Pharaoh is Gone: The Next Phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution

Today the Algerian government arrested Ali Belhaj,leader of the banned Front of Islamic Salvation, for a sermon he gave. But Internet anti-dictatorship activists in Algeria had already dubbed tomorrow their January 25th. The removal of Mubarak less than 24 hours before the dawn of the planned Algerian protest may have given a great boost to the Algerian revolutionaries. We'll see if Algeria proves to be ripe for the next phase of the 2011 Arab Anti-Dictatorship Revolution. We have learned from Egypt and Tunisia that Facebook communication works only if there are people on the ground with adequate organization ready to take action and build momentum. The April 6 movement in Egypt began in 2008. They called for an April 2009 strike, but then the response was limited. With the success of the Tunisian revolution in forcing Ben Ali out, many Egyptians began thinking they could the same to their dictator if they shed away fear and believe in themselves. Young opposition leaders siezed the moment. They heeded the Arab saying "hit the iron rod when it's hot."

Algeria may prove to be a tougher case. Although there have been protests since January 14, the country has a multi-party system that includes the MB and other Islamists. But the state is military-controlled like Egypt. Algerians have an elected president but they know that when push comes to shove, he does not call the shots. Even in normal times he does not make the most important decisions in the country. With Egyptians now openly calling for a political system controlled by civilians, Algerians might be thinking that they too deserve what Egyptians hope for. Algerian society is not as homogeneous as its Egyptian or Tunisian counterpart. But this may not hinder a mass uprising. The major division in the country produced the Berber-Arab tension, but this is mitigated by the fact that nearly all Algerians are Sunni. Berbers are now leading the charge for change. With Sunni Arabs joining, the country might have a chance in producing the first multicultural civilian state in North Africa.

The current pro-democracy revolt in the Arab world is spearheaded by a generation that grew up under repression but with full awareness of the language of freedom and rights. Egypt and Tunisia tell that declining economic conditions mix with high education levels to produce a good recipe for revolt. Educated people know how to link their living to the upper structures of power in their state.

But Arab countries vary. A Syrian friend of mine tells me that Friday, February 4, 2011, failed to be the Syrian Day of Rage because the regime carried out a psychological terror blitzkrieg. People woke up in Damascus to find the pictures of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad hung at every corner, letting anyone thinking of responding to the cyber activists know that the security forces are there in their neighborhood. The fear tactic worked. But for the long run the regime may have aided in its own demise. Most Syrians never heard of the Internet call to demonstration. But now Asad is telling them that all of them are suspect and they must fear reprisals if they respond to anti-regime instigators. This may force passive Syrians to begin thinking seriously about the possibility that fear is holding them from marching into the path of freedom. Facing one's fear is the first step; the Asad regime has forced it on people. The Syrian regime may have won a battle, but the revolt for freedom is a long term process.

But there is another important obstacle in Syria. The largest opposition group, the MB, had been banned since 1982 and membership in the group is punishable by death after a band of their militants embarked on a campaign of sectarian violence against Alawite security targets. The insurrection was put down violently: the old city of Hama was leveled by air strikes, killing more than 20,000 people and leaving 100,000 refugees. But the regime has grown increasingly dependent on the Alawite minority as a social support base for the regime. A pro-democracy opposition have better a chance of success if it deals with the fears of Alawites under a political system of people power should be the first order of business.

In Bahrain a Sunni family rules a country that has a majority Shia population. The rulers have allowed a measure of representation but has relinquished no power whatsover. In other countries there are grassroots demands for power sharing but ruling families engage in various forms of posturing about political reform without offering any tangible concessions. These are: Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Libya (which began as a military regime before turning into a family rule). The level of political participation varies widely in these countries; Kuwait has a strong parliament and the opposition has a majority, but every resource and instrument of power (oil revenues, military and security forces and burearucracy) is in the hands of Sabah family.

There are other forms of power structures in the Arab world: Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania are military regimes that have allowed extensive measures of freedom but where power rests with those who the group that has the most guns. In the United Arab Emirates and Qatar there are no visible movements from top or bottom for power sharing. But this might change soon, given the spread of the Arab Anti-dictatorship Revolution.

Lebanon and Palestine are exceptional cases. The former is a confessional democracy that witnessed the rise of Hizbullah's military wing under two decades of Israeli occupation. The latter has distorted power structures because of the Israeli occupation. The state has to be free before a clear picture of power emerges. At the society level Palestine and Lebanon offer the most extensive and developed expression of political diversity.

