A few weeks ago, on Saturday, May 5, 2012, I met with four members of the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly at a private event in Virginia. The delegation included three top leaders of Ennahda, the majority party in Tunisia, which has modernist Islamic leaning, and a leader of the Block, the party of the Turnisian president, which has socialist, secular leaning. They shared agreement on the identity of the new state as Arab and Muslim (Tunisia is nearly all Sunni Arabic speaking society). But they seemed obsessed with the Bin Ali legacy; two members served more than a decade in prison. The Block party leader is a coalition partner to Ennahada. He was very gracious in sharing the history of his group in offering their podium for Ennahda to express its views during the repressive years of the deposed dictator.
Little did I hear about the greater injustices that Bin Ali committed against the whole people of Tunisia. Now that the election brought these parties into power, the challenge for the factions is to transform into revolutionary leaders for all Tunisians. This means they have to begin talking about politics with people at the center of it, whether in the past or in the present or the into the future. Factional narratives of history will inform how each faction behaves and the priorities they place with regards to the national agenda. Leaders who know what their factions feel without placing those special feelings in the general public's mood are not good national leaders.
The risk of factional narratives is that politics may become reduced into factional rivalries that alienate the vast majority of the people who made the revolutionary outcomes possible but without committing themselves to factions. The danger implied in the slide to factionalism (whether led by one or a coalition of a few groups) is the possibility of the return to dictatorship or the development of a new form of authoritarianism. General Rachid Bin Ammar did not support his boss not for the sake of the current ruling parties, but to side with the demonstrable will of the masses (which were not chanting the names of any party or group, except the Bin Ali party they wanted out). The Turkish experience shows that generals are tempted to step into politics in the name of solving crises, when parties are engaged in infighting and the public is unhappy. Thus de-factionalizing politics by empowering people in Tunisia is in the interest of building democracy. Another alternative is the authoritarianism of factions, which may result from the inability or unwillingness to follow the natural course of the people power revolution by creating a system based on checks and balances that prevent any segment, institution or faction from excercising hegemony over the political system. In other words, current political leaders and the people who brought them to power can only ensure the ability to develop people centered narratives and political solutions by sharing power not only amongst the national elite but also with people in their localities, clubs, schools, and streets. This would force political leaders to begin referring to political memories that the general has experienced. This is the best assurance for democratic transformation.
Little did I hear about the greater injustices that Bin Ali committed against the whole people of Tunisia. Now that the election brought these parties into power, the challenge for the factions is to transform into revolutionary leaders for all Tunisians. This means they have to begin talking about politics with people at the center of it, whether in the past or in the present or the into the future. Factional narratives of history will inform how each faction behaves and the priorities they place with regards to the national agenda. Leaders who know what their factions feel without placing those special feelings in the general public's mood are not good national leaders.
The risk of factional narratives is that politics may become reduced into factional rivalries that alienate the vast majority of the people who made the revolutionary outcomes possible but without committing themselves to factions. The danger implied in the slide to factionalism (whether led by one or a coalition of a few groups) is the possibility of the return to dictatorship or the development of a new form of authoritarianism. General Rachid Bin Ammar did not support his boss not for the sake of the current ruling parties, but to side with the demonstrable will of the masses (which were not chanting the names of any party or group, except the Bin Ali party they wanted out). The Turkish experience shows that generals are tempted to step into politics in the name of solving crises, when parties are engaged in infighting and the public is unhappy. Thus de-factionalizing politics by empowering people in Tunisia is in the interest of building democracy. Another alternative is the authoritarianism of factions, which may result from the inability or unwillingness to follow the natural course of the people power revolution by creating a system based on checks and balances that prevent any segment, institution or faction from excercising hegemony over the political system. In other words, current political leaders and the people who brought them to power can only ensure the ability to develop people centered narratives and political solutions by sharing power not only amongst the national elite but also with people in their localities, clubs, schools, and streets. This would force political leaders to begin referring to political memories that the general has experienced. This is the best assurance for democratic transformation.