist al-Bashir government has allowed a referendum on South Sudan secession. The country will split peacefully after decades of civil war. The ruling Islamists had taken over power in 1989 under Hasan al-Turabi’s leadership who split from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, a marginal group in Sudan’s politics.
Syria, 2011: Syria today is simmering; there have been spontaneous demonstrations since January 14; the government has been intervening in Facebook and Twitter communications. The MB is the largest opposition group, but it is banned. Membership in the MB is punishable by death, though the law is not enforced. This law was promulgated after the failed 1982 insurrection by a militant group of the MB in the city of Hama. The regime then (led by the father of the current president) bombed the city, killing thousands and forcing many members of the group to flee to other Arab and Western countries.
Libya, 2011: The MB is a banned underground organization. Qaddafi attacks them regularly on state television. He has also criticized the Tunisian people for their revolt against Ben Ali.
Morocco, 2011: The largest social group in the country, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement, is denied a legal status. Al-Tajdid (a MB-like group) has formed a political party under the authoritarian monarchy of Muhammad the Fifth and is represented in the parliament. The political system includes two Egyptian NDP-like parties dependent on state patronage, with other parties allowed to operate in a limited space.
Saudi Arabia, 2011: The MB took a conscious decision not to organize in the kingdom, whose merchants fund many MB affiliated social and religious activities. But there are some intellectuals with MB leaning. But the Basic Law of 1992 bans political parties on account that they produce un-Islamic divisive politics. King Abdulla h criticized the Egyptian protesters.
Algeria, 1992: After the cancellation of the free election that was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) a civil war ensued. HIMS, a small Algerian MB group, did not take sides in the conflict but criticized FIS for demagoguery and the security forces for brutality. Later HIMS participated in governments but then split; one faction continues to be part of the government.
Jordan, 1993: The MB forms Islamic Action Front (IAF), now the largest opposition legal party. The king manipulates the electoral process, which the IAF tolerated until 2010, when they decided to boycott the election. Seeking to head off the Tunisian-Egyptian political tsunami, the king dismissed his government and admitted that there were mistakes. But he appointed an old guard ally to lead the dialogue with the opposition, which thinks the king overture is not satisfactory.
Yemen, 1994: The Islamist Reform Party, rooted in MB movement, joined the North Yemen military in a successful bid to unify the north and south of the country. Detesting the Saleh politics of marginalization and increased reliance on his clan, the Reform Party joined forces with the southern opposition against the ruling party. Then the Reform Party joins demonstrators encouraged by the success of the Tunisian revolution. On February 2, 2011, the president announced he will not run again nor will he name his son to succeed him. The Reform Party announced the continuation of their drive for comprehensive political reform. Protesters called February 4, 2011 “Friday of Rage”.
Iraq, 2003: The Sunni MB joined pro-Iran Shia groups al-Dawa and the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq as well as ethnic and religious Kurds in a de-facto alliance with the U.S. to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Shias briefly fought other Shias led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Islamic Party, which thus far suffered on factional split led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.
Palestine, 2006: A plurality of Palestinians voted for Hamas, the political branch of the MB, to express dissatisfaction with the failing peace process and the worsening of quality of life in the Occupied Territories. Fatah, entrenched in the West Bank, conspired with Israel to deny Hamas the exercise of power after allowing them to run in the election. Hamas could not overpower Fatah in the West Bank but routed them in Gaza. They ran a government and withstood the subsequent Western boycott and suffocating Israeli siege. Two years later, Hamas survived the Israeli bombardment of Gazan civilian targets that destroyed all infrastructure and 14% of the strip. Hamas emerged cautious in its rhetoric, insisting on resistance but willing to accept a two-state solution.
Lebanon, 2006: The MB branch, the Islamic Group, is active in Sunni areas, especially the stronghold of Tarablus in the north. Despite a small following, they are an important player in the country’s fractured sectarian democracy. The group moved closer to Hizbullah during and after the impressive performance of the latter in the war with Israel. The confrontation between the Shia Hizbullah and the Sunni Future bloc (led by the former PM), split the MB. The founder, Islamic thinker Fathi Yaken, aligned with Hizbullah while the bulk of the MB remained closer to Future bloc.
Tunisia, 2010: Islamists were nearly absent in the unrest that began in December 17, 2010 and forced the former dictator Ben Ali from office on January 14, 2011. On January 30, 2011, founder of Ennahda Movement (the most progressive MB-like group), returns to his country after 21 years in exile. In 1988 he approved the ban on polygamy as a valid Islamic ijtihad (reinterpretation). Thousands of supporters welcomed him. His first statement was that his group will not contest the coming presidential election and he will not run for any political seat.
Egypt, 2011: The MB (where the movement was founded in 1928) holds on joining the mass protests that began in January 25 until the following Friday, January 28, 2011. The revolt has many voices, of which the MB is the largest organization. Diversity characterizes the Muslim Brothers themselves who essentially represent a social movement akin to the Turkish Gulen Movement, with the exception that Gulen is apolitical and emphasizes intercultural and interfaith relations while the MB is political and tends to be less open. Due to waves of repression, they have not developed a specific political program catering to a certain constituency. Their appeal used to be limited to the educated middle class, but now workers and some upper class Egyptians support them. The effective policies of the NDP precluded the emergence of rivals with self-initiating, mass following.
Sudan, 2011: The Islamist al-Bashir government has allowed a referendum on South Sudan secession. The country will split peacefully after decades of civil war. The ruling Islamists had taken over power in 1989 under Hasan al-Turabi’s leadership who split from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, a marginal group in Sudan’s politics.
Syria, 2011: Syria today is simmering; there have been spontaneous demonstrations since January 14; the government has been intervening in Facebook and Twitter communications. The MB is the largest opposition group, but it is banned. Membership in the MB is punishable by death, though the law is not enforced. This law was promulgated after the failed 1982 insurrection by a militant group of the MB in the city of Hama. The regime then (led by the father of the current president) bombed the city, killing thousands and forcing many members of the group to flee to other Arab and Western countries.
Libya, 2011: The MB is a banned underground organization. Qaddafi attacks them regularly on state television. He has also criticized the Tunisian people for their revolt against Ben Ali.
Morocco, 2011: The largest social group in the country, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement, is denied a legal status. Al-Tajdid (a MB-like group) has formed a political party under the authoritarian monarchy of Muhammad the Fifth and is represented in the parliament. The political system includes two Egyptian NDP-like parties dependent on state patronage, with other parties allowed to operate in a limited space.
Saudi Arabia, 2011: The MB took a conscious decision not to organize in the kingdom, whose merchants fund many MB affiliated social and religious activities. But there are some intellectuals with MB leaning. But the Basic Law of 1992 bans political parties on account that they produce un-Islamic divisive politics. King Abdulla h criticized the Egyptian protesters.
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