It's Not Over: The January 25 Revolution Enters a Most Critical Phase

Fissures have already begun to appear regarding the post-Mubarak era. For Western powers, the ideal poitical structure that could emerge in Egypt is something similar to the Turkish model, where there is a civilian democracy that can be deposed anytime by a powerful military. But this may not be what Egyptians want. Egyptians today have a very clear understanding of their modern political history; going against the emerging anti-dictatorship culture will only guarantee confrontation with the new political leaders, who may not necessarily want to diminish the role of the military.

The generals have remained loyal to their patron Mubarak but ultimately seemed to have coaxed him into agreeing to step down. It was people power that forced the generals to pressure Mubarak to concede, but the remaining generals have yet to accept people power as the defining character of the new structure of political power (not government). Their third statement only remarked that the High Military Council of the Armed Forces, the wielder of national political power now, understands that "it is not a substitute for a legitimacy agreeable to the people." But they did not acknowledge that that the current regime is effectively a coup. The current constitution calls for the Speaker of the Parliament to take over in the absence of the president.
This is reminiscent of the regime that took over in Egypt in 1952, claiming to project the people’s will. The only difference between Tantawi and Nasser is that the latter, an ultimate opportunist, rode a wave of popular protest to depose the colonial era king, then moved to establish The Revolutionary Command Council. That was Nasser’s transition power structure. At the time he was a junior military leader. He used the council to bypass the top brass of the military without actually having to confront them, which he did later by purging them to clear his way to the top. Ultimately, he managed to concentrate civilian and military powers in his hands. Mubarak inherited this power structure from Sadat, Nasser's successor.
The current military leader Tantawi does not need a revolutionary council. He is now the head of the state in its civilian and military structures. If the announcement of Omar Suleiman is accurate, Mubarak handed power over to Tantawi, which means the regime has not changed, except that it is completely removed from any façade of constitutional legitimacy. Egyptian civilian leaders understand this dynamic very clearly. Some of them immediately issued statements aired on Al-Jazeera right after Mubarak stepped down. These included a statement read Justice Mohamed Fouad, Vice President of the State Council, who had joined the revolutionaries at Tahrir Square. The statement called for a transitional government of politically independent experts, excluding political trends and parties to manage the country's affairs, ending in free and fair elections in nine months. He also called for securing freedom of expression and association for the people and for a constitutional convention to produce a new constitution that would put to a popular referendum. The statement also called the military leaders to adopt these steps and the demands of the revolution and completely side with the people.
This statement was signed by a previously unknown group called Masses of the January 25 Revolution, but it is headed by a senior civil servant. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest sociopolitical NGO in Egypt, offered a different vision for the transition that calls for handing over presidential powers to the head of the High Constitutional Court to lead the transition to a civilian government. Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the National Coalition for Change, specifically named the establishment of a civilian power structure as the goal of the revolution. Obviously, civilian Egyptian politicians agree on what they want for the new Egyptian state. They want this reflected in the transitional period. The 1952 popular uprising was hijacked by the military that ultimately produced a dictatorial rule; the Mubarak regime was only the most corrupt and oppressive manifestation of it. Today' Egyptian generals have abandoned the theatrical politics of empty promises and gestures that Nasser introduced to post-colonial Egypt. Tantawi does not claim credit for the 2011 revolution like Nasser did. But Tantawi and his comrades have power. Their statements thus far neither oppose nor support the popular wish of civilian rule. Their fourth statement did not declare the nullification of emergency law but reinstated Mubarak’s corrupt ministers and governors. They have already offended the sensitivities of the public. The Egyptian revolution is far from over. It's most critical phase has just begun.

Coptic Positions on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution

Al-Jazeera (Arabic) reported on Suday, February 6, 2011 on the sermon of Father Fawzi Khalil who led a mass at Tahrir Square for Coptic, Anglican, and Catholic Christians particpating in the revolt. The priest emphasized that Egyptians are looking for the future with hope for a free Egypt. After the mass, Muslims offered a prayer for the 300 myrters of the uprising.

Once the religious services were over, There were large Chrisitian crosses and Qur'ans on display. A statement from 300 Coptic religious and lay leaders supporting the uprising was read. Then music was played along with nationalist Egyptian songs, while a Muslim cleric conducted a wedding ceremony for a young couple. Egyptian diverse culture has never exhibitd this festive public unity--perhaps never since 1952. All groups seem interested in demonstrating that the makers of the new Egypt understand religious diversity can be expressed at the same time and in the same space where people are fighting to exercise the right to define for themselves what common good they share.

Still, there is serious debate among Copts about their role in Egyptian politics, inlcuding the uprising. Coptic Pope Shenouda supports President Mubarak for fear of that the status of Copts may further deteriorate in a democracy dominated by Muslims. The Coptic Church has repeatedly complained of restrictions on the building of churches under Mubarak; the Pope fears that those restrictions will only increase in the post-Mubarak era. The Coptic minority of less than 10 percent is between the rock of revolution and the hard place of dictatorship. This Pope was arrested by the previous leader of Egypt, Sadat, in the wake of sectarian violence. Many Muslims give him the benefit of the doubt, having to think of the rights of the Copts under the rule of a Muslim dictator.

But the Pope's position is not unanimously followed by members of the church. This is evidenced in today's Christian mass at the epicenter of the revolt. Secular Christian George Ishaq, founder of Kifaya Movement, is among the groups that called for the January 25the Day of Rage, which launched the revolt. There are other Christians who believe the current Pope has an isolationist tendency and does not speak for Copts on political matters. Local priests take public positions that are consistent with the interests of their congregations, irrespective of the political positions of the Pope.

Copts are still reeling from the unprecedented attack on an Alexandria church on New Year's day. The government blamed an extremist group in Gaza, but many Copts remain skeptical. Communal violence and anti-governement protests by copts erupted in the wake of the bombing, but this was not the only incident that sparked such violence. One of the awful qualities of the Mubarak regime is the inexusable neglect apart. Suppressing activists from both sides was always his preferred method (which he learned from his predecessor). When tensions rose the only regime response has been more crackdown. Now Egyptian Muslims and Christians have a chance to write a new social contract to address the root causes of tension and to create constitutional and legal mechanisms capable of promoting freedom of religion for all and amity between Copts and Muslims.