Despite the variety of forms of government, the question at hand has to do with the nature of state political power. So far Lebanon may not even last as a state and Palestine is being dismembered under the cover of a peace process. In the rest of the Arab countries all powers ultimately tend to rest with the person on the top of the politcal pyramid. Tunisia and Egypt have toppled their dictators. The order of business for them now is to move to recognizing the people as collectivity as the sovereign. In Egypt, the transitional military regime that took power after Mubarak departed has acknowledged that it is not a replacement of the "legitimacy that people accept." What this means will soon appear in the actions of the military leaders. The revolution here is entering a new phase.

Hesitant Egyptian Generals are Shackled by People Power

In Tahrir Square people have been disappointed by the position of the military generals who are still trying to hold the stick from the middle between Mubarak and the Egyptian people. Their televised first meeting, which did not include their Commander in Chief Mubarak, and Statement 1, which did not mention the president, gave the impression that the generals understand the sentiment of the people and have decided to topple Mubarak. Then the military waited 12 hours to ponder their position following the disappointing speeches of Mubarak and his VP. The generals issued Statement 2 on behalf of the High Council of the Armed Forces, announcing that they will move to secure the transition to a new government in accordance with the directions of Mubarak. But they also attempted to appease the demonstrator's feelings by suggesting that the military sympathizes with their legimate demand of free, democratic government. Yet the only action they took is to continue the meeting while calling people to return back to normal life.

Like Mubarak, the generals were too slow for the pace of the revolutionaries. They do not seem to understand (or appreciate) the transfomation that has occurred in Egypt. Egyptian demonstration leaders in different parts of the country are telling Al-Jazeera that Egyptian society has been reborn. Egyptians discovered they could do without government control institutions. When the police pulled out of the streets, people formed local committees to police their own neighborhoods. Egyptian food markets are operating and the prices have not changed without the watch of government inspectors. People are realizing that private markets and the public functions that they control over can operate, without the oppressive, corrupt and bankrupt regime.

The government closed the banks and the stock market; demonstrators tell al-Jazeera that there is no reason why these institutions should be closed and that they would be willing to protect them, just as they rushed to protect the Egyptian Museum before military tanks arrived to the scene. Egyptians striking in factories and other institutions could go right back to work whenever they choose--bar any subbotage by the regime. The loss of tourism is transient and is understandable given the current instability. But tourists did not go to Egypt to make a statement of support to Mubarak; they went there because of the wonderful tourist attractions that Egypt has. Egypt should become even more attractive for tourists when it becomes free. Egyptians tell reporters that they are not bothered by the current losses; they are willing to sacrifice for the long haul until their revolt succeeds.

While parts of Egyptian life have come to a standstill for 18 days and the intial uprising has turned into a full-fleged revolt, the generals are jockeying for their place in the future. The generals do not understand the dynamics of people power. The collective will of the Egyptians is now focused on removing what they see as a dictatorial regime. Appeasing the regime means going down with it. The generals watched while the Mubarak baltagiah threw fire balls on peaceful protesters. The generals stayed put when the police abandoned their responsibility for internal security--except for guarding major national institutions. And now they are using Statement 2 to position their institution for a place in the new Egypt as a guarantor of stability and legitimacy. They are probably thinking of the Turkish model. What is missing is the relevance of this thinking to positioning the military in the unfolding events and emotions on the streets of Egypt. People are losing trust in them. People are wondering, if the preservation of the nation calls for the steps the generals outlined, why do not they proceed? Why do they act like Sulieman, throwing the ball in the revolution's court?

There is war in the country between the people and their top political leaders. Outside Cairo, demonstrators have taken over state buildings, liberating their own country and forcing Mubarak governers out in Asyut and Tanta. In Cairo, people are going out spontaneously in millions calling Mubarak murderer, untrustworthy, and corrupt. People's anger was so visible when protesters realized in the middle of Mubarak's speech yesterday (Feberuary 10, 2011) that he was not stepping down and began chanting angry revolutionary slogans. If Statement 3 does not realign the emotions of the generals with those of the Egyptians, the top brass may go down with Mubarak and the military will likely become separate from and subservient to the civilian government of the New Egypt.This is what many protesters want anyway. They might have their wish.